Attentive friends, busy enemies, and a bright future — 2023 for North Korea

10 January 2023

A year ago, North Korea’s outlook for the future was quite pessimistic as there was “little hope for improvement” concerning the immediate challenges for the country. The uncertain effects of COVID restrictions and a struggling economy did not give a reason for optimism in North Korea. However, judging from domestic and international developments in 2022, we can expect that 2023 will be a positive year for the country’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un. North Korean politics are strongly influenced by the regime’s friends, its enemies, and its own ambitions. As it turns out, things look promising for Pyongyang on all three fronts.

Renewed friendships with Beijing, Moscow, and beyond

North Korea’s most important partners, China and Russia, have intensified their economic exchange with Pyongyang in recent months. Both are present in North Korean special economic zones (SEZs). Rason SEZ, given its proximity to the North Korean-Russian border, is generally more interesting for Moscow, whereas Beijing concentrates most of its attention on the Sinuiju International Economic Zone near the Chinese border city of Dandong. While both SEZs have seen a dramatic decrease in activity due to Pyongyang’s COVID policies since 2020, it is very likely that the increased economic activity between Pyongyang and its partners witnessed this year is sustainable. In other words: it does not look like North Korea is going to close its borders with Russia and China again anytime soon — and all parties profit from this increased exchange.

Chinese President Xi Jinping supports North Korea both politically and economically and there are no signs that Beijing will allow the EU or NATO to put pressure on Pyongyang. Moreover, with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol wanting to enhance cooperation with the EU and NATO, as well as within the Japan-US-South Korea triangle, North Korea will have no problem in convincing Beijing to increase its support. This support would come in the form of more economic exchange or through obstructive behaviour in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The same goes for Russia — the spectre of an intensified South Korea-Japan-US-EU grouping on Moscow’s doorstep is reason enough to help Pyongyang.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is proving to be an unexpected boon for Pyongyang in two ways. First, despite official denials, North Korea still seems to be supplying Moscow with weapons. The sale of arms has always been a stream of income for Pyongyang, but Moscow is a more affluent and influential client than, for example, Syria. Second, Russia and North Korea are also improving their relationship on a political level. With better relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, the North Korean government can expect that it will be even easier for it to evade present (and future) sanctions at the North Korean-Russian border, given that Moscow has no interest in stopping or even controlling such activities.

North Korean politics are strongly influenced by the regime’s friends, its enemies, and its own ambitions. As it turns out, things look promising for Pyongyang on all three fronts.

Like Beijing, Moscow can support Pyongyang simply by not enforcing sanctions at its borders. An unanticipated development of the Ukraine war seems to be the resurgence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as, for example, some Global South countries have been unwilling to cut ties with Moscow. Pyongyang, a NAM member state since 1975, may profit from this development since it weakens the status of North Korea as an international pariah. It also presents renewed opportunities for North Korea to expand and improve its political and trade relations with other states in the Global South — a long-running project for Pyongyang.

Patient Washington, nervous Seoul

Concerning Pyongyang’s enemies, 2023 will most likely be dominated by reactions to North Korea’s (nuclear) weapons tests. Right now, however, it does not look like Pyongyang has anything to fear. First, both Moscow and Beijing can easily block any new resolutions in the UNSC. Second, sanctions have been in place for a long time, but they have evidently failed to reach their goals in North Korea. Third, beyond sanctions, neither the United States nor South Korea seems to have a long-term engagement strategy involving either diplomacy or military pressure. This leaves room for Pyongyang to continue developing its military technology and economic capability over the coming year.

The US under President Joe Biden has yet to show that it has any meaningful new ideas for approaching North Korea. The US government’s recently unveiled National Defense Strategy (NDS) was described as “lacking a clear and convincing vision” for the overall challenges posed by Russia and China, or threats like those from North Korea and Iran. To all intents and purposes, regarding North Korea, “the NDS signals business-as-usual”. This essentially renewed ‘wait-and-see’ approach is problematic because ‘business-as-usual’ on the Korean Peninsula has meant the uncontrolled development of nuclear technology, as well as delivery systems, in North Korea. This has even resulted in a debate over whether North Korea should be regarded as an ‘official’ nuclear power. While the United States’ ‘recognition’ of North Korea may be a way to start a dialogue, it is unlikely that Washington will grant Pyongyang this ‘title’ without receiving anything in return, and it is uncertain whether Kim Jong-un wants to enter talks with the US. Still, if the US decides not to up the pressure and does not offer engagement either, North Korea will simply continue to develop its military capabilities.

