Forum: The G7 Hiroshima Summit
Forum: The G7 Hiroshima Summit
25 May 2023
Over the weekend of May 19-21, leaders from the G7 member nations attended the G7 Hiroshima Summit alongside representatives from eight invited countries, including India, South Korea, and Ukraine.
Unsurprisingly, Russia’s war against Ukraine was high on the agenda, as well as how to interact with China.
9DASHLINE asked a select group of experts to share their assessment of the outcomes of this meeting.
JAPAN’S DIPLOMATIC LEADERSHIP IN A DIVIDED WORLD
SEBASTIAN MASLOW, SENIOR LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, SENDAI SHIRAYURI WOMEN’S COLLEGE
Ever since its destruction in 1945, Hiroshima has served as a global symbol of the horror of nuclear war. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s decision to host this year’s G7 Summit in his home constituency has thus ensured that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was at the top of the agenda. As President Putin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine revived Cold War fears of nuclear annihilation, the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament has reinforced the need to uphold the global norm prohibiting the use of nuclear arms. And yet, despite the symbolism of world leaders gathering at the ground zero of a nuclear strike, the omission of any reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the summit’s final communiqué and the absence of a concrete roadmap to implement the world leaders’ vision raises serious doubts regarding the international community’s commitment to mitigating the risks of nuclear war.
Prime Minister Kishida’s successful initiative to bring Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to the table of this year’s summit ensured that Russia’s illegal war remained at the centre of discussion. As a result, world leaders restored their commitment to Ukraine’s defence. Tokyo also advocated broadening the front against Russia by strengthening coordination with the ‘Global South’. Kishida’s effort to initiate a dialogue between Zelenskyy and the leaders of India, Indonesia, and Brazil illustrates Japan’s proactive role in global security affairs. Yet, failing to bridge international divisions, the G7 again illustrated the deep rifts that continue to divide the world over Russia’s war and China’s growing global presence.
For years, Japan has promoted a global geostrategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific designed to counter the risks posed by a rising China. In this way, Kishida worked hard to ensure that the G7 agenda addressed Tokyo’s specific regional security concerns (in fact, the final communiqué mentions China 20 times) while restating an international commitment to a rules-based liberal international order. The G7 leaders’ commitment to economic security through ‘de-risking’ and ‘decoupling’ from China (and Russia) to secure global supply chains is consistent with this ongoing geostrategic rebalancing. At this summit, however, Prime Minister Kishida and his colleagues again failed to outline concrete steps to install an international order that addressed the concerns of the ‘Global South’, thus making their switching position unlikely.
CONVERGENCE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY — BUT WILL IT PASS ITS FIRST STRESS TEST?
ELISABETH WINTER, PROGRAMME DIRECTOR, GLOBAL MARKETS & SOCIAL JUSTICE, BUNDESKANZLER-HELMUT-SCHMIDT-STIFTUNG (BKHS)
Hiroshima was the first G7 Summit that featured economic security high on the group’s joint agenda with an already decent outcome: the G7 leaders committed to a separate communiqué on economic resilience and economic security that displays the group’s new level of convergence on economic security and its position towards China. But it remains a balancing act on how far the scope of national security will stretch into the economic sphere during implementation.
Prioritising de-risking over decoupling, the G7 agreed on a common language about reducing existing vulnerabilities in global supply chains, notably, its dependencies from China, similar to the one the European Commission introduced a few weeks ago. The G7 refuses to turn inwards and to cut off all business ties with China. To enhance its global economic resilience, it concentrates on the reduction of excessive dependencies in critical supply chains.
The G7 leaders acknowledged that security has taken centre stage in global economic dynamics with China as a main practitioner of weaponised interdependence. To deter other nations from using economic leverage to pressure others into political concessions, the G7 partners launched a new Coordinated Platform on Economic Coercion. Underlining its commitment to a free international order, the G7 seeks to cooperate with partners beyond the original seven members and to develop targeted instruments.
Out of the many issues in terms of economic security, the G7 is right to focus on strengthening supply chain resilience and deterring economic coercion. But it still needs to agree on a common practice of de-risking, concrete measures to counter malign economic activities, and criteria regarding when to prioritise security over the economy. So far, their individual national approaches have been different as their policy decisions are largely influenced by the extent of their varying dependencies on China.
THE EU IS SHAPING THE NARRATIVE ON CHINA, BUT WILL THE CONSENSUS ENDURE?
DR ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY, HEAD OF THE ASSOCIATE NETWORK AT 9DASHLINE AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT NATIONAL DONG HWA UNIVERSITY
Going into the G7 Summit, expectations were high that the leaders of the seven leading economies would manage to consolidate their emerging convergence on China, and outline a coordinated response to threats presented by its continuous rise. In this sense, the summit was a success. By agreeing on common — and comprehensive — language on China, the leaders showed political will to act together to address economic and political threats. In other words, the summit delivered on articulating a positive geostrategic vision based on de-risking, not decoupling.
De-risking is what European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promoted in the EU and encouraged its partners to pursue. Therefore, judging from Brussels’ perspective, the G7 embracing this language is a sign of European leadership in shaping the new democratic narrative on China, where cooperation, rather than confrontation, remains the priority. Agreement on a return to cooperation with China — as long as Beijing acts in line with international rules — is an encouraging outcome, given that no global challenge can be addressed without China. Yet, whether the G7 countries can sustain their consensus is what will matter most in the coming months, including on Taiwan.
De-risking can still mean different things to different governments in the G7, so one should not overestimate the outcome of the summit. One question remains even after the summit: how can democratic countries ensure peace and security in the Taiwan Strait while reassuring Beijing that cooperation with Taiwan is their right and not in violation of relations with the People’s Republic of China? Only by asserting clearly and consistently their right — as they did at the summit, although not strongly enough — can they effectively push back against Beijing’s disinformation, and deter further pressure on Taiwan. Whether they will manage to do so will determine the success of the summit.
G7 INTERNATIONALISES THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE
DR ASHTON CHO, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION AT THE KOREA ASSOCIATION OF MILITARY STUDIES
This year’s statement is certainly the strongest G7 statement we have seen on Taiwan. Most notable is the internationalisation of the Taiwan Strait issue: describing the “importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” as being “indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community”. However, I think the more consequential texts affecting Taiwan are in the Standalone Statements.
Take the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine. This condemns Russia’s invasion as illegal, shows plans for tighter sanctions, and demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of all annexed territories. This is significant because the statement rejects China’s 12-point Ukraine peace plan released in February. It means the G7 will not let China interpret the UN Charter, define what aggression is, decide on punitive international sanctions, and dictate the terms of peace. When the implications are listed like this, you can see how the Ukraine statement also has the Taiwan Strait in mind.
The second is the Leader’s Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security. This statement outlines a series of coordinated measures to reduce economic dependency on China and vulnerability to China’s economic coercion. Promising among these is the Coordinated Platform on Economic Coercion, a multilateral mechanism to collectively prepare, assess, deter, and respond to Chinese economic coercion. If successful, the Coordinated Platform will complement G7’s punitive trade sanctions with defensive trade countermeasures. This will strengthen deterrence against China’s aggressive ambitions, but more importantly, blunt one of Beijing’s major tools for coercing states to align with China against Taiwan. If G7 actions follow G7 statements, more support should be coming Taiwan’s way.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Image credit: European Union, 2023.