As the Philippines’ 'agency' in West Philippine Sea rises, so too does its infrastructure development
As The Philippines’ ‘agency’ in the West Philippine Sea Rises, so too does its infrastructure development
WRITTEN BY JOSHUA BERNARD ESPEÑA
21 March 2024
For the Philippines, 2023 was an innovative and proactive year. Countering China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) operations in the West Philippine Sea, Manila has claimed part of the larger South China Sea by using cheap drones and other imagery intelligence devices to monitor and expose these activities. The international community praised this growing agency, with some observers noting that this assertive transparency can be a model to combat revisionist moves worldwide.
This geostrategic agency is growing, if not unstoppable, in 2024 and beyond. As I defined in a previous article, ‘agency’ refers to the “ability to exercise [one’s] will without and despite persuasions and threats from other foreign actors”. In the Philippine context, the country’s newfound middle-power position offers the Southeast Asian state the ability to navigate uncertainties based on clearly defined national interests, and doubling down on its commitment to develop its infrastructures in the West Philippine Sea is one of the ways to do it.
In December 2023, the Philippine Congress approved a proposed budget of roughly USD 101 billion for 2024, including an estimated USD 53 million worth of funds for developing infrastructure in the West Philippine Sea, such as more expansive runways and new shelter ports. According to Philippine House Speaker Martin Romualdez, the government wants “to invest more of the resources because of the strategic importance and value it brings” to the country. In pursuing robust economic development, particularly the need to diversify its resource base, Manila has set its sights on the West Philippine Sea’s bountiful natural resource potential.
Does agency matter?
In an attempt to produce a favourable strategic effect on the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines has historically used diplomatic tactics with China. However, this does not seem to have worked in its favour, given the decades-long asymmetrical power relations between the countries. This is because, in the past, Manila lacked the sophistication to craft its theory of victory in the South China Sea due to its relatively poor strategic culture. Consequently, it failed to make sense of its informational, military, and economic statecraft to complement diplomatic efforts in effecting a workable version of peace.
Whether perceived as defensive or offensive by China, ramping up efforts to develop its infrastructure in the West Philippine Sea will be paramount for the Philippines in forming its base for a future victory.
Nevertheless, the Philippines’ newfound position as a middle power now suggests that Manila is anything but a pushover. In an interview in December 2023, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. argued that peace in the South China Sea “required new solutions”, noting that “tensions have increased rather than diminished”. The incumbent government’s National Security Policy (NSP) 2023-2028 states that the Philippines aspires to become a middle power fit for a multipolar world. It places national sovereignty and territorial integrity as the country’s top national security interest by leveraging relevant but consistent unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches.
Unsurprisingly, China does not welcome the Philippines’ growing sense of agency. The Chinese foreign ministry and state media outlets lambast Philippine moves such as resupply missions, joint exercises, and construction development activities, among others, as “provocative” and “dangerous”, vowing to respond resolutely should Manila continue on this path. Manila has brushed aside such accusations, countering that it would not put its vessels and seafarers in danger; it insists instead that China is committing dangerous manoeuvres.
Negation of inconsistencies
According to political scientist John Mearsheimer, state leaders lie in international politics because they find good strategic reasons to protect their national interests — especially if lying successfully achieves foreign policy objectives. This point relates to how China strategically lies in diplomatic and informational spheres to negate Filipino agency: it rebukes the Philippines’ alignment with like-minded allies and partners as intrusive, but it also wedges influence within the country’s domestic politics.
China insists that ‘external powers’, a pseudonym for the US, allegedly dictate the incumbent Philippine government’s foreign policy. This assertion was first fuelled when Marcos Jr. revived the Philippine-US alliance in early 2023 by agreeing to add four more Filipino bases for American personnel to operate under the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), with three of them in Northern Luzon, located in proximity to Taiwan. Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian then threatened Manila that if it cared for its citizens living in Taiwan, it should stay out of Beijing’s internal affairs with the island nation. However, such a threat is baseless when seriously considering Philippine interests.
Earlier this year, the Philippines embarked on its Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC), which inevitably involves the latent defence of the Luzon Strait, located southeast of the Taiwan Strait. In January [this year], the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) resolved to strengthen its presence in Mavulis Island, the country’s northernmost territory, and Basco, the capital city of Batanes province. Observers note that EDCA bases in Northern Luzon serve American interests by checking Chinese power in the Taiwan Strait. However, the Philippines' interests lie in augmenting the West Philippine Sea and Luzon Strait as a singular theatre of operations within the CADC. In a press statement, the Philippine Department of National Defence argued that the CADC is less about the Philippines interfering in the Taiwan Strait than enhancing its long-neglected archipelagic security.
As for China’s intrusions in the Philippines, Beijing is proactive in negating Filipino geostrategic agency by exploiting the domestic political rift between Marcos Jr. and former president Rodrigo Duterte and entrenching its views among pro-China Filipino social media personalities that support Duterte’s foreign policy brand. It is no secret that Duterte and his political allies have dissented from Marcos Jr.’s decision to expand the EDCA last year.
In July 2023, Duterte travelled to Beijing for a “personal visit” with Chinese President Xi Jinping to further Philippine-China relations, visiting Marcos Jr. at the Malacañang Palace upon his return to give “some good pieces of advice” on foreign policy (according to Philippine Communications Secretary Cheloy Serafil). On the surface, Duterte’s gesture looks friendly; Marcos Jr. even hoped that an informal meeting would yield better communication between Manila and Beijing.
However, Duterte sent the message that he still has the political capital to stir the country’s geopolitics. Interestingly, Xi told Duterte in that meeting to continue promoting cooperation between China and the Philippines even as the current government reversed his policy. Duterte’s political persona remains China’s key foothold in disrupting the Philippines’ sense of agency in the West Philippine Sea.
In the first quarter of 2024, Duterte declared his open rivalry with Marcos Jr., threatening to call for the secession of Mindanao, the country’s second-largest island group, over issues of the country’s constitutional change. Known Duterte ally and former House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez supported Duterte’s call to secede, as the Marcos Jr. government drags “the entire nation towards the prospect of war” instead of employing a “balanced and sound approach” towards China over the West Philippine Sea (the latter of which translates to Duterte’s approach of appeasement toward China).
The latest development came in March, when an anonymous Chinese official in an exclusive interview with The Manila Times argued that the incumbent government was scuttling the Duterte administration’s efforts by allegedly ignoring Beijing’s proposals, as laid out in eleven confidential concept papers relating to guidelines of interaction in the South China Sea. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs quickly refuted this, noting that it had submitted counterproposals to the concept papers to reflect Filipino interests.
Even though Duterte does not comment frequently on Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy, since leaving office in June 2022, his pro-China influence has been deeply ingrained in online platforms. Various social media influencers and national think tanks have made huge scores online to echo narratives that ring similar to the Chinese position that the Marcos Jr. government is provoking war against China to serve American interests. Philippine National Security Council spokesperson Jonathan Malaya stated that while the government is not conducting a “witch hunt” that may impede freedom of expression, it monitors pro-China statements posted online to trace how closely they echo the Chinese government's position and counters them with more accurate information about Manila's motives and actions in the West Philippine Sea.
For now, it is unclear whether Marcos Jr. will be able to weather the storm till his term ends in 2028. However, one thing is clear: developing the West Philippine Sea is not the priority of Marcos Jr.’s political rivals — which sits well within China’s ‘Philippines-as-provocateur’ narrative.
Deadly future
“Nobody wants to go to war” and “the country is friends to all and enemies to none”, as Marcos Jr. repeatedly states at every opportune moment. Yet, his government is also consistent in saying that “not one inch of territory” will be taken by the country’s enemies. Thus, the incumbent government’s ability to defend Philippine interest in the West Philippine Sea in an open conflict will be the test of its mettle.
Growing agency means the ability to innovatively hone a grand strategy for such an unwanted version of the future. Should Beijing ‘blink’ because of a miscalculation, its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Theatre Commands in the First Island Chain will go on high alert to respond to perceived threats against Chinese interests. Whether perceived as defensive or offensive by China, ramping up efforts to develop its infrastructure in the West Philippine Sea will be paramount for the Philippines in forming its base for a future victory.
As I previously mentioned in an article late last year, militaries worldwide, including that of the Philippines, are moving towards optimising their capabilities, however meagre, to fight in multi-domain future warfare. This means that the AFP must be able to integrate its land, sea, air, cyber, electronic, and space domains into a workable command-and-control for a competent battle system against enemies that also adopt the same kind of approach in warfare. However, as ‘sci-fi’ as it sounds, it still requires defence planners to push for a theatre of operations that is logistically sustainable to produce a favourable strategic effect. Hence, doubling down on dual-use infrastructures in the West Philippine Sea matters if the Philippines were to be serious in its growing geostrategic agency, not just to defend — whether alone or with allies — against threats but to develop its regional rapport for the years to come.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Joshua Bernard Espeña is Vice President at the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), a Manila-based think tank. He is also a lecturer of international relations at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. He is the co-author of The Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization is not Finlandization (2021) and the upcoming The New Middle Powers in Southeast Asia. Image credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet (cropped).