Washington’s lack of action and North Korea’s potential new ability to threaten the US mainland contribute to a general nervousness in Seoul about whether the US is really going to commit to the US-South Korea alliance in case of an attack from the North. This has fuelled a debate over South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons. Proponents stress that, among other reasons, Seoul must have its own nukes to seriously negotiate a deal with Pyongyang. However, South Korea would violate its own inter-Korean commitments by reintroducing nuclear weapons (either independently acquired or through nuclear sharing) to the peninsula, undermining its own credibility in possible future negotiations. Additionally, it is highly doubtful whether South Korean independently acquired nuclear weapons would provide more security in the region, as they potentially increase the likelihood of low-level conflict and conventional wars.

To Pyongyang’s advantage, Seoul’s stance on nuclear weapons and its overall North Korea policy is uncoordinated. During his candidacy, Yoon expressed plans to pursue the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons from the US to South Korea; after becoming president, he backpedalled. South Korea’s government will have to carefully consider more than just the North Korean threat when thinking about nuclear weapons, even if public support in the South for nuclear weapons is high.

The problem for the Yoon administration is that the originally envisioned economic and political engagement for denuclearisation with North Korea quickly failed. Yoon’s “audacious initiative” was — as expected — simply not enough to get North Korea back to the negotiating table. Yoon’s answer to North Korea’s missile tests and provocations is much more pronounced than his predecessor Moon Jae-in’s. However, Yoon has found that public support does not automatically come from trying to exert pressure on Pyongyang. In one instance, a South Korean military drill involving missile launches failed quite publicly, sparking domestic criticism instead of support for a harder course of action against Pyongyang. Seoul is struggling to find a strategy for North Korea that fits both national and international goals.

A bright future? Maybe

While we know much about North Korea’s friends and enemies, we know far less about policy planning in Pyongyang. In the upcoming months, we will likely see another yearly report from the Korean Workers’ Party outlining past performance, current challenges, and future goals. While exact details from such reports are unreliable, they do indicate what the government in Pyongyang sees as important tasks, which makes it a useful signpost to look to when judging its future politics. North Korea always has the possibility to test its weapons, nuclear or not. Pyongyang may also decide to focus on the economy, and especially work on improving the agricultural sector’s resilience. Given its increasingly self-confident handling of nuclear doctrine and its (unofficial) nuclear-armed status, it would be easy for the government to publicly shift national efforts towards improving the economy.

There always has been, and probably always will be, belief in the unavoidable collapse of the North Korean regime and arguments about its ostensible crises. Current trends, however, do not point towards problems for Kim Jong-un. The agricultural and economic sectors are far from faring as poorly as during the great famines of the 1990s, and even then, Pyongyang held out. Border trade between North Korea, China, and Russia is resuming. Yoon Suk-yeol may try to be hard on Pyongyang, but the regime’s ideological support thrives on adversity: the more obvious the threat to North Korea, the easier Kim Jong-un can justify his rule. The inconvenient truth is that North Korea looks stable.

Pyongyang’s opponents are busy with their own problems, and they do not seem to have a clear plan for dealing with North Korea. Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s partners are open to more cooperation. If Kim Jong-un is clever, he will continue to steadily improve North Korea’s economic situation without crossing potential red lines like nuclear proliferation — because this is one issue where a united opposition against Pyongyang may quickly arise.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Benedikt Christoph Staar is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Duisburg-Essen and associate editor at 9DASHLINE. His research focuses on North Korean security, domestic politics, and propaganda. Image credit: Flickr/Trump White House Archived (cropped).