Ageing China increases its military spending
Ageing China increases its military spending
WRITTEN BY JIACHEN SHI
22 March 2024
Like many advanced industrialised countries, China — the world’s second-largest economy, which long took pride in its ‘demographic dividend’ — must now confront a significant challenge: population ageing. While some argue that this demographic shift typically has a crowding-out effect on a nation’s military spending, compelling the government to allocate more resources to ageing-related social problems, this theory does not seem to align with China’s case.
As a party-state regime consistently prioritising military prowess, China tends to frame population ageing within the context of traditional national security, despite concerns about ageing-induced economic and social issues. Unlike many other states, population ageing in China has been exerting a crowding-in effect on military spending across three dimensions: active-duty personnel, demobilised servicemen, and prospective soldiers.
Incentives for active-duty personnel
To maintain the army’s spirit, the Chinese government has repeatedly voiced its commitment to ensuring material support for soldiers through legislation to prevent the loss of talent, making a constant increase in soldiers’ salaries inevitable. According to China’s National Defence White Papers, over the past four decades, the impetus for these salary increases has arisen not only from the demands of soldiers but also from the essential needs of their families.
Resorting to military build-up consistently emerges as a rational choice for Chinese policymakers who perceive the country as entangled in a series of ‘internal troubles’ such as social instability and ‘external threats’ such as provocations from the United States.
Soldiers usually have to be separated from their families for a long time, rendering them unable to provide care and companionship. This predicament generates considerable pressure and anxiety, affecting not only the military personnel themselves, but also their family members. When physical companionship becomes less feasible, material support for soldiers’ families gains greater importance as an alternative. Population ageing, which has already projected a dim economic outlook, further intensifies the financial burden on soldiers as they strive to support the needs of their elderly parents and other family members.
To make matters worse, over 70 per cent of Chinese soldiers are ‘only children’ due to the country’s one-child policy. This increasing burden of caring for elderly parents is amplifying soldiers’ perspectives on their military careers, shifting the focus from honour to financial considerations. To mitigate the looming risk of a substantial loss of soldiers, the Chinese government recognises the imperative of boosting military spending on two fronts: first, enhancing soldiers’ salaries, enabling them to provide increased financial support to their ageing parents or dependents; and second, augmenting direct benefits for soldiers’ dependents.
Demobilised servicemen’s increasing share in military spending
It is important to note that as the general public ages, so does the military. As of today, China has more than 57 million retired military personnel, with this figure growing annually at a rate of several hundred thousand. Consequently, the burgeoning population of demobilised servicemen is becoming a growing group eligible for retirement benefits and compensation packages.
However, the dissatisfaction among veterans with their benefits is on the rise, leading to more frequent veteran protests in recent years. While repressive measures are often employed to address these concerns, the Chinese government recognises that such actions offer only a short-term solution to a long-term issue that could potentially undermine regime security.
As a direct response to the surge in veteran protests, the government established the Ministry of Veterans Affairs in 2018. The move reflects the government’s acknowledgement that substantially enhancing veteran benefits would be a more effective, cost-efficient strategy to address growing dissent among veterans rather than continuously spending on repression.
The 2019 report on China’s military spending by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals that, from 1990 to 2019, payments to demobilised and retired soldiers stood out as the sole subcategory experiencing an overall increase as a percentage of the total national defence budget.
Prospective soldiers and the effects of the one-child policy
Compared to active-duty personnel and demobilised servicemen, the impact of population ageing on prospective soldiers is more nuanced. However, its significance has been on the rise in recent years, as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faces unprecedented recruitment difficulties. China’s military modernisation strategy necessitates maintaining a relatively young, high-quality, and educated force through constant recruiting of fresh personnel. Nevertheless, population ageing is gradually downsizing the pool of qualified draft-age candidates while concurrently provoking people to question their motivation to join the army against the backdrop of China’s economic slowdown.
As reportedly argued by a PLA soldier, today, young people in China are given more options than just joining the army, including but not limited to going to college, studying abroad, or going on the job market. In the meantime, the PLA’s austerity and strict regulations are causing more young soldiers to drop out. This action is more likely to be supported by parents of soldiers who are the only children in their families because they tend to worry more strongly about their only child becoming a soldier — a job with a relatively low social status in the traditional Chinese culture.
Historically, the majority of PLA soldiers were mainly semi-literate peasants from rural regions. However, as ageing becomes more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas, the PLA’s traditional recruitment pool is rapidly shrinking. Although urban areas experience a less severe ageing trend, they are not completely immune to its effects.
The strict implementation of the one-child policy in urban areas has significantly altered family structures, resulting in many ‘only children’ with no siblings. Faced with eldercare responsibilities that are more burdensome than those of the last generation, young people are increasingly inclined to seek greater financial rewards on the job market rather than considering a military career which is titularly honourable yet materially meagre.
The reluctance to join the army is especially noticeable among Generation Z, a demographic possessing the sought-after skills that the PLA requires. However, members of this generation often choose a non-political and leisure-focused lifestyle over pursuing a military career. Despite efforts to attract this demographic through various preferential incentives, such as waiving tuition fees and relaxing age limitations, the proportion of college students among total enlistments each year remains significantly lower than anticipated.
While financial incentives may not be the only solution to the escalating conscription challenges, they remain the most pragmatic approach, especially considering the economic challenges faced by the young Chinese generation. In a China deeply influenced by capitalism, the PLA can no longer rely solely on promoting non-financial rewards — such as a code of honour or patriotism — to attract individuals. The changing economic landscape necessitates a more practical consideration of financial incentives to meet recruitment goals.
An alternative to ‘geriatric peace’
Mark Haas’ ‘geriatric peace theory’ suggests that under the US hegemony, the demographic advantage enjoyed by the US over other advanced industrial countries would deprive the latter of their motivation to compete with the former. For those governments, it is a rational strategy to divert resources away from military build-up to addressing ageing-related socio-economic issues. However, when Haas put forward his theory, he probably did not anticipate China’s rise and its leaders’ perception of the potential threat caused by ageing.
Chinese leaders have a tradition of considering the use of force as the ultimate safety valve for ensuring regime survival. Resorting to military build-up consistently emerges as a rational choice for Chinese policymakers who perceive the country as entangled in a series of ‘internal troubles’ such as social instability and ‘external threats’ such as provocations from the United States.
The scale and ramifications of population ageing are something China has never dealt with before. Looking at population ageing through a national security lens may not offer an immediate error-free solution to the issue. Still, it at least helps the Chinese government rule out all the other ‘costly’ options – such as continuous suppression of protests by discontent veterans — that may yield uncertain outcomes, allowing it to focus on the military method in which it has the most confidence in achieving success.
A similar struggle with population ageing can also be found in other states, especially in regional powers such as India and Russia. While India’s demographic situation is still better than that of China, the Modi government has already started to make plans for the potential consequences of population ageing by diverting resources earmarked for military salaries and pensions to the modernisation of weapons and platforms. Russia, to maintain defence spending in the face of a more severe ageing issue, has also been driven to pursue more expensive but manpower-saving weapons systems.
In a multipolar era, the ‘geriatric peace’ envisaged by Mark Haas is more likely to be found among developed industrial democracies. However, in authoritarian regimes, especially those highly reliant on their military, ageing could serve as a driver of enhanced military spending. This is because authoritarian leaders are inclined to believe population ageing could cause political instability. And contemporary China is presenting itself as a prominent example.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jiachen Shi is a PhD candidate in political science at Tulane University. He received his M.A. in international relations from the University of Liverpool. His main research interests are in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, with a special focus on US-China relations and comparison of US and China politics. His articles have been featured in The Diplomat and The National Interest. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Christophe Meneboeuf (cropped).