Written by Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
Lacking confidence and bandwidth, Pakistan’s new government is unlikely to prioritise improving ties with India. If anything, India will be way down the pecking order of its policy actions.
Read MoreWritten by Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
Lacking confidence and bandwidth, Pakistan’s new government is unlikely to prioritise improving ties with India. If anything, India will be way down the pecking order of its policy actions.
Read MoreWritten by Michael Kugelman
Ultimately, like any democratic leader, Muizzu will need to walk a tightrope between foreign policy imperatives and domestic political considerations. A balancing policy abroad will also require one at home.
Read More2022 was a difficult year for Pakistan: A humanitarian crisis sparked by devastating floods, the assassination attempt against former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and a faltering economy. Growing political instability also prompted US President Joe Biden to call Pakistan one of the most dangerous countries in the world, characterising it as “nuclear weapons without cohesion”.
Read MoreWritten by Bashir Abbas
India’s abstentions during the present Ukraine crisis are occurring during the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party, whose right-wing credentials are well established. The 2014 vote on Crimea occurred during the rule of its predecessor — the United Progressive Alliance, a centrist party with the Congress at its helm.
Read MoreWritten by Hamna Tariq
A peaceful Punjab region could prevent bi-national conflicts from spilling over into the region and, as both Punjabs border the seat of governments in Delhi and Islamabad respectively, regional bonhomie is likely to influence central government attitudes.
Read MoreWritten by Archana Atmakuri
The Galwan Valley clash marked the end of the Wuhan-Chennai consensus which had raised hopes that India and China would discuss and resolve deep misunderstandings, however, informal summits failed to prevent the recent tensions in Ladakh.
Read MoreWritten by Velina Tchakarova
India’s geopolitical choices are either joining the US-led bloc of predominantly Anglosphere allies and close partners such as Japan and Australia against China, or, once again, building partnerships of non-aligned middle powers that can navigate through the complex relationship between Washington and Beijing without taking sides.
Read MoreWritten by John Pollock
The continuing presence of the PLA throughout Ladakh, with the pressure being applied on the Depsang Plains and the refusal to withdraw from Gogra and Hot Springs, indicates Beijing is not yet finished eroding India’s tactical position in the Himalayas for its strategic gain.
Read MoreWritten by Claude Rakisits
Militarily, this is an agreement that India needed more than Pakistan, especially following last year’s military confrontation with the Chinese in Ladakh (which is part of the greater Kashmir area). Caught on the backfoot, Delhi could not afford, in military and budgetary terms, to have two active fronts to worry about on its northwest border, particularly given that Pakistan and China are strategic allies.
Read MoreWith Happymon Jacob
When one looks at Sino-EU relations from New Delhi, it seems that the EU is not so critical of Chinese policy. The EU wants to do business with China and Brussels is not very keen to push back on Beijing's aggressive behaviour or criticise its conduct toward smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific. The CAI, which replaces 16 existing economic agreements with Beijing with a single major agreement is perhaps indicative of this.
Read MoreWritten by Javed Iqbal Wani & L. David Lal
The Indian government’s attitude towards the people of the region has become clear over the past year. It has not taken enough steps towards ameliorating Kashmiri fears of Hindu nationalism and overreach by the Indian state has put them at the crossroads of an active confrontation between three nuclear powers in South Asia.
Read MoreWritten by Saurav Sarkar
India has been cautious in talking to the Taliban for multiple reasons, owing to Pakistan’s significant influence over the Taliban, and New Delhi’s commitment to engage with the elected Afghan regime. Some have advocated that India establish communications with the Taliban to keep its options open if or rather when they return to power.
Read MoreWritten by Saurav Sarkar
In March this year AQIS changed the name of its Urdu language magazine Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad to Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind (NGH). This change may have been required in order to give the impression that India would be the priority theatre for AQIS after its apparently successful jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban.
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