France in the Indo-Pacific: A credible strategy in the making?

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France in the

Indo-Pacific: a credible strategy in the making?


WRITTEN BY ANTOINE BONDAZ

14 September 2021

A few days before President Emmanuel Macron's trip to Japan and French Polynesia in July 2021, the French government published its "Indo-Pacific Strategy". This 66-page document is without an equivalent in Europe and confirms France as being at the forefront of conceptualising and implementing its own strategy in this region. Following the creation of the position of Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific in September 2020, (filled by the former Ambassador to Malaysia and Australia, to better coordinate the actions of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, and more broadly, the government) this document further affirms France's commitment to the region. Yet, if France is the European country with the most accomplished strategy, it is also perhaps the one with the most misunderstood one.

French sovereignty interests in the region: Unique for an EU member state

The first elements of a strategy for the Indo-Pacific were presented by the President of the Republic as early as spring 2018, during a visit to Australia. It must be recognised that the security, and even military, dimension was omnipresent at the time. One can think of the choice to deliver this founding speech on the Garden Island naval base in front of helicopters and armoured vehicles. The Ministry of the Armed Forces was the first ministry, before the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, to present a Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific in a remarkable setting. Indeed, Minister Florence Parly presented the strategy at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, while the French naval air group, including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, made a port call in the City-State.

France differs from the other member states of the European Union because it has sovereignty interests in the region. More than 1.6 million French citizens live in overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, while three-quarters of France's exclusive economic zone — the second largest in the world — are located in the region. France is not a spectator in the Indo-Pacific, it is a resident power. The power projection to French Polynesia in less than 40 hours, for the first time in June 2021, of three Rafales, two A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport and two A400M Atlas, is the essence of this.

The possibility of renaming the Directorate of Asia and Oceania of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, which includes the sub-directorates of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Far East, to the Directorate of the Indo-Pacific should be considered.

However, it would be wrong to think that French interests in the region can be summed up solely in terms of security interests. Indeed, there is a significant bias in the perception of this strategy, in France and abroad, due to several factors. The Ministry of the Armed Forces was the first to conceptualise and publicly use the Indo-Pacific concept, as the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs had no official documents on the subject for a long time, let alone its own strategy. In addition, the emerging public debate at the level of think-tanks and to a lesser extent universities has focused on security, especially the issue of maritime security, which although essential, is only one of the issues in the area. Finally, one must recognise a certain Chinese obsession in any discussion of the Indo-Pacific. But while the Indo-Pacific strategy is partly about China, it is neither solely about China or against China.

Three major strategic partners and a variety of concrete actions

Australia, India, and Japan are essential to the French Indo-Pacific strategy. Partnerships with these countries are the result of years of work with the signing of a Strategic Partnership with Japan as early as 1995, India in 1998, and Australia in 2012. Since then, bilateral visits have multiplied, at all levels, as have the signing of numerous political and commercial agreements: an agreement for the supply of 36 Rafale aircraft in September 2016, a strategic partnership agreement in 2019 for the construction of twelve Attack class submarines with Australia, etc. Notably, the political-military dialogue at the level of foreign and defence ministers ("2+2") with Japan, initiated following the signing of an exceptional partnership in 2013, is now being extended to Australia. On 30 August 2021, the four ministers held their first virtual dialogue of this type and launched negotiations to strengthen and diversify military cooperation in support of the posture of French forces in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, France now insists on the need to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, including ASEAN which recognises the country as a "development partner" since 2020. France and Japan also supported publicly the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in July.

France supports numerous multilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific that aim to strengthen the response to natural disasters, protect the environment, fight illegal fishing, etc. In February 2020, the multi-donor Kiwa initiative, announced during the 2017 One Planet Summit in Paris, was launched to protect the biodiversity in Oceania and further adapt to climate change using “nature-based solutions”. In April 2020, after cyclone Harold hit Vanuatu and Fiji, France delivered 25 tonnes of humanitarian aid during several operations, carried out by the Forces Armées de la Nouvelle Calédonie (FANC) and the Forces Armées en Polynésie Française (FAPF). France is also increasing its diplomatic presence in regional forums. It joined the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in December 2020 and chaired the 7th Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in Summer 2021.

If the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs continue to play a central role, governmental agencies will become more and more involved. The Agence Française de Développement (AFD)’s mandate for action in the Pacific, first expanded in 2018 to regional projects in the sector of adaptation to climate change and biodiversity, was expanded again in 2021 to include bilateral projects. While France also strengthens the regional network of several research institutions — including the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), the Pasteur Institute, the National Institute for Ocean Science (IFREMER) and the Centre of Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD) — the number of international technical experts deployed among these in the Indo-Pacific will quadruple by 2023.

To better promote and explain this strategy in France

To gain even more credibility and legitimacy in the region, this strategy needs to be supported in France. Although the MPs of the National Assembly, within two information missions from the Committee on National Defense and Armed Forces as well as from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, are now showing explicit interest in the strategy, the general level of knowledge within the political class remains limited. The general public remains largely uninformed through mass media, especially TV, and the very notion of the Indo-Pacific is either completely unknown or misunderstood. What is all the more paradoxical is that despite its international dimension, the Indo-Pacific strategy also has an obvious national dimension: to promote the development and integration of French territories in the region, from Mayotte to French Polynesia, including Reunion and New Caledonia. This was reiterated during President Macron's visit to Reunion Island in 2019 and his slogan "Choose Reunion. United in the Indo-Pacific Space".

