Xi, the state, and war
Xi, the state, and war
WRITTEN BY MAXIMILIAN ERNST
22 December 2022
In October 2022, during the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed an unprecedented third term as General Secretary of the Party and head of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Xi also elevated numerous loyal individuals into powerful positions in the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the CMC, replacing potential adversaries from rival factions. Xi’s consolidation of power was, perhaps most dramatically, illustrated by the removal of former President Hu Jintao from the Congress’ closing ceremony, presumably to preempt his potential opposition against the composition of the Central Committee that was about to be confirmed on the final day of the Congress.
As the Sino-US competition increasingly takes on a military-strategic dimension, there is much interest in Xi’s personality. There are numerous debates concerning his plans for China’s foreign policy going forward, designs for unification with Taiwan, and how he may pursue China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea against the opposition of littoral states or even the US. News media and scientific research on Chinese foreign policy tend to uncritically accept the truism that current Chinese foreign policy is, prima facie, a result of Xi’s, and by extension his inner circle’s, proclivities. Therefore, China’s turn towards a more assertive, coercive, and even aggressive foreign policy over the past decade has been commonly explained as the product of Xi’s assumption of power in 2012.
However, foreign policy analysts should be wary of uncritically assuming that contemporary Chinese foreign policy is primarily the result of decisions made by Xi Jinping and a small foreign policy elite around him. Certainly, Xi and his closest comrades in Zhongnanhai make the decisions. But would another leader have made different decisions? If, for instance, Bo Xilai had emerged at the helm of the CCP in 2012, would Chinese foreign policy deviate significantly from the one we have seen? Such counterfactual considerations allow us to reflect on the role of individual leaders vis-à-vis structural processes in the outcome of foreign policy decision-making. In his 1959 book "Man, the State, and War" Kenneth Waltz argued that the international system impacts international relations more profoundly than domestic political institutions or even individual leaders and states people. A structural perspective on international relations considers factors such as geography, military and economic power, and treats states as units in an international system, driven by their desire to increase their wealth, enhance their security, and avoid conquest and destruction by other states.
Structure matters more
Although Xi has elevated people loyal to him into many of the most powerful positions within the CCP establishment, within-party competition among rival groups is likely to persist. It is therefore conceivable that Xi and his inner circle make foreign policy decisions to meet demands or preempt the criticism of powerful rivalling groups within the CCP, such as the Chinese Communist Youth League, the Shanghai Gang, or the Neo-Maoist faction. Indeed, the biggest threat to Xi Jinping comes from within the party, as Kerry Brown writes in his book “CEO, China”: “Xi’s deadliest enemies are almost certainly those who sit closest to him, within the Party. They are the people who have the most immediate means to harm him”. To please the rivalling factions and to preempt mutiny within the highest echelons of the party, even a powerful leader like Xi will have to consider foreign policy options that safeguard the wider interests of Chinese elites beyond his inner circle.
Hence, before looking for clues to Chinese foreign policy in the personalities of Chinese leaders, foreign policy analysts would be well advised to first direct their attention to the international level.
However, what analyses focused on domestic politics or Xi Jinping overlook is the considerable degree of continuity in Chinese foreign policy over the past decades. Indeed, the evolution of China’s more assertive posture on the international stage had commenced before Xi assumed the position of General Secretary in 2012. Alongside China’s Reform and Opening policies, Deng Xiaoping formulated the ‘Hide-and-Bide’ strategy (韬光养晦, which is commonly translated as “hide your strength, bide your time”). Expecting China’s imminent economic rise and being conscious of the potential counter-balancing coalitions that might form against its growing power, the Chinese leadership around Deng emphasised shared commercial interests with the world.
The Hide-and-Bide strategy can be divided into three phases. The actual Hide-and-Bide phase lasted from 1979 to 1989, during which Beijing catered to the international community’s wishful thinking of China becoming a responsible stakeholder, embracing free markets and international cooperation. In the second phase, the Hide-and-Bide made way for the Bind-and-Hedge phase which lasted from 1989 (i.e., post-Tiananmen) to 2009. China joined the WTO and integrated its economy into global supply chains. The third phase, the Shape-and-Restructure phase, started in 2009 and continues to this day. By this time, China had become powerful both economically and militarily, but Beijing’s dependence on global commons like international finance and shipping lanes had also considerably increased.
Importantly, the third phase can be understood as a reaction to the US pivot to Asia, which, although pronounced later in name, can be traced back to US strategy documents from the mid-2000s. The pivot, or rebalancing, which would lead to an enhanced US military and economic footprint in the Asia-Pacific, required Beijing to reassert itself as an attractive economic partner to regional states and as a powerful military actor that could hold its own against the US alliance network along the first island chain which reaches from the Kuril Islands in the north over Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the Malay Peninsula in the south. Following the economic slowdown induced by the COVID-19 pandemic, China may soon reach the apex of its rise. Hence, Beijing may no longer require a new Hide-and-Bide phase, and instead, seek to consolidate the impressive economic and military progress it has accomplished over the past four decades.
Individual leaders matter less than commonly assumed
It becomes clear that Chinese foreign policy is dictated primarily by structural processes relating to its economic development as well as its military power relative to its strategic rivals, notably the US and its regional allies. These dynamics have been largely consistent over the past four decades, and so is the overall direction of China’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, the variations of Chinese foreign policy that were observable throughout the decades, for instance, infrastructure development deals under the Belt and Road Initiative or its increasingly assertive, at times coercive, policy towards neighbouring countries, were primarily in response to external processes or internal developments over which the Chinese leadership had little control.
So what would be different had someone other than Xi Jinping assumed the most powerful position in China in 2012? Not much. The main difference might have been that the likeness of Winnie the Pooh would not be banned from Chinese cinemas. It is possible that the composition of the top Chinese leadership, and the internal processes of the Chinese state and the CCP more generally, do impact Chinese foreign policy decisions. However, structural processes on the international level have a much more direct impact on Chinese foreign policy. Hence, before looking for clues to Chinese foreign policy in the personalities of Chinese leaders, foreign policy analysts would be well advised to first direct their attention to the international level. Once the international level is understood but unable to explain a particular foreign policy decision, personal characteristics of leaders and domestic politics may hold the answer.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Maximilian Ernst is a Researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, hosted by the Brussels School of Governance, and a PhD Candidate at the Free University Brussels (VUB). His research focuses on Asia-Pacific security, in particular Chinese foreign policy towards regional states. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Office of the Press Secretary of the Philippines.