nuclear proliferation — 9DASHLINE

2023: South Korea and nuclear ambitions

Should South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons? 9DASHLINE invites a select group of experts to assess the viability of this proposition and its potential impact.

East Asia9DLJanuary 27, 20239dashline, 2023: South Korea and nuclear ambitions, ELISABETH SUH, DR ERIC J. BALLBACH, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, nuclear, nuclear weapons, missile launches, nuclear-armed regime, nuclear imbalance, Seoul, independent arsenal, US tactical nuclear weapons, US, US-South Korea alliance, Washington, Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, nuclear arms race, nuclear program, Yoon Suk-yeol, nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile tests, artificial nuclear warheads, military command facilities, nuclear-sharing arrangement, nuclearisation, defence budget, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, ISR, nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence, civilian nuclear power program, military program, weapons-grade fissile material, nuclear explosives, nuclear warheads, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, international sanctions, 123 Agreement, conventional triad, air and missile defence systems, Short-Range Ballistic Missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, defensive missile technologies, offensive missile technologies, pre-emptive strikes, retaliatory strikes, forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons, US extended deterrence, China, Article X, negotiation, non-proliferation regime, global non-proliferation regime, DR IN YOUNG MIN, DR MIN-HYUNG KIM

Attentive friends, busy enemies, and a bright future — 2023 for North Korea

Written by Benedikt Staar

North Korean politics are strongly influenced by the regime’s friends, its enemies, and its own ambitions. As it turns out, things look promising for Pyongyang on all three fronts.

Pacific9DLNovember 23, 20229DashLine, Reuben Steff, The fate of the Indo-Pacific: Lessons from Ukraine and US diplomacy towards Taiwan, Martin Jirušek, Taiwan, US National Security Strategy, geopolitics, Europe, Indo-Pacific, super-order, security order, rules-based institutionalism, Moscow, China, USA, diplomacy, military, rebalancing, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s rise, Cold War, ‘hub-and-spoke’ system, alliance, Washington, networked’ security architecture, minilateral, multilateral, defence, allies, National Defense Strategy, Beijing, zero-sum, tit-for-tat, AUKUS trilateral security pact, Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), Australia, UK, United Kingdom, Japan, India, containment, trade war, microchips, blocs, Southeast Asia, South Pacific, Middle East, shatterbelts, nuclear proliferation, southeast asia, confidence building, Kyiv, Emmanuel Macron, peace, France, Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Taipei, Pentagon, White House, de-escalation, Joe Biden, President Biden, ‘One China’ policy, NATO, Admiral Philip Davidson, US Congress, Admiral Mike Gilday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, invasion, Michael Beckley and, Hal Brands, peaking power trap, UN