What is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour about?
What is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour about?
WRITTEN BY BEC STRATING
21 November 2022
In September, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) kicked off the Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE) — its annual regional engagement activity. The 2022 iteration allowed ADF members to engage with officials, civilians, and local armed forces from a record 14 countries across the region: Maldives, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia.
Beginning in 2017, a core aim of the IPE is to assist the Australian Government in meeting objectives set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper around strengthening partnerships with regional security partners. It constitutes a ‘whole-of-government’ form of ‘floating diplomacy’ that blends hard power capabilities and exercises with soft power engagement strategies.
IPE 2022 was designed to show the region that Australia is “back in force“. The last two iterations were obstructed by the COVID-19 pandemic: IPE 2020 was cancelled and IPE 2021 was delivered through contactless, virtual engagements. While the IPE is an interesting example of Australian regional defence diplomacy, there remain some areas that may be improved in future iterations. There is also the broader issue of how the success of the IPE in achieving goals around image projection and influence may be measured.
The IPE constitutes a form of ‘normative seapower’ through efforts to exert influence and shape perceptions within the crowded maritime marketplace of norms, ideas, and narratives.
Comparing IPE 2022 with earlier iterations, the IPE enables Australia to increase its interoperability with regional partners through joint exercises. Defence forces can practise working together in controlled environments so that they will be better prepared to act together during natural and human disasters or conflicts. The pursuit of interoperability — the ability of military forces, systems or units to conduct joint operations — is a familiar theme running through bilateral and multilateral joint training exercises across Asia and the Pacific.
Observing the IPE over the years
I was fortunate enough to join HMAS Canberra for IPE 2019 as the fleet travelled up the Straits of Malacca from Port Klang in Malaysia to Patong Beach in Phuket, Thailand. In the 2022 iteration, I sailed with the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) HMAS Adelaide — the Royal Australian Navy’s biggest ship — escorted by the frigate HMAS ANZAC. I embarked at Port Klang but this time the flotilla headed to the Sembawang Naval Base in Singapore. One benefit of sea riding again is being able to compare my observations of the activity in its pre- and post-pandemic forms. What was different in 2022?
With 1800 people, five ships, and 11 helicopters involved, IPE 2022 was bigger than its 2019 iteration. It might be considered an exercise in force projection. While Australia has a relatively small navy compared to great and regional powers, the flotilla shows off some of its naval and air capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, highlights its willingness and ability to work together with and alongside regional partners. In terms of image projection, the IPE must walk a careful line to avoid evoking negative connotations that may stem from ‘gunboat diplomacy’, a term that refers to diplomacy that is advanced or supported with overt displays of naval power.
To this end, there is an emphasis in information operations on getting the strategic narrative and messaging right by presenting Australia as a desirable ‘partner-of-choice’ for regional countries. The IPE constitutes a form of ‘normative seapower’ through efforts to exert influence and shape perceptions within the crowded maritime marketplace of norms, ideas, and narratives. Softer strategies such as official receptions, academic workshops and lectures, public promotions and media engagement, and onshore visits accompany the military manoeuvring, which was also a focus in 2019.
A striking difference between IPE 2019 and IPE 2022 was the bigger Army contingent and a greater focus on Army-to-Army engagement and amphibious training, alongside more traditional areas such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Around 500 army officers joined HMAS Adelaide for IPE 2022 to enhance interoperability not just between countries but also between Australia’s land and ship forces.
There also appeared to be a difference in the responses of key states, especially India. In the 2019 iteration, Australia conducted a successful bilateral AUSINDEX maritime exercise with India but Delhi was not interested in formally being a part of the IPE branding. In 2022, India’s involvement in IPE was unambiguous, with the Indian Navy promoting its involvement in the activity as an example of enhancing cooperation between the two countries in defence matters. It is worth remembering that in 2019, India had not yet invited Australia to participate in its Malabar exercises. This is yet another example of the deepening of Australia’s bilateral relationship with India over the last three years.
As IPE gets back into its groove, there was a smaller academic sea-riding contingent in 2022 than in 2019. Hopefully in 2023 and beyond this can be expanded to give academics from Australia and beyond the opportunity to engage with the ADF during the activity and understand its role in Australia’s broader regional security policy.
What could be improved?
According to the Department of Defence’s messaging, the IPE is Australia’s “regional engagement activity”. Yet, doing more to leverage the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s existing links with and knowledge of the region could enhance the activity in the future and give the ‘whole-of-government’ narrative greater substance.
Also, seeing the IPE in action made me reflect on some of the genuine issues in joint activities when the three services of the ADF — navy, air force, and army — remain relatively siloed. This may be a broader issue to be taken up in the Defence Strategic Review, currently underway. Greater attention to internal diplomacy especially for non-naval participants might also be useful. Sailing on an LHD for several months may not be viewed by all troops as an efficient use of their time or expertise.
A final observation is that for a sea-based activity such as the IPE, members of the armed forces need to understand how different regional states interpret key provisions of the international law of the sea. Even so-called ‘like-minded’ states understand their legal rights in different ways, including India and Australia. India seeks to impose restrictions on military exercises or manoeuvres in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Australia and the US have different views on navigating states’ freedom to conduct such exercises in a coastal state’s EEZ. There is a risk that decision-makers may be confronted with a choice between asserting Australia’s rights under the law of the sea (as it interprets them) and prioritising good relations with a major partner in the region.
The United States faces a similar choice when conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) against what Washington views as excessive maritime claims made by key partners and allies. In such cases, the US generally views the greater imperative to be the assertion of its navigation rights even if partners disagree. This is an issue that Australia may confront in future iterations.
As someone who studies the role of public diplomacy and strategic narratives for a living, the IPE appears to me as a notable attempt in framing Australia as a capable and committed regional power and a ‘partner-of-choice’. There is a lingering question, however, about the tangible benefits the activity provides to the ADF and Australia, and enduring issues of how ‘soft power’ and ‘influence’ can be measured.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Bec Strating is the Director of La Trobe Asia and Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University. Image credit: Flickr/US Pacific Fleet.