Xi — 9DASHLINE — Articles

As the Philippines’ 'agency' in West Philippine Sea rises, so too does its infrastructure development

Written by Joshua Bernard Espeña

In the Philippine context, the country’s newfound middle-power position offers the Southeast Asian state the ability to navigate uncertainties based on clearly defined national interests, and doubling down on its commitment to develop its infrastructures in the West Philippine Sea is one of the ways to do it.

Southeast Asia9DLMarch 21, 20249dashline, Joshua Bernard Espeña, Philippines, Philippine sea, maritime infrastructure development, Anti-Access/Area-Denial operations, A2/AD, South China Sea, SCS, drones, imagery intelligence devices, agency, assertive transparency, revisionist moves, middle-power, Southeast Asia, national interests, Philippine Congress, infrastructure development, Martin Romualdez, economic development, resource base, natural resources, Manila, diplomacy, China, Beijing, theory of victory, strategic culture, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Marcos Jr., National Security Policy (NSP) 2023-2028, NSP 2023-2028, multipolar world, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, resupply missions, joint exercises, construction development, John Mearsheimer, foreign policy objectives, informational spheres, like-minded allies, domestic politics, external powers, foreign policy, Philippine-US alliance, Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, EDCA, Northern Luzon, Huang Xilian, Taiwan, Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept, CADC, Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP, Mavulis Island, Basco, Batanes province, American interests, Chinese power, Taiwan Strait, West Philippine Sea, Philippine Department of National Defence, archipelagic security, geostrategic agency, Rodrigo Duterte, Philippine-China relations, Malacañang Palace, Cheloy Serafil, Xi, Pantaleon Alvarez, appeasement, Jonathan Malaya, territory, multi-domain future warfare, warfare, As the Philippines’ 'agency' in West Philippine Sea rises, so too does its infrastructure development

The transatlantic puzzle in the Indo-Pacific

Written by Mathieu Droin

The brewing Indo-Pacific architecture is inherently “flexilateral” due to the breadth of factors and the rapidly changing stakes that determine its many actors’ positions.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLJune 28, 20239DashLine, The transatlantic puzzle in the Indo-Pacific, Mathieu Droin, European Union, Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, AUKUS, transatlantic, minilateral, Indo-Pacific, Japan, China, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), India, strategy, flexilateral, Thucydides trap, geoeconomic, trade, geostrategic, ASEAN, ASEAN centrality, clubs, biannual EU-US high-level consultations on the Indo-Pacific, Washington, France, overseas territories, Indian Ocean, Pacific, strategic autonomy, puissance d’equilibres, power of balances, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Pacific Islands, Netherlands, Germany, Council of the EU, EU presidency, Italy, Rome, Tempest programme, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Raisina Dialogue, Denmark, maritime domain, Hungary, Chinese coercion, Lithuania, dependence, Berlin, Beijing, German Indo-Pacific strategy, Central and Eastern Europe, Xi, Putin, Czech Republic, Poland, Russia-China axis, NATO, EU Indo-Pacific forum, South Korea, New Zealand, President Macron, GLOBSEC Forum, North Macedonia, Sweden, Djibouti, Laos, transatlantic Quad, Anglo-Saxons, aspiring powers, rising powers, strategic autonomists, GCAP, Franco-Indian-UAE initiative, freedom to manoeuvre, Quaderateral Security Dialogue, Quad, EU, UK, Thucydides, Giorgia Meloni, Ukraine, Czech, Nato, GLOBSEC, NZ, UAE, CSIC, CSIS

Xi, the state, and war

Written by Maximilian Ernst

Hence, before looking for clues to Chinese foreign policy in the personalities of Chinese leaders, foreign policy analysts would be well advised to first direct their attention to the international level.

East Asia9DLDecember 22, 20229dashline, Xi, the state, and war, Maximilian Ernst, Xi the state and war, Waltz, Kenneth Waltz, 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese President Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), General Secretary of the Party, Central Military Commission (CMC), Central Committee, Politburo, Standing Committee of the Politburo, party factions, former President Hu Jintao, Hu Jintao, Sino-US competition, rising power, military, military-strategic, personality, China’s foreign policy, Taiwan, south china sea, US, opposition, Zhongnanhai, Bo Xilai, counterfactual, structural perspective, international relations, international relations theory, geography, economic power, military power, units in an international system, security, wealth, CCP establishment, Chinese Communist Youth League, Shanghai Gang, Neo-Maoist faction, Kerry Brown, elites, Reform and Opening policies, Deng Xiaoping, Hide-and-Bide, 韬光养晦, Hide-and-Bide strategy, responsible stakeholder, Bind-and-Hedge phase, post-Tiananmen, WTO, Shape-and-Restructure phase, pivot to Asia, rebalancing, first island chain, alliance, Kuril Islands, Japan, Philippines, Malay Peninsula, COVID-19 pandemic, Belt and Road Initiative, Winnie the Pooh

Why factional politics might no longer matter in China

Written by Jabin T. Jacob

Under these circumstances, what will be worth watching is the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee for clues on what Xi’s policy directions for the next five years of his rule are going to be.

