The fate of the Indo-Pacific: Lessons from Ukraine and US diplomacy towards Taiwan
The fate of the
Indo-Pacific: Lessons from Ukraine and US diplomacy towards Taiwan
WRITTEN BY REUBEN STEFF AND MARTIN JIRUSEK
23 November 2022
The newly-released 2022 US National Security Strategy declares the next ten years to be decisive for this century’s geopolitical competition. It frames Europe and the Indo-Pacific as an interconnected security order — or a ‘super-order’ — where the failure of rules-based institutionalism in one will endanger the other. While Moscow is identified as the immediate threat to the international order, China is the greatest long-term challenger in the Indo-Pacific. It “is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective”. The US, therefore, seeks to rebalance its diplomatic and military resources towards the Indo-Pacific as it prioritises the region in its grand strategy.
Given China’s growing power and its assertive behaviour, the US rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific is a welcome development. Yet, many in the region remain concerned over aspects of US strategy and conduct. The dynamics that led to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the similarities with ongoing tensions in the Indo-Pacific over China’s rise necessitate urgent diplomatic efforts to maintain stability in the region. Towards this end, the lack of an inclusive Indo-Pacific-wide security institution is a major omission in an increasingly competitive region, and the US should be more predictable in its diplomacy around Taiwan.
Lessons from Europe for the Indo-Pacific
Throughout the Cold War, the US prioritised a series of exclusive bilateral alliances throughout the Indo-Pacific (known as the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system). Its contemporary approach is a departure from this, as Washington shifts to a broader ‘networked’ security architecture comprised of intersecting bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral defence arrangements between the US and regional allies and partners.
Through its new National Defense Strategy, Washington claims to recognise that the options its allies face cannot be reduced to ‘binary’ pro- or anti-China decisions, given Beijing’s large and growing regional role, and the fact that China is the largest trading partner for most Indo-Pacific states. This is prudent, as exclusive alliances can feed zero-sum politics that generate ‘tit-for-tat’ reactions as excluded states respond by establishing their own exclusive partnerships.
Should war or a system of neo-Cold War style blocs emerge, it will be US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that form the new frontlines and that have the most to lose.
Two of Washington’s recent security initiatives — the AUKUS trilateral security pact (between the US, Australia, and the UK), and the Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) (comprised of the US, Australia, Japan, and India) — give the appearance of a clearer shift towards militarily containing China. This, alongside the ongoing trade war (now extended to high-tech microchips), increases the likelihood of re-ordering the region into Cold War-style blocs.
On this path, we are likely going to see geostrategic competition in important Indo-Pacific sub-regions, like Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Caught between Washington’s and Beijing’s conflicting interests, these will devolve into ‘shatterbelts’ — geographic arenas in which competition is characterised by internal rivalries and fragmentation, driven and exploited by the US and competing powers for geopolitical pre-eminence. This is the situation the Middle East finds itself in today and, arguably, the South Pacific shows early signs of this. Indeed, Southeast Asia already suffered a shatterbelt’s fate throughout the Cold War.
Given these risks, a logical response to suppress zero-sum thinking is for Indo-Pacific leaders to put forward a vision for a region-wide institution. This would offer a forum to share views and address regional issues of mutual concern (like climate change, nuclear proliferation, and a host of emerging non-traditional security issues), and a vehicle through which great power confidence-building can take place.
The run-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February this year underscores the need for this kind of institution, as there are eerie parallels between the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific regions. Aside from the West’s inability to recognise Moscow’s twisted Cold War-style geopolitical logic, there was one more factor that played a significant role. Moscow’s invasion was preceded by years of failed diplomacy between Moscow, Kyiv, and European capitals, and by the inability to construct a Europe-wide security architecture. Even worse, in the weeks preceding Russia’s invasion, European leaders showed disunity and naivety in dealing with Russia, probably best manifested by Emmanuel Macron’s hasty efforts to broker a peace deal without consulting France’s allies. As a result, the West’s disunity likely emboldened Putin to make his move. Now, in the wake of Russia’s war, European states are forced to do what they should have done much earlier — to create a functioning and militarily-empowered block capable of countering threats to European security.
Likewise, the Indo-Pacific lacks a regional architecture, and Beijing continues to issue declarations that it will reunify Taiwan with the mainland either peacefully or via military power. Without a strong structural counterbalance to its objectives, China may use its military in spite (or perhaps because) of increasing US diplomatic and military support for Taipei.
Worst-case scenarios
Washington’s diplomacy is also found wanting when we contemplate Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August. This occurred despite the fact the White House and the Pentagon officially claimed they did not endorse the visit, and despite the opposition of many nations in the region that seek de-escalation and, above all, want to avoid a war. President Biden’s repeated statements that the US would militarily defend Taiwan if China invaded also generate uncertainties, despite other officials saying that this does not denote a formal shift away from Washington’s adherence to the ‘One China’ policy.
US behaviour towards Taiwan could convince Chinese leaders that Washington’s support for the island will eventually give Taipei confidence to declare independence. Beijing may feel compelled to move against the island sooner rather than later, before it becomes a de facto US ally — akin to how some charge that Ukraine was becoming a de facto NATO ally due to European and US military support in recent years. In turn, this potentially factored into Putin’s reasoning to invade Ukraine earlier this year in what the Russian President (honestly or dishonestly) characterised as a pre-emptive move against NATO.
These worst-case scenarios for Taiwan are not pie-in-the-sky thinking. Just last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then head of the Indo-Pacific Command, told US Congress that the Chinese could make a military move against Taiwan before 2027. Meanwhile, Admiral Mike Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, said in October this year that this could happen even sooner. These statements come in the wake of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying that China was “determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline”.
A recent analysis by Michael Beckley and Hal Brands backs this up, predicting that Chinese power will climax this decade. According to the authors, this could create a ‘peaking power trap’, in which Beijing concludes that it is “strong enough to aggressively disrupt the existing order but is losing confidence that time is on its side”. In this situation, Beijing may feel it is better to act while a window exists before the potential stagnancy or twilight of its power sets in.
Towards diplomatic coherence and building order
Should war or a system of neo-Cold War style blocs emerge, it will be US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that form the new frontlines and that have the most to lose. As such, the stakes are extremely high and critical reflection is necessary to ensure the US, and the rest of us, get things right.
One proposal is for the leaders of the region to create a regional UN-like institution. This will allow for the sharing of views, creating a collective focus to address regional issues of mutual concern, and building a vehicle through which great power confidence-building exercises take place to build mutual trust. To buttress this, the US needs to be more coherent and predictable in its diplomacy around Taiwan. Disentangling its rhetoric and practical activities in the Indo-Pacific will allow it to better manage geostrategic competition with China and reduce the possibility that miscalculations or misinterpretations will lead to a costly, and likely disastrous, move by Beijing against Taiwan.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Dr Reuben Steff is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Waikato, where he teaches courses in International Relations and Global Security. He is currently a visiting research fellow at Masaryk University, Czech Republic
Dr Martin Jirusek is Assistant Professor at Masaryk University, Czech Republic, and Managing Editor of the Czech Journal of Political Science. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Indo-Pacific Fleet.