2022: Europe and the Indo-Pacific

4 January 2022

9DASHLINE invited a number of leading experts to explore the prospects for greater EU engagement with the geopolitical centre of gravity as several member states including Germany, France, and the Netherlands are now crafting independent Indo-Pacific strategies.

We, therefore, ask — what are the prospects for a cohesive European approach to the Indo-Pacific given several major EU member states are increasingly acting independently?

COORDINATED ACTION A PRAGMATIC WAY FORWARD

Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague.

The Indo-Pacific is now firmly in the lexicon of officials in Brussels and European capitals. 2022 will be the year to deliver on the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of September 2021, pushed in particular by France, Germany and the Netherlands. It is also the year to turn into reality the Global Gateway initiative of December 2021, advocated for by the European Commission President. That means promoting individual freedom, political liberty, and economic openness and resilience, together with partners that share Europe’s interests. The challenge for EU action in the Indo-Pacific lies in competing priorities of EU member states, rather than in competing interests. Coordinated action on niches where specific players wish to deliver is the way forward.

Two promising new approaches are emerging. First, working through ‘pioneer’ or lead states. Second, the Team Europe approach — a shorthand for enhanced coordination between varying groups of European stakeholders, including EU institutions, EU Member States, European financial institutions, as well as the private sector and civil society. Hence, expect France to take the lead in the military domain, where positive experiences with so-called ‘coordinated maritime presences’ in the Gulf of Guinea are taken to the Indo-Pacific. As an example of the Team Europe approach, think of member states’ contributions to EU-ASEAN cybersecurity cooperation by way of cyber policy dialogues and capacity building. The Netherlands has initiated action with Indonesia and Singapore, and dialogues with South Korea will follow. Coordinated and coherent action by (groups of) European players that act on their own niche, is a pragmatic way for the EU to prove its worth in the Indo-Pacific. The time is ripe: France and the Czech Republic, who will hold the EU-Presidency in the first and second half of 2022 respectively, are making the Indo-Pacific a priority.

EMPHASISE CREDIBILITY AND VALUE

Antoine Bondaz, Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) and Associate Professor at Sciences Po Paris.

The European Union’s adoption of a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in the fall of 2021 is an excellent step. However, this is only the beginning of a process and its implementation will be the next crucial move. This is one of the issues at stake during the French presidency of the Council of the European Union and the ministerial summit to be held on 22 February 2022 in Paris. Several points require strengthening: the Indo-Pacific should be better characterised by emphasising its maritime dimension; some key initiatives should be announced; provide a fact sheet of the EU’s role in the region must be provided; the focus on civil society should be strengthened; and, synergies must be identified among countries that have announced their Indo-Pacific strategies. The European strategy must start moving beyond speeches to be translated into action.

In terms of European coordination, a major effort has been underway for many months, including steps to take into account the interests and concerns of the Member States. The appointment of coordinators at various levels — the Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, Christophe Penot, in France in 2020, and the EU Special Envoy for Indo-Pacific, Gabriele Visentin, at the European Union-level, and Special Envoy to the Indo-Pacific, Libor Secka, by the Czech Republic, in 2021 — is an excellent step forward.

From now on, the European Union must insist on its credibility and added value. The latter is considerable. Europeans are the leading investors and providers of official development assistance in the Indo-Pacific. Even if their role is limited in traditional security matters, especially military affairs, they can play a key role in limiting the binary choice between the United States and China that many countries fear to face. Not so much by serving as a third way, which is illusory, but by presenting concrete alternatives in a variety of areas, especially the economy, public health, and the fight against climate change.

GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS

Garima Mohan, Fellow with the Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States.

A smart European approach to the Indo-Pacific — a vast and dynamic region with a wide range of challenges — needs to include both the EU and the member states to be effective. The EU’s adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategy in September 2021 indicates a degree of consensus among different European countries that the Indo-Pacific is crucial and outlines seven areas where the EU can contribute to regional stability and security. At the same time, it is important to remember that member states like France, Germany and the Netherlands also have their own national strategies for the region, bilateral security and diplomatic ties with partners, and different levels of existing engagement with the region.

The EU’s approach needs to be greater than the sum of its parts. Out of the priority areas outlined in the EU strategy, on the question of security and military engagement, member states will pursue their own approaches. But here too there is some degree of European coordination emerging. For example, The Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen joined the United Kingdom’s carrier strike group deployment in the Indo-Pacific. The EU can encourage member states to coordinate amongst themselves through instruments like ‘Coordinated Maritime Presences’ mentioned in the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, and also coordinate with key European external partners.

But there are other efforts that need to be led primarily by Brussels and member states will have to make sure they don’t duplicate efforts or undercut wider EU strategy. This pertains to areas like connectivity and investments in digital and physical infrastructure, where the combined resources of the EU and member states as well as public and private investments, will have a greater impact and bring in more leverage for Europe.

BEWARE THE LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

Michael Reiterer, former EU Ambassador and Distinguished Professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance

The French, German and Dutch papers were precursors to the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was endorsed by all Member States. This must be seen in the context of the 2018 Connectivity Strategy for Asia and the 2021 Global Gateway. The Strategy creates a comprehensive program for engagement in response to mounting isolationism paired with nationalism. This allows the EU to avoid the pitfall of seeing everything through the Chinese prism or the US-China competition. It offers partners a platform to enlarge their room of manoeuvre in opening a pathway to more autonomy from which the will EU profit.

The principal risk is non-implementation because of a lack of political will and the assigning of inadequate financial resources. This would wreck the EU’s ambition to influence international politics and be detrimental to its credibility, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, taking on strategic responsibility, developing a common European threat perception, and policies to meet these challenges through the Strategic Compass, is the homework for 2022.

AN EU APPROACH TO THE INDO-PACIFIC

Angela Stanzel, Associate with the Asia Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

There has actually been increasing cohesion among the EU member states towards the Indo-Pacific region, in particular among France, Germany, and the Netherlands, each of whom released their own Indo-Pacific strategy in recent years. France has been moving beyond its focus on security (see the updated Indo-Pacific strategy of 2021) and Germany has been moving towards security (eg the German Navy frigate Bayern patrol and training mission to the Indo-Pacific). What all these strategies have in common is that they are not purely focused on a national agenda, but on building an EU approach to the region.

This approach is reflected in the Joint Communication on the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy of 16 September 2021. The new strategy is an important step towards raising the EU’s profile in the Indo-Pacific, opening the door to a combined approach among the EU member states to deal with the region as a whole. And the prospects for a cohesive European approach to the Indo-Pacific have never been as good as today.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: European Union, 2021.