2023: Myanmar’s prospects for peace
2023: Myanmar’s prospects for peace
9 January 2023
Since the February 2021 coup, armed and unarmed resistance to Myanmar’s military dictatorship has persisted. Throughout 2022, the junta continued to resort to extreme violence against the population.
With the state of emergency set to end at the end of January and the military junta pledging to hold general elections by August 2023, 9DASHLINE asks a number of experts what we should expect from the upcoming elections in Myanmar and whether there is any prospect for peace in the country.
ELECTIONS WILL EXACERBATE LOCAL AND NATIONAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
NICOLA WILLIAMS — PHD SCHOLAR AT THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY (ANU) CRAWFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY AND BOARD MEMBER OF THE ANU’S MYANMAR RESEARCH CENTRE
There are no immediate prospects for peace in Myanmar in 2023. First, there is no bargaining space between the Myanmar military junta and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), with both sides seeking to defeat each other militarily and decisively. Second, there is also no common ground in the perceived outcomes of the crisis concerning the future of the Myanmar state. There will not be a grand track-one negotiation process engaging the military and the NUG and mediated by third parties anytime soon.
Both the junta and the NUG (in cooperation with ethnic resistance organisations) are employing a range of political and military strategies to gain control of territory, establish their own administrative systems, and gain legitimacy to govern the population. With its military strategy facing serious setbacks from new and old armed groups, the junta is seeking to legitimise its contested rule by orchestrating a general election in 2023.
Yet there is no possibility of free and fair elections under the junta. An election in 2023 will only exacerbate local and national drivers of conflict. Many elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and opposition politicians have either been jailed, are in exile due to threats against their lives, or are barred from taking part in the election. Local opposition movements will likely rise up around the election and face coercion and violent repercussions from the junta. Given that armed conflict currently affects more than three-quarters of the country, elections will likely be cancelled in many areas due to security reasons, disenfranchising scores of voters across the Bamar heartland and ethnic areas, while favouring towns where the military maintains a semblance of control.
The election will be divisive among local political stakeholders. The military is currently working to engage ethnic groups and political parties which have not been successful in recent years due to the NLD’s thumping victories in 2015 and 2020. Some groups may participate in the junta’s election in an effort to secure a better position for their communities. Ahead of the election, there will likely be renewed efforts by the junta to reform the electoral system from a first-past-the-post system to proportional representation.
ELECTIONS SUPPOSED TO LEGITIMATE THE MILITARY’S RULE
DR IAN CHONG — ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
So long as there are political prisoners and limits on the organisation of political parties in Myanmar, I am highly doubtful about the possibility of free, fair, and competitive elections. I also suspect that the military wants to have a semblance of elections to legitimate its rule, rather than having any meaningful elections. After all, its poor performance in the last elections was one of the triggers for the coup. Given the violence, instability, disorder, and economic hardship the coup has unleashed on Myanmar’s population, I am unsure how much the military’s popularity has increased (if people were to be able to vote freely in the upcoming elections).
Unless there is a pullback from violence, reconciliation — and an effective peace process involving the National Unity Government (NUG) and other ethnic groups that give them a meaningful role in the political process — in the short-term is unlikely. Of course, there is a possibility that an increase of violence can quell opposition over time, but if that were happening quickly the situation would not be as desperate as currently the case. Moreover, Myanmar’s history of independence shows that quelling opposition to central rule within the country’s borders is very challenging.
DECISIVE VICTORY BY THE RESISTANCE IS NECESSARY
HUNTER MARSTON — ADJUNCT FELLOW AT LA TROBE ASIA, AND ASSOCIATE AT 9DASHLINE
I expect the 2023 general election in Myanmar to be drawn out, unrepresentative, and carefully stage-managed to engineer the junta’s preferred results. The military will not allow the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the lion’s share of seats in the 2020 election, to participate. Thus, most citizens will not support the election or the results of what they see as a fraudulent process — with the exception of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is loyal to the military, and some opportunistic ethnic political parties. The USDP will almost certainly fare better than it did in 2020, while ethnic minority parties such as the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) may pick up more seats if they choose to participate. However, participation is likely to be much lower than in 2015 and 2020, unless the military makes voting mandatory or comes up with its own figures like it did in the 2008 constitutional referendum.
Since the majority of the country (and all of those fighting against the military) view the proposed election with extreme suspicion, the event will not resolve the country's many intersecting conflicts. Moreover, since the military is likely to deploy a high number of troops around the country to monitor polling stations and will be on alert to any attempts by the People’s Defence Forces to disrupt its efforts, the chances of conflict are actually likely to increase. Genuine peace will not come about until the military is willing to engage in political dialogue with the National Unity Government (NUG). A stalemate is unlikely to produce that result, so it would take a decisive victory by the resistance in conjunction with a significant increase in military defections to force the junta to the negotiating table.
ASEAN’S ‘MIDDLING’ POSITION WILL NOT DETER THE JUNTA
ABIGAIL CHEN — INDEPENDENT ANALYST
Advancing the 2023 election agenda is a priority for Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), given what it really needs: diplomatic credibility. The SAC wants to be recognised as a nominally ‘civilian’ government in hopes of resuscitating investment in the country. The exodus of foreign investment has strained Myanmar’s gas and oil sector — the junta’s largest source of foreign currency and essential to its military procurement.
However, party boycotts and hardened domestic resistance could derail the electoral processes that the SAC desires. If major ethnic parties like the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy refuse to participate in the elections, it could undermine the legitimacy that the SAC seeks to build. Destabilisation in resistance strongholds — including the Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, and Chin States', and the Sagaing and Magwe regions — could render the elections feasible only in limited regions. Myanmar’s security situation approaching February 2023, when its state of emergency is set to have expired, will be a key watching point for the election outlook.
Diplomatic repercussions to the elections, if they are to be held, may not be the political circuit-breaker in Myanmar’s path towards peace. Effective regional diplomacy must enable real political dialogue. Absent concrete actions to enforce the ‘five-point consensus’ peace plan (for example, by clarifying the mandate of the ASEAN envoy), ASEAN’s ‘middling’ position will not deter the junta. It remains to be seen how Indonesia will lead the bloc’s stance as the ASEAN chair, and whether Anwar’s administration will continue to display Malaysia’s resolve on the Myanmar issue. Outside of ASEAN, China and India are likely to ‘hedge’ in favour of their own geopolitical interests, while more concerted sanctions efforts led by the US, the EU, and the UK could further pressure the junta.
THE GOVERNMENT MUST COMPRISE OF ALL SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION
DR SREERADHA DATT — HEAD OF NEIGHBOURHOOD STUDIES CENTRE, VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, AND NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
The political situation in Myanmar is likely to remain tense and violence-prone in the months ahead. Currently, there are no leaders who can bring together disparate interest groups. Removing the State Administration Council (SAC), the government established by military leaders, from having control of the state may seem like a common goal but it has not induced a large section of people to set aside their political differences. The vast number of ethnic leaders have been unable to find common ground with the National Unity Government that many of the deposed elected leaders formed after the 2021 coup. Given the opposition’s inability to pursue strategic measures towards establishing a polity representing the interests of a majority of the stakeholders, unseating the military junta seems distant and farfetched at present.
If the elections are held under the present regime without any substantial reform towards a democratic transition, participation is likely to be limited to a certain section of the population. Several ethnic-based political parties have expressed their unwillingness to join the elections under the present conditions and the people, if not coerced by the military, are also unlikely to come out to cast their vote. The SAC may try to form an alliance with small ethnic groups and their political entities to overcome popular resistance. However, none of these eventualities is likely to usher in any encouraging outcome. There appears to be no sustainable solution to the ongoing impasse in sight. The leadership crisis is real and evidently no external intervention has been able to initiate a meaningful peace process. Sacrifices large and small at individual and much larger levels are required to establish a confederacy of equals. The people of Myanmar themselves have to find their way towards building peace and an inclusive government that comprises all sections of the population.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia.