Laos — 9DASHLINE

Clashes in the South China Sea, looking back at the PCA Ruling

Written by Varenya Singh and Chetan Rana

China's persistent rejection of the tribunal's jurisdiction and ruling, along with its continuous assertion of sovereignty, underscores the limitations of international legal mechanisms in addressing deep-rooted geopolitical disputes.

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Facing battlefield losses, Myanmar’s junta may look to ASEAN for off-ramps

Written by Hunter Marston

Identifying possible mediators and key stakeholders is critical at this particular juncture, and given the present circumstances we need not let perfect be the enemy of good.

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Manila is shopping, not re-aligning

Written by Drake Long

Rather than celebrating each time a country publicly cancels a Chinese project, the US, Australia, the EU, and other nations competing for influence at the expense of Beijing should keep in mind the wider picture — Manila and other capitals like it are shopping around for alternatives.

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Structural trends could force swing states to choose sides

Written by Marc Saxer

‘Partnerships of the Middle’ recognise the aversion of Asian powers against alliances and offer informal avenues of collaboration to safeguard global public goods.

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The myth of the 'vassal state': China’s influence in Laos is waning

Written by Joanne Lin

Statistics have shown that although China has a significant degree of influence over Laos, it is certainly not controlling the country.

The transatlantic puzzle in the Indo-Pacific

Written by Mathieu Droin

The brewing Indo-Pacific architecture is inherently “flexilateral” due to the breadth of factors and the rapidly changing stakes that determine its many actors’ positions.

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ASEAN enters 2023 in a moment of crisis

Written by Hunter Marston

Some experts suggest Indonesia is likely to propose adopting a seven-vote threshold instead of requiring all ten members to agree on passing a measure. This would go a long way to making the institution more agile, responsive, and decisive.

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How and why Japan can be an alternative to China in the Indo-Pacific

Written by Kyoko Hatakeyama

Moreover, since Japan has maintained a stable relationship with China — despite their territorial disputes — the region does not have to worry about backlash or anger from China just because they choose Japan over China.

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What is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour about?

Written by Bec Strating

The IPE constitutes a form of ‘normative seapower’ through efforts to exert influence and shape perceptions within the crowded maritime marketplace of norms, ideas, and narratives.

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China, transnational organised crime, and Southeast Asia’s SEZs — is this Quid pro quo?

Written by Marco Neveu and Charlie Thame

Xi’s anti-corruption projects in the mainland seem to have sparked a degree of outward mobility by the triads from the authoritarian domestic core towards the more liminal and experimental periphery of Chinese influence.

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Russia’s self-inflicted annus horribilis

Written by Joe Varner

The strategic importance of the Russian Pacific Fleet has never been greater to Moscow than it is now as the key means to engage and support Chinese foreign policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

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Marcos Jr.’s Philippine foreign policy: What it means for the Indo-Pacific

Written by Joshua Bernard Espeña

It is unlikely that Manila will join Washington in balancing against Beijing — Marcos Jr has already made this clear. Neither will the country bandwagon with Beijing given domestic pressures driven by fears over creeping Chinese influence.

Pacific9DLMay 13, 2022Marcos Jr.’s Philippine foreign policy: What it means for the Indo-Pacific, Joshua Bernard Espeña, Philippines, China, United States, US, Bongbong, Marcos Jr, Indo-Pacific, South China Sea, Cold War, Filipino, Rodrigo Duterte, Manila, Washington, Philippinedisation, Solomon Islands, Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Taiwan, Quad, Australia, AUKUS, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Build Back Better World, Beijing, 2016 arbitral ruling, Association of the Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, Code of Conduct, COC, ASEAN-China Code of Conduct, Chinese Coast Guard, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, COLREGS, COVID-19, pandemic, Debt Trap, Sri Lanka, Hambantota Port, Ned Price, US State Department, Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, EDCA, People’s Liberation Army-Navy, International Development Security Cooperation, Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization

In Conversation: James Borton on 'Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground'

9DASHLINE recently sat down with James Borton to discuss his fascinating new book Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground, in which he argues that the South China Sea can become a body of water that unites, rather than divides.

Duterte, the last of the drug warriors?

Written by David Hutt

Much of the coverage of Southeast Asia’s drug wars has focused on the drug warriors themselves. But if, as experts say, populist politicians regard drug wars as an easy way to capture votes, perhaps the problem lies first with society, not with politics.

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ASEAN leads the Indo-Pacific climate response

Written by Clare Richardson-Barlow

The Indo-Pacific region includes several of the world’s largest polluters as well as leaders in renewable energy use and innovative policy solutions to climate and environmental challenges. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) presents great potential for regional responses to the global climate change challenge.

Going under? Belt and Road megaprojects and sovereign debt in Laos

Written by Keith Barney and Kanya Souksakoun

Rural people displaced by dams are now joined by the urbanites struggling with inflation in household staples during a sharp economic downturn.

2022: Does ASEAN have a leadership deficit?

Although Indonesia, which accounts for half of ASEAN’s size and wealth, is the natural leader of the grouping when it does not actively lead, the group is further weakened.

No strategic dialogue partner, but thinking very strategically

Written by Zachary Abuza

After the regional centre is established, Vietnam should take the lead in setting up local monitoring and other scientific and educational exchanges with their Lao and Cambodian counterparts. Here they have considerably more sway and interest than the United States.