Written by Dr Francesca Ghiretti
Holding the first in-person summit since 2019 is an important achievement, and the EU has been able to express some important concerns to Xi Jinping directly; however, the words — especially from China — demonstrate Beijing still views the EU mostly as an economic partner.
Read MoreWritten by Sjorre Couvreur
The adoption of the Anti-Coercion Instrument entails an important step for the EU’s adjustment to an increasingly geoeconomic context in international trade policy.
Read MoreWritten by Daniela Braun, Marie Antoinette de Jesus, and Sophiya Navarro
Increasing EU-Philippine maritime security cooperation is a positive development that reflects both actors’ mutual interests and values, as well as their willingness to engage with each other and other Indo-Pacific actors.
Read More9DASHLINE asks a select group of experts to assess the outcomes from the recent G7 Summit held in Japan.
Read MoreThis week, 9DASHLINE enjoyed the opportunity to have a candid discussion with Member of the European Parliament, Reinhard Bütikofer, where we sought to gauge his views on Europe, its interests in the Indo-Pacific, and its ties with China.
Read MoreWritten by Axel Nordenstam
As Ukraine is the top European priority, it would make sense for Indo-Pacific partners to consider joint projects in and for Ukraine. The reconstruction of Ukraine could benefit from such cooperation.
Read MoreWritten by Marcin Jerzewski
In the context of Taiwan-EU relations, the primary objective of cooperation on human rights should be to address the main areas of concern delineated by the EU.
Read MoreWritten by Mohammadbagher Forough
While tropes such as ‘values’ and ‘standards’ are promoted as the main feature of the Global Gateway’s connectivity agenda, African countries (and many others in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America) will not overlook the fact that this promoted feature contrasts uneasily with neo-colonialist-sounding dichotomies like ‘garden/jungle’.
Read MoreWritten by Phuong Mai Tran
Obviously, the EU must prioritise Europe’s defence. The important question here is whether its Indo-Pacific strategy would be affected as a result.
Read More9DASHLINE invited a number of leading experts to explore the prospects for greater EU engagement with the geopolitical centre of gravity as several member states including Germany, France, and the Netherlands are now crafting independent Indo-Pacific strategies.
Read MoreWritten by Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy
The EU’s foreign and security policy is indeed driven by member states and any decision on EU policy concerning China and Taiwan, or any third country for that matter requires the unanimous support of all EU member states.
Read MoreWritten by Justyna Szczudlik
The European Parliament’s role in popularising the Taiwan issue cannot be overestimated. The EU should promptly move towards popularising existing platforms for cooperation with Taiwan, such as those on industrial, digital and high-tech topics.
Read MoreWritten by Antoine Bondaz
The possibility of renaming the Directorate of Asia and Oceania of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, which includes the sub-directorates of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Far East, to the Directorate of the Indo-Pacific should be considered.
Read MoreWritten by Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy
As China entails a multi-dimensional threat to Europe, it requires a multi-dimensional strategy. Conferring a prominent role to human rights in its approach to China will be vital for Brussels’ efforts to champion human rights for all.
Read MoreWritten by Ong Kian Ming
ASEAN must also be willing to push the envelope when it comes to economic diplomacy in a manner that would strengthen the unity of the grouping and safeguard the interests of its members.
Read MoreWritten by Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy
Lithuania’s decision to open an office in Taiwan sets a precedent for Latvia and Estonia, neighbours who face similar threats from China — and Russia — and must urgently address similar vulnerabilities at home.
Read MoreWritten by Filip Sebok
It seems that Beijing is willing to sacrifice strategic gains in some areas, including the successful ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI), in favour of the aggressive defence of its increasingly repressive domestic policies in Xinjiang and elsewhere.
Read More
