Russia’s self-inflicted annus horribilis

18 October 2022

To say that 2022 is the annus horribilis of the Russian Armed Forces, its leadership, and its Commander-in-Chief President Vladimir Putin would be an understatement. The dreams of conquering glory for the Russian Federation appear to have evaporated in the military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. What started out as a Russian blitzkrieg drive on Kyiv has turned into a war of attrition.

Russian forces have largely yielded the initiative and tried to hold on to what they have in the east and south of Ukraine. Russian military losses have been horrendous: an estimated 60,000 dead, 180,000 casualties, and 75 per cent of its tank fleet as well as 37 per cent of its armoured vehicle fleet destroyed or captured. While the war has been nothing short of a disaster for the Russian ground and air forces, its navy and Black Sea Fleet have not covered themselves in glory either. In this ground and air war, the Russian naval forces lost their cruiser Moskva to an anti-ship missile, a large amphibious ship, and at least 13 other warships. The Russian Navy lost control of Snake Island, has failed to conduct a planned amphibious assault, and shelters in ports usually home to cruise ships located just outside the range of Ukrainian anti-ship missiles.

Putin and the Russian Federation’s future are on the line with only the threat to use nuclear weapons propping up the Russian war machine. Given the state of the Russian Armed Forces, it will take them many years to reconstitute themselves and likely more if sanctions continue. The Russian Navy is no longer the darling of the Russian military that it was when Admiral Gorshkov guided and built his fleet. It has one badly damaged Soviet-era aircraft carrier and cruisers, destroyers, and a whack of other vessels equal in vintage. Furthermore, it seems the only bright spot for the Russian Navy outside its submarine forces is it’s Pacific Fleet based on geography and its ever-growing strategic partnership with China in which Russia is an increasingly dependent junior partner.

Russia’s Pacific Fleet

Russia’s Pacific Command, the Eastern Military District Headquarters at Khabarovsk, maintains robust military forces. The operational mandate of Russia’s Pacific Fleet consists of nuclear deterrence, protecting Russian territorial waters and offshore infrastructure, and naval diplomacy through port calls in the Indo-Pacific region and in the Mediterranean. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Russian naval forces in the Pacific are focused on a force of five Borey-class and Delta III nuclear-powered Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), seven Oscar II and Yasen-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) (two of which are in long-term maintenance), four nuclear-powered Akula and Akula II attack submarines (SSN), and nine conventional-powered Kilo and improved Kilo patrol submarines (SSK).

The strategic importance of the Russian Pacific Fleet has never been greater to Moscow than it is now as the key means to engage and support Chinese foreign policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The surface fleet maintains one Slava-class guided missile cruiser, five Udaloy I and Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers (one of which is in refit and one deployed to the Mediterranean), five new Steregushchiy-class frigates, 21 corvettes of which 14 appear operational, eight mine warfare ships, and four amphibious vessels dedicated to its two naval infantry brigades. Finally, the Russian Navy maintains two anti-ship missile brigades in the region for coastal defence. Russia planned to deploy 70 new warships to its Pacific Fleet by 2026, but Ukraine has likely side-lined that. In addition, Russian Pacific Fleet naval aviation assets alone contain a dedicated fighter squadron, three attack helicopter squadrons, one squadron of Tu-142 Bear strategic bombers, and supporting transport and electronic warfare fleets.

In real terms, Russia’s nuclear deterrent in the Pacific must rely on four fully operational Borey-class submarines and one Delta III submarine which may be in strategic reserve. While all the cruisers and destroyers are Soviet-era warships and 30-plus-years-old, the five frigate-sized Steregushchiy-class corvettes are very recent designs and modern warships. The Ukraine War has demonstrated the vulnerability and lack of utility of Russia’s amphibious warfare ships. Like their ground force brethren, the Eastern Military District’s Naval Infantry was badly mauled in Ukraine and their utility is also open to question.

