Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan
Slowing the escalatory spiral over Taiwan
WRITTEN BY AMANDA HSIAO AND IVY KWEK
29 September 2022
Under the stress of US-China competition, abiding understandings between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan are unravelling. Heightened tensions with clear risks will characterise the foreseeable future, with the potential for the two parties to misinterpret each other’s intentions and of an unintended military incident. Two fundamental understandings that have anchored the status quo are eroding. First, Washington’s expectation that Beijing will not employ military force to compel Taiwan to unify with China no longer seems tenable as China’s military capabilities advance and its intentions appear increasingly aggressive. Since 2016, Beijing has stepped up military, economic, and political pressures on Taiwan. Second, Beijing’s understanding that Washington is not pursuing a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ end state — in which Taiwan would remain separated from China in perpetuity — seems increasingly less credible. Washington has in recent years lent more support and attached greater strategic importance to a de facto autonomous Taiwan.
In response, the US and China are engaging in escalatory tit-for-tat shows of resolve to ensure the status quo they prefer. Washington hopes to take away China’s option of unification through force, while Beijing wants to ensure the option to unify remains by limiting the scope of US-Taiwan relations. Each side believes it must signal resoluteness and commitment to its respective position, in reaction to shows of resolve by the other side.
Within this context, US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan — intended to show the strength of US commitment to Taiwan — accelerated the escalatory spiral that was already in motion. In response to the visit, China staged unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan, banned certain imports from and exports to Taiwan, conducted cyberattacks, cancelled and suspended exchanges with the US, sanctioned Pelosi, and jailed a Taiwanese citizen in the mainland on pro-independence charges. In doing so, China hoped to deter further US actions that, from its perspective, would dangerously strengthen Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty.
The episode did not alter the existing dynamic but a number of implications are worth noting.
Post-Pelosi reverberations
One enduring consequence is an increase in military activities in the Taiwan Strait — and with it, the increased risk of an unintended incident. Following Pelosi’s visit, Beijing has sought to normalise breaching the median line — a maritime boundary that Beijing and Taipei had tacitly agreed upon and that both sides rarely crossed. Chinese and Taiwanese warships have reportedly been playing a risky game of cat-and-mouse in the area, with Taiwanese ships attempting to prevent Chinese ones from crossing the line. Washington has been restrained thus far, conducting two routine transits through the strait. However, calls persist for the US to militarily push back against China’s establishment of a “new normal”.
A long-lasting solution on Taiwan will be difficult to realise anytime soon. However, avoiding miscalculation and slowing the escalatory spiral that the parties are currently engaged in are achievable outcomes that Taipei, Washington, and Beijing should prioritise.
Beijing has also increased drone incursions into the airspace of Taiwan’s offshore islands. Under domestic pressure to push back after leaked footage depicted Taiwanese soldiers’ weak response, Taipei shot down a Chinese drone for the first time in early September, triggering concerns of further escalation.
Though no party wants a conflict to erupt, human error can always occur during these encounters. A recent US assessment suggests the number of unsafe intercepts by Chinese aircraft and ships of US and partner military crafts in the Pacific significantly increased in the past five years.
As a second implication, the episode has reinforced the threat perceptions and narratives that drive escalatory behaviour. China’s military measures confirm perceptions in Taipei and Washington of Beijing’s aggressive intent toward Taiwan and provide more concrete rationale for advancing US-Taiwan engagement around strengthening Taiwan’s defence. In the weeks after China’s exercises, Taiwan announced a 13.9 per cent increase to its defence budget and the US approved an arms sale worth USD 1.1 billion, the largest arms package under the Biden administration. If Beijing had hoped to drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington by making Taiwan the primary target of its retaliation, its actions appear to have had the opposite effect. A survey following the visit found that the number of Taiwanese confident that the US would send troops to help Taiwan in a conflict rose from 40 to 50 per cent.
In Beijing, Pelosi’s visit helps reinforce the view that Washington will continue to hollow out its commitments to China on Taiwan and play the Taiwan card to contain China’s rise, providing a rallying point for more resolute handling of the cross-strait issue. Already, the Taiwan issue has been a focus of Beijing’s diplomacy, including in Central Asia and at the United Nations.
The leadership’s desire for a relatively stable external environment in the lead-up to the 20th Party Congress partially accounted for China’s escalatory, but ultimately controlled, response to the visit. Domestic criticism of China’s restraint was loud enough that Beijing engaged in a propaganda campaign that emphasised the unprecedented nature of its military response and the complexities of the Taiwan issue. Once Xi has consolidated power at the Party Congress, China is likely to assume a more proactive posture on Taiwan because of these domestic pressures and Xi’s own ambition to resolve the Taiwan issue. An amphibious invasion in the near-term is unlikely, as China does not yet have the military capabilities to ensure a successful operation and the likelihood of a strong international response — including potential US military intervention — is currently high. More probable is Beijing’s employment of military, paramilitary, legal, economic, and diplomatic tools to incrementally turn up the pressure on Taiwan.
Third, the Pelosi episode set back incipient efforts to identify areas of cooperation and address irritants in the US-China relationship, raising the political cost of these efforts in both capitals. The event further complicated deliberations in Washington over whether to lift tariffs on Chinese imports imposed during the Trump administration, and halted what had been growing momentum behind the resumption of defence dialogues.
Fourth, Chinese actions deepened concerns among regional actors over how a Chinese military assault on Taiwan would directly impact their own security. China’s delivery of five missiles into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the proximity of Japan’s southernmost Yonaguni Island to China’s exercise areas accelerated discussions in Tokyo of Japan’s role in a Taiwan contingency, and added to momentum behind upgrading Japan’s defence capabilities. In late August, Japanese lawmakers and Taipei agreed to discuss the evacuation of Japanese citizens residing in Taiwan in the event of an invasion. One of China’s exercise areas also overlapped with the Philippines’ EEZ; in early September, Manila said that, if important for its national security, it may allow the US to use its military bases in the event of a Taiwan conflict.
The way forward
The conditions do not currently exist for identifying a long-term solution for Taiwan’s status, not least because Washington and Beijing’s preferred end states for Taiwan have become more irreconcilable. In the meantime, the three governments should prioritise strengthening crisis management mechanisms, the US and Taiwan should work to make the prospect of successful unification by force too uncertain for the Chinese leadership to pursue, and Beijing and Washington should determine and convey the specific assurances they are seeking from the other side and the assurances they can provide to slow down — if not stop — the escalatory cycle.
A small sliver of optimism can be found in the fact that the US, Taiwan, and China all share the same short-term goal — preventing a war. To that end, the three militaries should exercise utmost restraint in their military presence operations around Taiwan. Washington and Beijing should utilise existing crisis management mechanisms; Taipei and Beijing should develop communication channels that can be used during an incident. Unfortunately, neither is particularly feasible in the current political climate. Given the regional reverberations of a Taiwan conflict, regional actors should encourage the three parties to develop and strengthen these mechanisms.
In order to deter a Chinese attempt to unify with Taiwan through force, Taiwan and the US and its partners should make clear the military and economic costs that they would impose in response. This includes strengthening Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, with appropriate caution concerning escalatory risks, and developing a credible package of economic retaliatory measures. The objective of these measures would be to reinforce the fragile status quo in the interim, absent any feasible long-term political solution.
At the same time, it is incumbent on both Beijing and Washington to identify the types of assurances that can help to manage the current volatility. However difficult this task has become given the dearth of trust, assurances can help to provide a counterpoint to voices in Beijing that may be inclined to speed up unification and argue that peaceful unification is no longer possible. They would similarly provide a buffer against arguments in Washington that longstanding US policies — including that the US does not support Taiwan's independence and maintains ambiguity over whether it would militarily intervene in a conflict — should be overturned.
Beyond consistent messaging from Washington that it continues to uphold the One China policy and the commitments it made under the Three Communiques, Washington should refrain from symbolic gestures that do little to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience and will force a response from Beijing. Congress should not pass provisions in the current draft of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 that call for removing existing restrictions on interactions between US and Taiwan officials and ending the practice of referring to Taiwan as “Taiwan authorities”, for instance.
Beijing, too, should provide assurances to Washington, including by continuing to affirm its preference for peaceful unification. Refraining from additional, public forms of escalation such as increasing military activities in the Taiwan Strait would itself be a form of assurance.
A long-lasting solution on Taiwan will be difficult to realise anytime soon. However, avoiding miscalculation and slowing the escalatory spiral that the parties are currently engaged in are achievable outcomes that Taipei, Washington, and Beijing should prioritise.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Amanda Hsiao is the China Senior Analyst for International Crisis Group. Ivy Kwek is the China Fellow for International Crisis Group. Image credit: Flickr/Official Photo by Wang Yu Ching / Office of the President.