In Conversation: Michael Schuman on his latest book "Superpower Interrupted"

*IN CONVERSATION: MICHAEL SCHUMAN on “SUPERPOWER INTERRUPTED”*

20 October 2021

We recently enjoyed the opportunity to speak with Michael Schuman where we discussed his latest book “Superpower Interrupted” which looks to examine the role of history in China’s geopolitical power.

Noting that “we tend to talk about China through the prism of our own world history”, your book offers a historical account from the Chinese perspective. Could you tell us what led you to write from this viewpoint? Also, how has writing this book shaped your own views of China’s place in the world today?

My motivation for writing this book was to help readers better understand how the Chinese have perceived their role in the world through their long history and how that influences the goals and ambitions of the Chinese leadership today. We are all to a degree shaped by our history, and even more, how we perceive our history. If policymakers around the world are to contend with a rising China, it is absolutely critical to understand and appreciate this Chinese version of history, and how it defines their view of the world today. For me personally, I gained a much better grasp of how that history influences modern China and especially, the policies of Xi Jinping and the current leadership. It became clear to me that Xi’s vision for China’s global role in the future is very much influenced by China’s role in the past, or perhaps more accurately, how he may see that historical China.

In response to the popular question “what does China want?”, you argue that China wants the status it always had, to be a superpower in the world. What are the implications of China feeling like a “superpower interrupted” in today’s context?

My sense is that Xi Jinping, based on China’s history, believes his country has a “right” to be a great power, or “deserves” a central role in the world. China, of course, was not always a great power. It suffered invasions, disunity and other disorders. But it was the dominant power in East Asia for long stretches of time. Xi’s notion of national rejuvenation — what he calls the “Chinese Dream” — is to a great degree a restoration of Chinese greatness. For policymakers dealing with China, they need to know that Chinese leaders believe their rise to the top is, in a sense, historically determined, and therefore inevitable. Many of us tend to talk about China’s rise as if it is something startling and new. But to the Chinese leadership, the restoration of Chinese greatness is a return to what was the norm for much of human history.

In recent years, some Chinese and Western scholars have discussed whether the current government is envisioning a world order akin to the old tributary system. How fitting do you find this concept for understanding the international ambitions of the current Chinese government? What could a modern 'tributary system' look like?

The “tribute system” is a controversial topic among historians of China. Many believe no such thing ever existed, and the concept is a creation of Western scholars attempting (and failing) to make sense of the foreign policy of Chinese imperial dynasties. My own view is that China did have a special form of foreign relations, rooted in its political ideology, that governed the way China’s governments interacted with and understood the outside world. The basic principle was hierarchy. The Chinese believed in unequal relationships, in which they always held the superior position. That’s why other kings and chieftains were expected to “pay tribute” and become “vassals” of the Chinese emperor. In real life, relations were not as unequal as the language implied; much of this system was ceremonial. But perceptions and ideas count. We can see elements of these practices and norms in Chinese foreign policy today. For instance, Xi held two forums related to his Belt and Road Initiative, in which foreign leaders or their ambassadors were expected to travel to Beijing and acknowledge China’s largesse — not so unlike the tribute missions of old. Beijing also seems to deal with disputes with its neighbours as if they’re unruly vassals. Take, for example, how Beijing tried to punish South Korea by curtailing its access to the Chinese market for defying its wishes and installing a US missile-defence system.

You provide a thorough overview of how China was the beating heart of a global economic system that existed centuries ago. Today, China is perceived more as a ‘rule breaker’, and increasingly as a ‘rule maker’, to the chagrin of the West. In your view, is China returning to making the rules, and how will this impact the current international rules-based order?

It has become apparent that Xi Jinping’s China wants to remake the current world order. Part of that impulse is driven not by history but modern politics. Xi wishes to infuse authoritarian elements into a system built on liberal political and economic ideals in order to make it more favourable to Chinese interests. But some of Xi’s agenda is informed by traditional forms of Chinese foreign relations. Whenever China was able to restore the pillars of its power, the new rulers also reasserted China’s own “rules” of diplomacy, tribute and trade onto other societies. The Chinese have never been content to allow foreigners to set the terms of engagement. That seems to be happening again, as Xi increasingly is trying to dictate to other governments the terms of their relationship. We can see this, for instance, in how Beijing has tried to dictate the basis upon which its relations with countries like the US and Australia should work — in other words, to determine what is and is not acceptable, and make good relations conditional upon those terms being accepted. That’s part of a greater campaign by Beijing to rewrite the rules of international relations and discourse. The widening confrontation between the US and China is very much about who gets to set the rules of the global order.

The United States has used its power to spread influence across the globe and establish itself as a superpower, through military, economic and cultural means. The European Union, as a normative power, has sought to project its influence through the pursuit of fundamental freedoms and increased trade relations. What sort of power does China seek? How do you assess the effectiveness of China’s power projection as it seeks to return to superpower status?

The Chinese leadership has tried to convince the world that it has a different conception of power, which favours “peaceful development” and is devoid of hegemonic ambitions. They like to point to moments in their history — such as the Zheng He voyages — to prove they were never an aggressive power like the European colonialists. That version of history, though, is sanitised. When the dynasties were at the height of their power, they were often aggressive, militarily and politically. Today, it is hard to make the case that China doesn’t want to dominate, at least within East Asia, but probably well beyond. The goal of its economic policies is to capture control of the technologies of the future and thus the commanding heights of the global economy. Beijing increasingly turns to coercion to cow other countries that defy its wishes — Australia, for instance. Look at how Beijing has bullied its neighbours in the South China Sea or is currently using military harassment to intimidate Taiwan. I think the Communist government intends to amass as much power as possible and exert its will onto the world.

Why is China struggling so much with its soft power today considering it had so much of it for most of its (imperial) history?

The problem is that modern Chinese have devastated their traditional culture, which held so much appeal and sway with other societies and they have failed to replace it with something else equally attractive. The current government tries to capitalise on China’s ancient cultural connections — that’s how the Confucius Institutes got their name — but this is superficial. And while Xi wishes to change the world order, he has yet to elucidate an attractive and comprehensive vision for an alternative. Xi’s entire conception of foreign affairs is to strip them of values (or at least liberal ones), rendering his worldview vacant of ideas that would woo others. And Chinese entertainment, arts and media haven’t gained a wider audience, in the way, for instance, that K-pop has, due, in my opinion, to the political control over these facets of Chinese society. If Xi wants China to be “loved” he’ll have to change his coercive approach to both other countries and his own people.

Today, relations between the Western world and China continue to deteriorate, both as a result of power competition and ideology. Both sides represent divergent world views and are responsible for the lack of mutual understanding. What would help reconcile our differences in a mutually acceptable way. Is this at all possible?

I don’t have much hope for US-China relations at the moment. The United States has an ideologically driven worldview that cannot accept the challenges posed by illiberal governments. And China’s leaders are increasingly revelling in the perceived success of just that kind of illiberal governance. More than that, China also believes it is a nation of destiny, on a historical mission to return to greatness. I call the widening confrontation a “clash of exceptionalisms”. I think the two powers could and should find a way of getting along (as they had for several decades) if Xi Jinping’s government was willing to cooperate with and work within the current world order. This doesn’t mean China would have to “change” or couldn’t pursue its own ambitions. But it does mean China would have to show more willingness to play by the “rules” as the US sees them and exert its new power in that context. I think in that scenario, the US would be willing to accommodate China within the current world system and allow it to continue to gain in strength, even if it remained autocratic. At the moment, though, there’s no sign that will or even can happen.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Michael Schuman is a journalist and author with a quarter-century of experience in Asia. Aside from “Superpower Interrupted,” he is the author of the books “Confucius and the World He Created” (2015) and “The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth” (2009). He is a contributor to The Atlantic and a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. Formerly, he was a correspondent for Time Magazine and The Wall Street Journal.