In terms of geography, the Russian Navy probably has not faced comparable challenges since the start of the Second World War (1939-1945). From a geostrategic position, the challenges are not in Russia’s favour, with the exception being the Pacific Fleet. In wartime and times of crisis, with Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, Russia’s Baltic Fleet is trapped and with little chance of surviving a full-on fight. The Ukraine War has shown just how vulnerable Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is to finding itself locked away like a prisoner in a cage without a key. If Turkey — as a NATO member — prizes NATO solidarity, we hold the cork to the bottle. If Moscow was bothered by the geostrategic position of Norway and its proximity to Russia’s Northern Fleet and prized military bases in the Kola Peninsula, it now finds itself under the further scrutiny of neighbouring Finland and Sweden. That leaves Russia’s Pacific Fleet, which has an open run into the Pacific. The Sea of Okhotsk remains a protective bastion for Russia’s ballistic missile submarines.

Russia: China’s junior strategic partner

As has been pointed out in the past, since the end of the Second World War, Russia has been a forgotten Pacific power. Whether through the Chinese Civil War or the Korean War, China and North Korea seem to have taken up all the attention in the Pacific since about 1949, and they continue to be the centres of attention to this day with an aggressive China becoming the norm and North Korea about to conduct another nuclear test. Russia has mostly flown under the radar — but that may be about to change as Moscow does have the ability to project power throughout the Indo-Pacific, should it choose to do so. In a sense, the Indo-Pacific has been about the China threat and the West confronting and managing an aggressive Beijing.

Russia has been considered a European power threatening NATO interests in the Baltic region and Central Europe. But a quick look at Russian moves in the Indo-Pacific in 2022 points to a different picture with Moscow now acting as the junior strategic partner in its relationship with Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping is the one strategic partner Putin cannot afford to lose and China may be the only state that can help rebuild Russia’s equipment losses in Ukraine. What Beijing wants from Moscow in the Pacific is naval power. China and Russia together are a direct challenge to the US and its allies — particularly Japan, the lynchpin of US interest in the Pacific. Now that Taiwan is on China’s front burner and the focus of its strategic interest in the region with the threat of war ever-present in the press, Russia is a key strategic player in Chinese war plans.

Japan expressed “serious concerns” in late May 2022 after six Chinese and Russian heavy bombers conducted joint flight operations around Japan through the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and into the Pacific Ocean. The warplanes did not enter Japanese territorial airspace. In June 2022, at least nine Russian and Chinese warships were seen steaming through the Tsushima Strait, which separates Japan and South Korea, and then patrolled around Japan, encircling the home islands. In August 2022, a group of 14 Russian Navy ships transited through La Pérouse Strait from the Western Pacific Ocean into the Sea of Japan ahead of Russian war games.

The Russian Ministry of Defence hosted the Vostok 2022 (East 2022) exercise in early September at seven firing ranges in Russia’s Far East and the Sea of Japan with more than 50,000 troops, 140 aircraft, and forces from China, India, Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, and Syria. In late September 2022, a United States Coast Guard ship encountered a Chinese guided missile cruiser, two other Chinese, and four Russian warships in the Bering Sea having passed near the Aleutian Islands in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. And in October 2022, a Russian destroyer, a submarine, and a submarine rescue ship were found 40 kilometres northeast of Cape Soya, Hokkaido, with the Russian ships sailing westward through the La Pérouse Strait into the Sea of Japan. This occurred at the same time as Japanese forces were monitoring Chinese naval movements around Japan.

Putin’s Ukraine War and heavy losses in people, equipment and treasure have sideswiped the Navy. Rebuilding it is a strategic priority and will present a significant challenge as resources are directed at harder-hit sectors of the defence establishment. Instead, it is going to have to take a back seat to the Russian Army, Special Operations Forces, and air and elite forces for the near future if not the long term. The Navy has also been sideswiped by geography with a Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO threatening both the Baltic Fleet and Northern Fleet. Additionally, Turkey standing by its allies and blocking the Black Sea Fleet necessitates Russian forces in the Mediterranean to return home for replenishment and repairs.

Outside of its submarine fleet, Russia’s Navy is turning into a green-water navy through rust out, neglect and lack of resources. It is only in the Pacific where Russia’s Navy has a bright future: it is unhindered by geography, has a strong submarine force and new frigates, and has a strategic partner in China — Russia’s key foreign policy relationship. The strategic importance of the Russian Pacific Fleet has never been greater to Moscow than it is now as the key means to engage and support Chinese foreign policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Joe Varner is the former Director of Policy to Canada's Minister of Defence, Deputy Director of the Conference of Defence Associations, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point's Modern War Institute. Image credit: Kremlin.ru.