Sweden's EU presidency and the Indo-Pacific: A letter from Stockholm
Sweden’s EU presidency and the Indo-Pacific: A Letter from Stockholm
WRITTEN BY AXEL NORDENSTAM
6 February 2023
On 1 January, Sweden took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union from the Czech Republic. Since the European legislative period 2019-2024 is about to end, policymakers are expecting thousands of meetings and much legislative activity in the coming months. For Stockholm, the presidency offers an opportunity to look beyond national interests and serve as an “honest broker” in European policy-making. The new Swedish government has the chance to showcase its European commitment during this third Swedish EU presidency. At the same time, Stockholm could find new signature priorities for future engagements in European foreign policy.
Yet, the timing of the presidency is undoubtedly challenging. The EU faces war in Ukraine, great power competition between the US and China, spiking energy prices, and inflation in the European common market. Additionally, the EU member states show disunity about the need for treaty reform. The new Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson seems to be aware of this: “Europe finds itself in a dark age,” he recently said in a speech. Other European leaders have also reminded us of the cost of energy dependencies in times of crisis. Implementing the European Green Deal and the EU’s plan for the green transition “Fit for 55” will be critical, not just for the Swedish presidency but also for the Commission and the Union as a collective bloc.
A neighbourhood-first presidency, but not without a global outlook
Released on 14 December, the 34-page long work program details foreign policy direction on a number of issues. As expected, the Swedish presidency will attempt to “contribute to a united, engaged, and effective EU” as well as “to strengthen the EU as a global actor”. A strong transatlantic link and working with “trusted partners” is essential. In the same paragraph as EU policy on China, the presidency program also states a commitment to “continue to implement the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the conclusions of the 2022 ministerial conference. The focus will be on security and defence, value chains, climate and sustainability, and trade relations”. The work program also underlines support for the ongoing trade negotiations with Australia, India, Indonesia, and New Zealand as well as for the EU’s partnership agenda in the Indo-Pacific region.
As Ukraine is the top European priority, it would make sense for Indo-Pacific partners to consider joint projects in and for Ukraine. The reconstruction of Ukraine could benefit from such cooperation.
While supporting trade negotiations was also an objective in the Czech presidency work program (from July to December 2022), the Swedish and the Czech presidencies differ on the Indo-Pacific. First, unlike the Czech presidency, the Swedish work program lacks a specific geographical focus on the Indo-Pacific and deals instead with a broad range of regions and thematic areas. Second, the Czech presidency detailed ambitions for an Indo-Pacific Digital Partnership, alongside the Trade and Technology Councils (TTC) that the EU already has with the US and India. Neither the proposal of a digital partnership with the Indo-Pacific nor the TTC with India is mentioned in the Swedish presidency program. Third, the Czech presidency work program highlighted the importance of EU-ASEAN ties, whereas ASEAN is not even featured in the Swedish presidency program.
The Swedish presidency work program is unclear on how the vague formulations about the Indo-Pacific will be implemented. What will Stockholm prioritise from the outcomes of the Ministerial Forum in Paris, which gathered 27 EU foreign ministers and around 30 representatives from the Indo-Pacific region? Will Stockholm arrange a second edition of the Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum like the one that was held in Paris? Will Stockholm push for a new fund for joint international development projects with Indo-Pacific partners? Will Stockholm propose any new initiatives? These questions remain unanswered.
Indo-Pacific: Swedish foreign policy change or a temporary commitment?
One reason for Sweden’s vague formulations about the Indo-Pacific may be the Swedish view of the Indo-Pacific as such. Although Sweden has long-lasting engagements with Asian partners, pays close attention to Asian economies, appreciates bilateral relations with Indo-Pacific countries, and is active at the EU level in forming European foreign policy, Stockholm has thus far paid minimal attention to the notion of the Indo-Pacific. Deciding how to engage with China has been Stockholm’s main Asia-related challenge, at the expense of engaging with the Indo-Pacific region comprehensively. Instead of writing guidelines like Germany and the Netherlands or devising a comprehensive regional strategy like France, Stockholm supported the development of the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific and participated in the ministerial conference in Paris. Until recently, however, that was all.
In December, Sweden appointed its first Indo-Pacific Envoy, who will coordinate the Swedish contribution to the implementation of the EU-wide Indo-Pacific Strategy. The group of Indo-Pacific Envoys in Europe now consists of officials representing the EU, France, Sweden, and the Czech Republic. While the EU and the French Ambassadors are fixed positions, the Swedish Envoy has only been appointed until August. The new Ambassador, Erik Widman, is a career diplomat who previously served as Climate Security Ambassador. With extensive diplomatic experience, not least as Deputy Head of the Asia Division in the Foreign Office, the appointment illustrates that Sweden wants to be a responsible actor in the strategic Indo-Pacific setting. Significantly, the appointment could enable Stockholm to assess whether Sweden needs a standing Indo-Pacific Envoy who could travel across the region, build European unity, and engage regularly in strategic discussions.
In fact, the new Foreign Minister Tobias Billström stated during the presentation of the EU presidency agenda at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in December that “since the developments in the Indo-Pacific region are of great weight for the future of Europe, Sweden will also work to implement the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. There are many important partner countries for us, such as Japan, India, Australia and South Korea”. Despite this statement, Billström surprisingly did not mention the Indo-Pacific at the annual defence conference arranged by Folk och Försvar in January. This could either show that Billström views the Indo-Pacific from an international cooperation perspective or that he is unsure about what embracing the Indo-Pacific would mean for Swedish foreign policy.
Not just Stockholm, but also the EU as a bloc, is struggling with finding an approach to this new foreign policy environment. After successfully pushing for an EU-wide Indo-Pacific strategy, France focuses on bilateral relationships in the region rather than common EU-wide initiatives. Germany is recalibrating its ties in the Indo-Pacific region and trying to deepen its relationship with India. As the new Swedish government wishes to build closer transatlantic ties, it should engage with Washington to better understand American thinking and explore possibilities for transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Sweden could also consider initiating a coalition with select EU member states to forge new projects with Indo-Pacific partners. Concrete projects that accelerate transitions should be prioritised, including the digital, energy, green, and industry transition. Given the strong existing partnership between Sweden and India, it would be prudent to engage with Indian counterparts on this endeavour.
With the appointment of a Swedish Indo-Pacific Envoy, the new government is opening up for change in Swedish foreign policy. Instead of maintaining a low-profile role in the Indo-Pacific debate, the appointment could imply that Stockholm is considering investing more into building ties with Indo-Pacific partners and being part of the inner circle of European strategy-making for the Indo-Pacific. If the Indo-Pacific becomes a foreign policy priority for the new government, we would see a policy change in Swedish foreign policy. The other interpretation would be that the appointment constitutes a simple way for Sweden to responsibly contribute to common European policy during the presidency, without any long-term commitments.
What Indo-Pacific partners can do to attract more European attention to the region
Undoubtedly, the core priority for the next six months will be to push Russia out of Ukraine and set the foundations for peace in Europe. Since much financial support to Ukraine originates from the EU budget, the common European budget is under pressure. A potential consequence can be a slow implementation of the Global Gateway, even though there are tentative plans to appoint a former European head of state as “Global Gateway czar” who could generate visibility. Given this reality, European policymakers will likely find it easier to convince the European public to support Ukraine over investing financially elsewhere. To some extent, the fear of many strategic thinkers about the Indo-Pacific can be confirmed: it is harder to invest in Indo-Pacific partners with an ongoing war on the continent. For young Europeans, this is also the first war on the continent in their lives.
Moving forward, there is a need for a positive push for cooperation, in the Indo-Pacific as well as in Europe. Indo-Pacific partners can reach out to European capitals — not just Brussels or Stockholm, but to the EU27 — and suggest joint projects. Outreach on European soil would positively surprise European policymakers. As Ukraine is the top European priority, it would make sense for Indo-Pacific partners to consider joint projects in and for Ukraine. The reconstruction of Ukraine could benefit from such cooperation. Partners could also send delegations to think tank conferences and foreign policy platforms across Europe. In these ways, they can play the long game in Europe at a time when the continent is on fire. Such a cooperative push will require a result-oriented approach based on priorities, a shared understanding of current needs, and a lot of outreach.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Axel Nordenstam is a member of ECFR Strategy Group on Indo-Pacific; an Associate Fellow, Swedish Institute of International Affairs; and a PhD Candidate in International Relations, Stockholm University. Image credit: Flickr/Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU.