Written by Rishma Banerjee
Given the broader context of India’s rivalry with China, and its tightrope act of balancing ties between Russia and the West, New Delhi’s support for the six new BRICS members reflects its broader strategic and geopolitical interests.
Read MoreWritten by Miriam Prys-Hansen and Jan Phillip Ronde
Progress on the issue of loss and damage could benefit from clear engagement by the ‘in-between powers’ in the Global South, such as India, who may be in a position to exert a decisive influence on the outcomes of the COP27 talks.
Read MoreWritten by Giulia Sciorati
As the SCO opens to other Asian sub-regions and even the African continent, Central Asia risks losing its centrality and becoming a minor geographical area compared to the Gulf or Southeast Asia, where the national interests of SCO member states (and China, above all) are prominent.
Read MoreWritten by Bashir Abbas
India’s abstentions during the present Ukraine crisis are occurring during the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party, whose right-wing credentials are well established. The 2014 vote on Crimea occurred during the rule of its predecessor — the United Progressive Alliance, a centrist party with the Congress at its helm.
Read MoreWritten by Anisa Heritage
The E3 could continue to deepen interoperability in flexible small groups including Japan, India, Australia and South Korea on security issues of mutual concern, including cyber defence and maritime domain awareness. Japan has developed strong security ties with France and the UK.
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