2023: Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia — foreign policies between hegemons
2023: Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia — foreign policies between hegemons
30 January 2023
In 2022, Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand found themselves compelled to revisit and renew their approaches to China and the United States. With Australian elections ushering in a change of government and Aotearoa New Zealand’s planned parliamentary elections this year, 9DASHLINE sought the views of several experts on the state of both nations’ foreign and defence policies.
We asked, how have Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand navigated their relations with the US and China in 2022, and what will this year bring?
CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY
DR NICHOLAS ROSS SMITH — SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Under the leadership of former prime minister Jacinda Ardern, Aotearoa New Zealand mostly sought to preserve its middle-ground position in the Indo-Pacific: it maintains a close trade relationship with China (by far Aotearoa New Zealand’s most important trading partner) and a strong security relationship with the United States and its allies. However, as the Sino-American relationship continues to deteriorate, the room for such a middle-ground position is shrinking, and the path Aotearoa New Zealand is traversing became something of a tightrope act in 2022. This was particularly evident during its response to China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Pacific-wide tour in May.
In keeping with Ardern, it is likely that the NZ Labour Party government will continue to try and keep Aotearoa New Zealand in the middle in 2023, and it may bolster the country’s use of constructive ambiguity to achieve it. Avoiding an Australian-style decision to unequivocally side with the United States seems to remain a clear priority in Wellington. However, a change in policy could occur in late 2023, as Aotearoa New Zealand will hold its general election which the Labour party is currently projected to lose. While it is unlikely that the National Party under the leadership of Christopher Luxon would seek to completely abandon the country’s putative Indo-Pacific ‘hedging’ strategy, it will likely take a sterner stance on China than the two Ardern governments had.
RETURN TO DIPLOMACY
DR MELISSA CONLEY TYLER — EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ASIA-PACIFIC 4D; HONORARY FELLOW, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE ASIA INSTITUTE; AND, FELLOW, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Since the Australian election in May, the question has been what change and continuity we would see in Australian foreign policy, especially in the relationship with China. In recent years, there has been a downward spiral that led to China imposing a freeze on diplomatic contact and a series of import restrictions on Australian goods, including lobsters, wine, timber, wheat, coal, and barley. The new government had been careful during the election campaign to say that there would be no substantive policy change — just a change in tone. This carefulness was showcased when Prime Minister Albanese met with President Xi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit. It marks a return to diplomacy as a way of managing differences, and it will be seen internationally as a lesson that China’s economic coercion was unsuccessful.
The other major change in Australia’s international outlook was in its climate change policies. Less than a month after the election, Australia notified the United Nations of a revised emissions reduction goal. Other election commitments included investment in solar banks and community batteries, rewiring of the energy grid, and the promotion of clean energy exports. The change in climate policy has been particularly transformative in relations with Pacific Island countries, which had made no secret about their views on Australia’s lack of climate ambition. Now, there is a palpable sense of greater alignment. Australia and the Pacific Island countries have agreed to a joint bid to co-host the 2026 UN Conference of the Parties, which will keep pressure on Australia to progressively increase its climate change reduction ambition over time.
DIALOGUE ACROSS DIFFERENCE
DR JASON YOUNG — DIRECTOR, NEW ZEALAND CONTEMPORARY CHINA RESEARCH CENTRE, AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON
Strategic competition between the United States and China — in technology, ideology, military, and economy — has intensified in 2022. Most commentators conclude that this is unlikely to dissipate in 2023, or that Chinese policy will be less assertive, proactive, or disruptive. Concerns about supply chain resilience, economic coercion, social cohesion, international institutions, and geopolitics are likely to see Aotearoa New Zealand further strengthen cooperation with a variety of partners to build security, political, and economic resilience. Aotearoa New Zealand will continue to manage relations with China, its largest trade partner and a significant regional actor, with tact and consistency. Balancing these two demands is likely to become even more challenging in the coming years.
Aotearoa New Zealand increased its engagement with the US in 2022. It joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, though commentators bemoaned the lack of market access. Along with Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, it also joined Partners in the Blue Pacific. Former prime minister Ardern led a trade delegation to the US and met President Biden at the White House in May. The US remains Aotearoa New Zealand’s most important high-tech market, including for the evolving space industry, and their partnership, which has experienced ups and downs, continues to strengthen.
Ardern met President Xi at the APEC Summit in November. Relations with China have seen strong growth in goods trade but ongoing disruptions in the services sector due to China’s Covid restrictions. Strains in relations have become more evident in government statements and shifts in public sentiment. Relations are punctuated by differences over human rights, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s activities in the South China Sea, international institutions, and the Pacific Islands. China’s policy toward Australia continues to trouble New Zealanders, as do concerning trends in China’s domestic politics. Aotearoa New Zealand continues to signal a desire to maintain respectful dialogue while noting areas of difference that are becoming harder to reconcile. These concerns have dampened some business sentiments and are crowding out space for new bilateral initiatives — even though the year 2023 will mark 50 years of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic.
UNLIKELY STEPS
DR REUBEN STEFF — SENIOR LECTURER IN SECURITY STUDIES, WAIKATO UNIVERSITY
Throughout 2022, Aotearoa New Zealand was forced to deal with a rapidly deteriorating regional and global security environment. The US led a largely liberal-democratic Western bloc against two autocratic Eurasian powers in China and Russia. Indeed, the latter announced a ‘no limits’ partnership in February, only weeks before Moscow launched the largest conventional war in Europe since World War II. Beijing, for its part, continued to expand its influence into the South Pacific — a region of immense importance to Aotearoa New Zealand, and one whose fragmentation into a geopolitical shatterbelt Wellington hopes to prevent. China also conducted military manoeuvres around Taiwan — an island that Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo have all pledged to defend in the event of an invasion.
It was a no-brainer for Wellington to strongly protest Russia’s invasion in 2022 and make a material and intelligence contribution to Ukraine’s struggle. However, when it came to China, Wellington continued its years-long balancing act between Beijing as well as the US and Australia. The crux and dilemma are clear: Aotearoa New Zealand is reliant on China for over 30 per cent of exports, yet its security, intelligence ties, and values align it with Washington and Canberra.
Freed from the strictures of Covid limitations, former Aotearoa New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Ardern and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Nanaia Mahuta travelled abroad to signal their support for the democratic bloc, while making it clear they did not seek to expand Aotearoa New Zealand’s military alliances — a tactic that proved successful enough to prevent China from economically punishing Wellington for siding too closely with its Western partners.
On trade, Wellington secured Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the United Kingdom and the European Union in order to try and encourage export diversification — an outcome that would create more foreign and defence policy manoeuvrability on China-sensitive issues. Yet, this is unlikely to eventuate in the near term and the most significant option for trade diversification remains an FTA with the US. However, securing this will require Wellington to downgrade its anti-nuclear advocacy and significantly increase its military capabilities and commitments in a manner that advances Washington and Canberra’s strategic interests at the expense of China — steps Aotearoa New Zealand officials will be very unlikely to take in 2023.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet (cropped).