In Brief with Reinhard Bütikofer MEP

21 April 2023

This week, 9DASHLINE enjoyed the opportunity to have a candid discussion with Member of the European Parliament, Reinhard Bütikofer.

In light of recent events, we sought to gauge his views on Europe, its interests in the Indo-Pacific, and its ties with China. Unsurprisingly, we started our conversation by looking at the recent visit to Beijing by two of Europe’s most important leaders.

9DL: How do you assess the joint visit of French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Beijing? Did it make any progress towards the EU strengthening its position vis-à-vis China?

RB: I evaluate the results of the parallel visits of President Macron and President von der Leyen as positive. President von der Leyen was a blessing and President Macron was a blessing in disguise. She prepared her visit well with a very sober, realistic, pragmatic speech, and stuck to her guns when in Beijing. She gained a lot of prestige and support by doing so. Whereas, President Macron unexpectedly positioned himself as an almost isolated outlier on some core issues regarding the EU’s China policy. One example is the question of whether we believe that it is in our interests to show solidarity with Taiwanese democracy and help defend stability, security, and peace in the Taiwan Strait against unilateral changes. That issue is now even clearer than it has been over the last years: von der Leyen, Borrell, the European Parliament, and the Germans (both the foreign minister and the chancellor) — they have all said so. So, I think there is now a clearly defined position on the matter and that is a good basis for making progress.

9DL: Before the visit and while in Beijing, von der Leyen stressed that the future of the EU’s relationship with China will depend on how the latter responds to Putin’s war. However, the EU has yet to articulate what the consequences might be if Xi decides to arm Putin. Do you think such rhetoric can help deter China’s deepening relationship with Russia?

RB: Certainly, China’s deepening relationship with Russia will not change because of our rhetoric. I found the Chinese defence minister’s remarks congratulating President Putin’s regime for its contributions to world peace during his recent Moscow visit deeply troubling and very toxic. It can hardly get more cynical than that. It signals that China is not neutral. It is not just tilting a little bit towards Russia. It is fully supporting Russia’s war of aggression, just with the exception that they do not yet provide armaments. They have promised not to do so in the future either. I would say we just have to keep up the pressure, and make them understand fully that for us this is really a red line. Von der Leyen has said that in just about the right words. The future of the EU-China relationship depends to the relevant degree on how China positions itself towards the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. I don’t think we have to spell out what the specific consequences would be if they cross that red line, just make them understand that we are really serious about it.

9DL: Among EU member states, France has been the most supportive of the Indo-Pacific concept — a region where the EU has its own interests to protect, and China’s coercion has been most serious. Taiwan lies at the heart of this region, and the EU is the largest investor there. In that context, what should we make of Macron’s comments that “[Europe’s] priority is not to adapt to the agenda of others in all regions of the world”?

RB: Obviously, in his very regrettable remarks on Taiwan, President Macron is deeply ignoring his own Indo-Pacific policy. The French were the first to come up with an Indo-Pacific policy. They should be proud that they have been leading the EU on their way towards understanding that this is going to be the central region of the world in the 21st century. Now, as you say, Taiwan lies at the heart of the region and you cannot have an Indo-Pacific strategy without dealing with Taiwan. We not only have our own trade, investment, and economic interests, but we also have an interest in showing solidarity with the like-minded democracy. I think his remarks were just very ill-considered; I would say, a third Gaullism, maybe 15 per cent being overly exhausted, and a lot of vanity led to these remarks.

9DL: How has China responded to these speeches and comments? Could you speak to the future of EU-China relations, and what in your view is the best way to deal with a demonstrably more confident and assertive China?

RB: We should not expect simplistic answers to the perennial question of how we deal with our so-called unity in diversity. It is always difficult to speak with one voice. But I think when you take a step back and compare the situation today with the situation seven years ago, we have clearly come closer together and that is positive. China has responded to our clarification about where we stand and what we expect with an attitude of the arrogance of power. They have unlearnt listening to others sometimes, I feel. But we should not let that unsettle us. As Annalena Baerbock said already in the last electoral campaign cycle, we have to walk on two legs. We have to combine dialogue and toughness.

9DL: Where do the European Parliament and Commission stand on China, and in your view, where does the balance of power sit within Europe in this regard? Do you feel that EU unity is being affected by individual member states’ initiatives and positions vis-a-vis China?

RB: The European Parliament’s stance on China has been transparent for years. We have taken these positions with overwhelming majorities. We don't mince words and we recognise the systemic rivalry. We want to pursue a realistic and sober approach and I think when you take the speech by President von der Leyen as a yardstick, the Commission is on a similar trajectory. We are closer together than we have been and we hope we will also find more understanding within the European Commission for the Parliament’s position on Taiwan for fostering stronger relationships with the country.

9DL: What can we expect from Germany’s soon-to-be-launched China Strategy, and to what extent will it be aligned with the EU’s priorities?

RB: The government in Berlin promised in its coalition agreement signed at the end of 2021 that we would pursue a European China policy, and that we would put more emphasis on common EU priorities. This is still our ambition. I think the foreign minister’s statements provide a very clear indication of what we will find in the German government’s China strategy.

9DL: Macron also had a lot to say about Europe’s strategic autonomy. On the one hand, Europe needs the US and the rest of the world to act against Russian aggression in Ukraine. On the other hand, Macron seemed to argue for Europe to stay out of issues that ‘don’t affect it’. How does this dichotomy affect Europe’s global standing?

RB: I have never been a fan of the "strategic autonomy" slogan. I am convinced that "strategic autonomy à la française" would be very risky for the EU. I am rather in favour of a policy of strategic solidarity with democratic and other like-minded partners, including, of course, Taiwan. Regarding the second part of your question, I think it is an illusion that the EU can withdraw behind its own walls and isolate itself from what happens in other corners of the world. If the EU wants to be a geopolitical player, it has to deal with global realities. As a German playwright once taught us: "He, who did not share the fight, will share the defeat". We should be wise and not believe that we can save our own skin by avoiding the necessary international solidarity in pushing back against the imperialist and hegemonic ambitions of authoritarian regimes.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of Reinhard Bütikofer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Biography

Reinhard Bütikofer is one of the Co-Chairs of EGP, and MEP for the German Green party Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. He also serves as the Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with China and sits on the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and is a substitute member of the Committee on International Trade (INTA). Image credit: Wikimedia.