In this respect, France should not only communicate better to French people but also further integrate French Indo-Pacific territories into the national strategy. If most of them already host international conferences, for example, Reunion Island is expected to host an IORA meeting in 2021, or bilateral meetings, Nouméa hosted the first Japan-France Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue in Nouméa in 2019, these territories should become central in the framework of increasingly decentralised cooperation. It would also be necessary to highlight other themes such as the issue of agriculture, for example by making these territories pilot areas for sustainable agriculture and excellence, thus serving as models for neighbouring countries with similar geographical and climatic characteristics.

Finally, at the institutional level, while the appointment of a dedicated ambassador for the Indo-Pacific is a positive development, the question of reorganising the geographic perimeters of certain ministries must be addressed. The possibility of merging the Directorate of Asia and Oceania of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, which includes the sub-directorates of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East, with a sub-directorate of the Indian Ocean, while renaming it to the Directorate of the Indo-Pacific should be considered. On that point, more clarity is needed on whether East Africa fully belongs in the Indo-Pacific, as some countries do not include the eastern part of Africa in their definition of the Indo-Pacific (just as they don't include the western part of the Americas). Additionally, the Advisor on Asia and Oceania to the President of the Republic could be renamed Advisor on the Indo-Pacific.

Reaching out to new actors and promoting global maritime dialogues

The French government’s efforts to correct the perception bias mentioned earlier also requires deepening our partnerships and initiatives with other actors beyond the three strategic partners, all members of the Quad format. These new partnerships, which would complement and not replace the three existing ones, are quite natural since other countries in the region share common interests and concerns with France. This is the case, for example, with South Korea, whose New Southern Policy covers the Indo-Pacific. While the issue of cooperation with Taiwan is obviously highly sensitive, technical cooperation already exists in the absence of diplomatic relations. Bilateral or multilateral cooperation on global, non-political issues, such as fighting oceans plastic pollution, should be welcome.

New trilateral formats should also be created. The France-India-Australia format and its initial trilateral dialogue in September 2020, followed by a Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue in May 2021, has so far been focused on maritime safety and security, marine and environmental cooperation, and multilateral engagement. Some concrete progress has been made such as an information-sharing workshop on maritime domain awareness held at the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) where both France and Australia have now assigned a liaison officer. In parallel, a Track 1.5 trilateral was organised for the first time on the margins of the Raisina dialogue by Carnegie India, with the participation of the Indian think-tank Observer Research Foundation, the French Foundation for Strategic Research, and the National Security College of the Australian National University, in spring 2021.

A France-Japan-Australia trilateral dialogue, at both Track 1.0 and Track 1.5 level, focusing on the South Pacific would be worthwhile, the two countries being the rare ones to have diplomatic representations in the French Pacific territories (Tokyo will soon open a consul general in Nouméa). The three countries share common concerns about illegal fishing, resilience in the supply of critical materials, and the Chinese presence in the region. A France-South Korea-Indonesia format would also make it possible to address environmental issues, particularly in terms of green growth and forest protection. Indonesia is home to the world's second-largest peatland, and the 2015 forest fires were one of the world's worst environmental disasters. South Korea has seen a threefold increase in palm oil consumption for biofuels in 15 years, mostly from Indonesia, and has already been involved in projects in the country since the Korea Indonesia Forest Center (KIFC) was established in 2011. These joint development programs, including reforestation projects, would also have the advantage of being ultimately transferable to other Indo-Pacific countries facing major environmental problems such as North Korea.

Eventually, it would be important to replicate the comprehensive maritime dialogue (initiated with Japan in 2019) with other countries. Following the successful Franco-Japanese track 1.5 Global Maritime Seminar, organised by the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) and the Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI) in December 2018 in Tokyo, the two countries have organised the first edition of the Global Maritime Dialogue, a track 1.0 dialogue, in September 2019. Maritime issues are at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, for obvious geographical and political reasons. This format is ideal to discuss a large number of issues (economic, security and environmental) while insisting on an inter-ministerial approach that is still too often lacking in most countries. These track 1.5 / track 1.0 dialogues should also be held, at least, with Australia, South Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam.

With Germany and the Netherlands presenting their own Indo-Pacific policy guidelines at the end of 2020, and the European Union Commission expected to soon present the first draft of an EU cooperation strategy in the region, it is important to maintain this momentum. In this respect, the French presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2022 offers a unique opportunity for France to best promote its interests while contributing to European awareness. If the unique French sovereignty interests explained above raise concerns among European partners about security and military dimensions, it is important to propose concrete initiatives that reassure them while demonstrating the added value of Europeans in the region. This may be the subject of another set of recommendations, in coordination with European partners.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Antoine Bondaz is a Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), as well as an Associate Professor at Sciences Po Paris. Image credit: Wikipedia.