East Asia9DLOctober 6, 20229DashLine, Jabin T. Jacob, Jabin Jacob, Why factional politics might no longer matter in China, China, factional politics, authoritarian, authoritarianism, authoritarian rule, regime collapse, Chinese Party, Chinese Party-state, security, defence, Communist Party of China (CPC), Communist Party of China, CPC, Chinese Communist Party, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), CCP, Xi Jingping, Xi Jinping, Xi, Xi Jinping Thought, corruption, loyalist, Surveillance, surveillance, CPC General Secretary, General Secretary, coup, military coup, Mark Twain, PRC, People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Mao, Mao Zedong, economy, globalisation, Tiananmen Square, Tiananmen Square massacre, 1989, core leader, one-party authoritarian state, Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction, Shanghai faction, laissez-faire capitalism, crony capitalism, Communist Youth League faction, Communist Youth League, Marxism-Leninism, Politburo Standing Committee, Tibet Autonomous Region, Liaoning, 20th Party Congress, WHY FACTIONAL POLITICS MIGHT NO LONGER MATTER IN CHINA

Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan

Written by Amanda Hsiao and Ivy Kwek

A long-lasting solution on Taiwan will be difficult to realise anytime soon. However, avoiding miscalculation and slowing the escalatory spiral that the parties are currently engaged in are achievable outcomes that Taipei, Washington, and Beijing should prioritise.

East Asia9DLSeptember 29, 20229DashLine, Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan, Amanda Hsiao, Ivy Kwek, Taiwan, China, US, USA, escalatory spiral, escalation, Washington, Beijing, Taipei, US-China rivalry, US-China competition, US-China relations, military, military exercise, reunification, one China, one Taiwan, US-Taiwan relations, US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Nancy Pelosi, cyberattacks, sanctions, Taiwanese, Chinese, sovereignty, Pelosi’s visit, median line, maritime, navy, airspace, drone, drones, human error, Pacific, US-Taiwan engagement, defence, defence spending, arms sale, arms package, Biden administration, Biden, Joe Biden, Central Asia, United Nations, 20th Party Congress, Party Congress, propaganda, Xi, Xi Jinping, amphibious invasion, amphibious, military intervention, Trump, Trump administration, Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Japan, Yonaguni Island, Philippines’ EEZ, Philippines, Manila, Taiwan conflict, Taiwan Strait, escalatory cycle, deter, deterrence, One China policy, One China Policy, One China, One-China, One-China Policy, Three Communiques, US Congress, Taiwan Policy Act

In Conversation: Katie Stallard on ‘Dancing on Bones’

9DASHLINE recently sat down with Katie Stallard to discuss her new book ‘Dancing on Bones: History and Power in China, Russia, and North Korea’. Drawing on first-hand, on-the-ground reporting, this fascinating book examines how the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea manipulate the past to serve the present and secure the future of authoritarian rule.

In Conversation9DLSeptember 6, 2022In Conversation: Katie Stallard on ‘Dancing on Bones’, 9DashLine, Katie Stallard, China, Russia, North Korea, authoritarian rule, regime types, historical memory, political tool, Soviet, ‘century of humiliation’, CCP, Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, Japan, US, regime mythology, Korean War, Putin, Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping, Ukraine war, Kremlin, Moscow, Pyongyang, Beijing, Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il, intercontinental ballistic missile, nuclear programme, long-range missile capabilities, Post-Soviet Russia, The Great Patriotic War, Cold War, USSR, nationalism, strong-man politics, populist, ‘patriotic education’ initiatives, populist narratives, WWII, Kim Jong-il, Great Patriotic War, WW2, Chinese Communist Party, Xi, Nazis, fascists, Jewish, Holocaust, Ukraine, Crimea, Kyiv, Kim Il Sung, South Korea, ICBM, Trump, Donald Trump, George Orwell, Oxford University Press, New Statesman

President Biden’s more strategic competition with China

Written by Nathaniel Sher

Washington understands that it is competing with Beijing to determine not only whose economy and military are more dominant but also whose principles of governance are more worthy of global leadership.

In Conversation: Michael Schuman on his latest book "Superpower Interrupted"

While Xi wishes to change the world order, he has yet to elucidate an attractive and comprehensive vision for an alternative. Xi’s entire conception of foreign affairs is to strip them of values (or at least liberal ones), rendering his worldview vacant of ideas that would woo others.