The EU’s self-perceived role in the Indo-Pacific — still a normative power?
The EU’s self-perceived role in the Indo-Pacific — still a normative power?
WRITTEN BY PHUONG MAI TRAN
8 September 2022
Nowadays, no international actor can be considered a genuine global power without a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Although the EU is the top investor in the region, the top provider of development assistance, and among the largest traders in the Indo-Pacific, it is not commonly considered a major player in the region. Mention of the EU is still largely absent from Indo-Pacific regional discussions. Brussels hesitated to use the concept ‘Indo-Pacific’ until 2020, and was late in producing its Indo-Pacific strategy compared to other powers. However, the recent strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific have forced the EU to re-evaluate and redefine its role in the region.
The EU has long portrayed itself as ‘a force of good’ on a global scale — the label ‘normative power’ was originally created to describe the EU’s international character. However, reputation is one thing, self-perception another. The EU’s newly-released Indo-Pacific strategy explicitly indicates its ambition for a larger geopolitical footprint in the Indo-Pacific, and by looking at the role that Brussels sees for itself in the Indo-Pacific, we may find whether its ‘normative power’ role conception remains, or whether it has already evolved with additional interpretations and new ambitions.
The EU’s self-perceived role in the Indo-Pacific region — a proactive cooperative power
France was the first EU member to develop its own guideline for the Indo-Pacific, followed by Germany and the Netherlands. The piecemeal approach of several individual strategies, rather than a joint approach, limited Europe’s overall influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, the EU member states were determined to change this situation by asking the European Commission and the EU High Representative to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy in the form of a joint communication. Compared to other major players in the Indo-Pacific, the EU was late in defining its strategy. However, late is still better than never. The EU might be late in its Indo-Pacific strategy, but it is in no way a newcomer or a follower in the region.
Obviously, the EU must prioritise Europe’s defence. The important question here is whether its Indo-Pacific strategy would be affected as a result.
Witnessing the flurry of military activities and economic manoeuvres in the Indo-Pacific over the past few years, Brussels recognises that no international actor can be considered a genuine global power without a strong presence in the region. Soft power is no longer enough to protect one’s interests globally, and the regional body attaches increasing importance to strategic thinking and hard power. As President von der Leyen and Vice-President Borrell have said, “it is time for the EU to learn the language of power”. Therefore, the EU’s self-defined role in the Indo-Pacific is more than just being the ‘normative power’ it is usually recognised as.
Looking closely at the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Brussels sees itself as a ‘proactive cooperative power’ in the Indo-Pacific region. This term refers to the EU’s strategic autonomy, which is ready to stand up to protect its interests and values with strong political, economic, and cultural influence in the region and worldwide. Altogether, the EU’s ‘proactive cooperative power’ role conception implies its commitment to cooperate with any actor in the Indo-Pacific that is not against the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and sustainable development.
A pragmatic calculation
To play a more pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific, the EU has to confront its lack of hard power and defence commitments. Its Common Security and Defence Policy remains intergovernmental, and Brussels does not have independent capabilities in that area. Hence, the question arises, how can the EU contribute meaningfully to the Indo-Pacific through more strategic engagement? The EU’s response is to ‘play to its strength’, pointing to partnerships and multi-dimensional cooperation based on principled engagement.
However, the EU’s self-defined role as a cooperative power has a deeper strategic implication: it provides an alternative way to conceive regional relations as neither pro- nor anti-China. Instead of deepening regional polarisation, Brussels has lent its full support to the ASEAN-led regional multilateral architecture. While the minilateralism that the US, Japan, the UK, Australia, and India have recently engaged in tends to increase exclusiveness and polarisation, multilateralism promotes inclusiveness and helps to mediate estrangement among states — especially the great powers. The EU’s message is clear: it is unnecessary to see everything in the region through the lens of geopolitical rivalry. In that way, Brussels avoids having to pick sides between the US and China.
Acknowledging that it is late in formulating the Indo-Pacific strategy, the EU tries to distinguish itself from other powers. On the one hand, it expresses its commitment to regional maritime security but “does not want to create rival blocs or force countries to take sides”. On the other hand, Brussels presents an alternative to the United States’ hard focus, promoting a ‘less military’ agenda by bolstering economic integration and improving standards and regulatory frameworks. Of course, geopolitical calculations are still there, as is the case with the EU’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific and the ambitious Global Gateway strategy. However, with an advantage and reputation in normative issues, Brussels seeks to build its image as a reliable, responsible, and predictable partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
Challenges
Normative influence still plays an important part, but the EU’s power approach is getting more comprehensive, pragmatic, and interest-based. Moving from a normative power to a ‘proactive cooperative power’ approach, the EU emphasises a higher level of strategic autonomy. Civilian instruments remain the most popular tool of the EU’s approach to foreign policy, but in recent years, its preference for combining different civilian with military tools has increased considerably. Although the EU’s military capabilities remain limited compared to other powers, its foreign policymakers have opened up to more ambitious and comprehensive agendas and a stronger military component in its foreign policy operation.
However, to enact its self-defined role as a ‘proactive cooperative power’ in the Indo-Pacific region, Brussels will have to face some challenges. The first challenge comes from the EU itself: its consensus-based political position. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy signals a unified shift toward the strategic region, but finding consensus will be much harder when it comes to implementation. Up to now, several EU member states remain ambivalent and show no real foreign policy interest in the Indo-Pacific region. The second challenge is the ‘China factor’. It is hard (perhaps even impossible) for the EU to engage more deeply in the Indo-Pacific without confronting China on several major issues, such as unfair trade practices, human rights abuses, military expansion, and cyberattacks. Although the EU emphasises that its Indo-Pacific strategy is about cooperation rather than confrontation, it prefers to cooperate with certain parts of the region (its ‘like-minded partners’) and can hardly avoid upsetting others.
The third challenge is related to the EU’s aim for a meaningful naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Due to its limited military capabilities, enhancing its naval presence beyond the western Indian Ocean will be difficult. Moreover, Brussels does not possess any meaningful independent capabilities in the field of security and defence. The fourth challenge is that, since the EU’s strategy has not drawn as much attention as other states’ strategies, its presence is not yet of great importance to other major regional players. The regional bloc is seeking to push forward a ‘less military’ narrative, but promoting such alternatives requires enormous efforts in light of other narratives in the region about the decline of multilateralism and the rise of minilateralism.
Last but not least, the EU is currently facing the biggest security threat in decades — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Obviously, the EU must prioritise Europe’s defence. The important question here is whether its Indo-Pacific strategy would be affected as a result. Even once the war is over, a huge amount of funds will be needed to rebuild Ukraine. Consequently, European capacities elsewhere will be restricted. For now, it is unrealistic to expect the EU’s Indo-Pacific agenda, whose financing source is already unclear, to be fully implemented.
To sum up, the EU has provided some answers on where it stands on key Indo-Pacific debates. Regardless of whether Brussels succeeds in enacting its self-perceived role as a ‘proactive cooperative power’ in the Indo-Pacific, there has been growing interest in the EU and its member states around the region. Can the EU translate available resources into a meaningful engagement to become a key geopolitical player in this strategic region? More extensive efforts are needed to prove that the EU is not just a paper tiger in the Indo-Pacific.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Phuong Mai Tran graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam with a BA in International Relations. She is a 4th-semester student of the Erasmus Mundus Master’s Programme “Euroculture - Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context”. Image credit: Flickr/European Parliament.