2023: South Korea and nuclear ambitions
2023: South Korea and nuclear ambitions
27 January 2023
In 2022, a record number of North Korean missile launches revealed the precarious security of South Korea in the face of a nuclear-armed regime in the North. Still, until now, the idea of equalising this nuclear imbalance with South Korean nuclear weapons was quickly rejected by policymakers and experts alike. The past year’s combination of extensive missile launches and a new president in Seoul, however, has changed the situation. Now, both in and outside of South Korea, observers are wondering whether Seoul may finally decide to press for some measure of nuclear armament against North Korea.
Should South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons? 9DASHLINE invites a select group of experts to assess the viability of this proposition and its potential impact.
DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE
DR IN YOUNG MIN — LECTURER, CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES, HEIDELBERG UNIVERSITY
Champions of South Korea having an independent arsenal claim that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear weapons. They argue that no matter how powerful South Korea’s conventional military forces are, North Korea will always get the upper hand due to the asymmetry in nuclear forces. The nuclear umbrella provided by the United States would not be of much help because of the classic credibility deficit in extended deterrence — will the US sacrifice Los Angeles for Seoul? South Korea is considered a nuclear ‘threshold’ state that possesses advanced technology to quickly build nuclear weapons. The South Korean public, moreover, is largely in favour of an independent nuclear arsenal.
However, opponents still dominate the foreign policy establishment. On the one hand, conservatives primarily call for the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea with something akin to NATO’s nuclear sharing in mind due to the expected hurdles in pursuing independent nuclear weapons, such as US opposition. Still, while the US-South Korea alliance may favour closer consultation to boost the credibility of American commitments, Washington is opposed to the idea of deploying nuclear weapons to South Korea. Liberals, on the other hand, reject the nuclear option for different reasons. They believe that the South needs to have the moral high ground by upholding the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization. If South Korea embraces nuclear weapons, they claim, the two Koreas will be caught in a nuclear arms race that may engulf the entire region.
What is largely missing in this debate is the fact that a decision to go nuclear is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, policy choice. Can Seoul convince Washington to turn a blind eye to such a move? Will South Korea be able to pursue a clandestine nuclear program otherwise? Is South Korea willing to risk the alliance for nuclear weapons? Can South Korea — heavily dependent on its global market ties — pursue nuclear weapons without disrupting its economic well-being? Public support for independent nuclear weapons rests on the idea that South Korea will be able to get them without any economic sacrifices.
Is there any president who is willing to pursue such an adventurous choice? It is difficult to imagine that Seoul will choose a nuclear path anytime soon. South Korea has already lived under the shadow of a nuclear North Korea for more than a decade and more missile tests from the North are not likely to force Seoul into making a choice. Nevertheless, the debate over the South Korean nuclear option will gain more prominence — as the recent controversy over President Yoon’s remarks shows — for there is no easy solution.
THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE COSTS
DR MIN-HYUNG KIM — PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY
Faced with North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and missile threats, South Korea should be prepared to develop independent nuclear capabilities. In September 2022, Pyongyang adopted a new law reaffirming that it would never give up its nuclear weapons and that its nuclear capabilities were irreversible. Moreover, it announced that it would use nuclear weapons pre-emptively against all hostile forces including non-nuclear states such as South Korea. In addition, North Korea’s latest ballistic missile tests (equipped with artificial nuclear warheads) reportedly simulated striking South Korea’s military command facilities, main ports, and airports.
To ensure its survival in the anarchic international system, Seoul must consider independently nuclear arming itself so that the nuclear balance between the two Koreas prevents war and produces stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. And this is probably the only realistic and long-term solution to the problem of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, public opinion polls over the last decade consistently show that the majority of South Koreans favour arming themselves with independent nuclear weapons.
Neither redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula nor pursuing a NATO-type nuclear-sharing arrangement are good options, as they fail to resolve the credibility problem of US extended nuclear deterrence — in the event of North Korea’s nuclear as well as conventional weapons attacks against South Korea, would the United States be willing to sacrifice New York for Seoul? The fact that South Koreans want nuclear weapons even if South Korea and North Korea were to reunify demonstrates that Koreans increasingly see the possession of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national pride and prestige.
While there are political as well as economic costs associated with South Korea’s nuclearisation, its benefits outweigh the costs. The benefits for South Korea include much stronger security, security policymaking autonomy and independence, upgraded international bargaining power, and greater power status, among others.
NUCLEAR BLUSTER IS NOT WORTH IT
ELISABETH SUH — RESEARCH FELLOW, GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DGAP)
South Korea is better off without having its own nuclear weapons. The immediate and collateral costs of building nuclear weapons outweigh any potential benefits. Its defence budget is best spent on boosting its capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as on conventional deterrence. Public talk about potential nuclear proliferation in Seoul does more harm than good; the allies need to present a united front to boost the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea.
Developing nuclear weapons entails numerous costs. South Korea already has a relatively high level of nuclear latency: it maintains an advanced civilian nuclear power program and has invested in collaborative fuel cycle research, including on plutonium separation. Yet, a military program to produce weapons-grade fissile material, develop nuclear explosives, and build functioning nuclear warheads would require extraordinary financial and political capital over a significant amount of time, and that is prior to operating and maintaining a reliable nuclear force. Furthermore, violating its legal commitments to not pursue nuclear weapons — as with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement with the United States — would ensure international sanctions and isolation. This would ultimately harm South Korea’s economic and political interests and its global status ambitions.
Developing advanced conventional weapons is comparably cost-effective and already underway. In fact, South Korea is the only non-nuclear weapon state to have a ‘conventional triad’ — armed forces that can launch conventional warheads from the ground, air, or sea. Seoul continues to invest heavily in ISR, air and missile defence systems, short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, and long-range cruise missiles. Doing so has already intensified the arms race and risks of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Such advanced defensive and offensive missile technologies, as well as accompanying doctrines for pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes, create uncertainties for North Korea’s nuclear forces, even more when combined with US capabilities for ISR and defence.
South Korea does not need its own nuclear weapons or US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons may be useful for alliance management, but they present additional targets and liabilities from an operational standpoint since the US can quickly employ its nuclear weapons from Guam in a contingency. Reassuring allies is more difficult than deterring adversaries, but increasing the credibility of US extended deterrence to South Korea serves both purposes. They can do so by boosting measures for consultations, signalling resolve, training interoperability and readiness, as well as by presenting a united front towards domestic and adversarial audiences.
GOING NUCLEAR WILL NOT BE QUICK AND EASY
DR ERIC J. BALLBACH — KOREA FOUNDATION FELLOW, GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS (SWP) BERLIN
On 11 January 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol stated that if the North Korean nuclear threat grows, Seoul would consider building nuclear weapons of its own or ask the US to redeploy them to the Korean Peninsula. The statement is another contribution to the ongoing debate about South Korea’s nuclear armament — a debate spurred by North Korea’s ever-increasing military capabilities and the expansion of its nuclear doctrine, a growing threat perception of North Korea and China in South Korea (ROK), questions regarding the credibility of the alliance, shifting domestic opinions on nuclear weapons, and changing perceptions regarding South Korea’s global role and status.
Referring to Article X of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which offers a withdrawal option if a member faces “extraordinary events” that “have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”, proponents argue that South Korea’s development of nuclear weapons would be a proportional and legal response to North Korea’s ever-increasing threat. As polls suggest that roughly 70 per cent of South Koreans support the development of their own nuclear weapons, supporters have become more vocal — and more visible.
However, the argument that having a nuclear capability would incentivise Pyongyang to negotiate with Seoul and agree to reduce or eliminate its own nuclear weapons seems far-fetched given North Korea’s assumed direct link between its own survival and its possession of nuclear weapons. With an increased risk of conflict escalation and an arms race in the region and beyond, a South Korea armed with nuclear weapons would have negative implications both for the alliance with the US and South Korean security, while risking to undermine (many) of South Korea’s foreign relations. The EU, for instance, would likely perceive such a move as an attack on the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime that could encourage other countries to pursue the possession of nuclear weapons outside of the NPT. Some European experts have already called for sanctions against South Korea should Seoul go down this path.
Ultimately, the decision whether to go nuclear rests on South Korea. Yet, it is crucial for Seoul to weigh the potential risks and costs of such a move. One thing is certain: South Korea going nuclear will not be a quick and easy process, but will be inherently complicated — and it will come at a high political cost.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/Republic of Korea.