BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion
BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion
WRITTEN BY RISHMA BANERJEE
19 December 2023
This August, the BRICS summit in South Africa saw the group more than double its original membership, injecting renewed vigour into the initiative. Although a last-minute impasse briefly stalled proceedings, the fact that Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa unanimously agreed to incorporate six new members — Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — is diplomatically significant.
Despite initially expressing reservations about the group’s expansion and voicing concerns about the eligibility criteria for new members, India took proactive measures during the summit to shape consensus on the selection of new members. New Delhi has long viewed the bloc as a significant entity, given BRICS’ focus on non-traditional security issues and its alignment with India’s priorities of championing Global South causes and promoting multipolarity in foreign policy. Given the broader context of India’s rivalry with China, and its tightrope act of balancing ties between Russia and the West, New Delhi’s support for the six new members reflects its broader strategic and geopolitical interests.
India’s interest in the new members
India’s support for including Argentina in BRICS is underpinned by New Delhi’s recognition of the South American country’s geopolitical and economic importance. In 2019, India signed a strategic partnership with Argentina, which centred on the important goal of boosting economic ties between the countries, focusing primarily on Argentina’s significant markets in the agricultural, pharmaceutical, and IT sectors. The countries also collaborate on issues such as climate change, sustainable development, and counterterrorism. Therefore, a robust partnership with Buenos Aires also aligns with New Delhi’s broader goal of diversifying strategic partnerships and global influence. With both Brazil and Argentina as BRICS members, it gives the group — and by extension India — much greater visibility in South America.
Given the broader context of India’s rivalry with China, and its tightrope act of balancing ties between Russia and the West, New Delhi’s support for the six new BRICS members reflects its broader strategic and geopolitical interests.
India’s backing of Egypt’s BRICS membership was solidified by the recent revitalisation of bilateral relations, reflected in the strategic partnership signed during Prime Minister Modi’s June visit to Cairo. Egypt is Africa’s second-largest economy and a key member of the African Union (AU), a regional bloc that has been on the radar of India’s recent foreign policy. This is primarily because India wants to counter China’s growing presence in the continent, as well as explore the economic and strategic potential that the continent offers.
In this regard, India also considers Ethiopia as a pivotal African nation, given its role as the seat of the AU. India has consistently supported Ethiopia's positions in international forums, including on issues like the Tigray crisis and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This alignment stems from India's advocacy for greater African representation in global platforms. New Delhi lobbied hard for the AU’s inclusion in the G20, and the Union’s acceptance as a member of the Group not only reflected growing global interest in Africa but also solidified India’s position as a leader of the Global South. With Egypt and Ethiopia in the BRICS Plus format, India can use this platform as a launchpad for more targeted engagement with African nations.
Including Middle Eastern countries in BRICS likewise aligns with India's growing engagement in the region to further its energy, trade, and broader geopolitical interests. India's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East are exemplified by various strategic partnerships and projects, for example, the I2U2 grouping, which includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, and is aimed at enhancing economic cooperation. Additionally, India is engaged in the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-mode network of ship, rail, and road routes for moving freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe. These initiatives, alongside the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC), demonstrate India's commitment to deepening ties and creating new avenues for trade and diplomatic relations across the region.
The expansion of BRICS bolsters India's strategic position, especially in the Middle East — a region pivotal to its interests. First, the Middle East is a key supplier of oil and gas to India and is therefore vital for its energy security. For example, in 2020-21, about 53 per cent of India's oil imports came from the region. Second, the welfare of the large Indian diaspora there, which contributes to India’s economy with its remittances, is crucial. In 2019, remittances from the Gulf countries amounted to over USD 40 billion. Therefore, New Delhi has an interest in maintaining the region’s political stability and is keen to increase its diplomatic presence there.
India's Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the UAE epitomises its robust engagement with the Gulf region. There are political divergences between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi, as India is seeking strategic autonomy in its relationship with Iran and is adopting a cautious stance towards China's regional ambitions. However, the India-UAE relationship is prospering, buoyed by a high volume of bilateral trade and mutual investments. The UAE serves as a linchpin for India's outreach to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), facilitating access to a collective economic and strategic front. The BRICS platform can amplify this relationship, allowing India to solidify economic ties, secure energy partnerships, and create a diplomatic balance amid varying regional interests, particularly as India navigates the intricacies of Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Despite fluctuations in the India-Iran relationship (due to factors such as the US-India nuclear deal and sanctions on Tehran), their collective vision of their strategic partnership, present in the signed New Delhi Declaration in 2003, remains crucial. Iran's geographical proximity to Central Asia and its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as India’s interest and stake in the Chabahar Port, make it a highly significant partner for India.
India has also been making steady efforts to cultivate a robust partnership with Saudi Arabia, exemplified by the signing of a strategic partnership in 2010 and the establishment of a Strategic Partnership Council between the two countries. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy away from the West positioned it favourably to gain India’s support in its membership bid.
Implications of the BRICS expansion
The inclusion of new members in the BRICS grouping heralds a significant shift in the global economic and geopolitical landscape. The original five BRICS nations already account for a significant portion of the global economic output, surpassing the Group of Seven (G7) nations in terms of combined gross domestic product (GDP). Upon its expansion, BRICS's global GDP share by PPP would climb to 37 per cent, overtaking the G7's 30.7 per cent, while its share in world exports and imports is projected to increase by 3.7 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. Likewise, the expanded BRICS represents 46 per cent of the world's population. With another 22 formal applications for membership pending, the group could evolve into a formidable alternative to Western-dominated institutions of global governance.
This expansion consolidates the BRICS' presence in key regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and South America, further enhancing its global footprint. With six of the top ten oil-producing nations globally now part of the grouping, BRICS Plus will account for 42 per cent of global oil production. This shift in energy dynamics could have far-reaching implications for global energy markets and geopolitics. Furthermore, although de-dollarisation is not presently on the group’s agenda, the recent summit took tangible steps towards using local currencies in trade. Establishing the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and introducing the BRICS Pay digital payment platform, both of which are tailored to accommodate transactions in local currencies, are foundational initiatives for realising this goal. The possibility that a significant portion of global trade could potentially be conducted internally within the BRICS grouping is a source of concern for Western stakeholders.
Looking ahead, India is likely to benefit from the expansion of BRICS — despite it being called a ‘Chinese project’, on account of China being the largest economy with the most robust outreach. The current members maintain cordial, if not friendly, relations with India. Furthermore, many of them also have strong and enduring ties with the US. This balance will help the BRICS to not become a China-led group. India can be comfortable in the knowledge that for now, BRICS Plus can be perceived as a non-Western group but not an anti-West one. Further expansion of the group in the coming years may pose a challenge to this narrative, especially if new members are less inclined towards favourable bilateral relations with India. However, cultivating strong ties with the members now will help cement India’s position in the group, thus enhancing its capacity to influence decisions taken by the group in its favour.
India's historical leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and its strong ties with the Global South positions it well to navigate a further expansion if it occurs at all. The real challenge instead will be instituting a consensus-based decision-making process within BRICS. With the membership now at 11 countries, this may become more complex as BRICS lacks a proper secretariat. Nevertheless, for now, the BRICS expansion has the potential to advance Indian interests and bolster its influence within a select group of nations that it seeks to deepen relations with.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Rishma Banerjee is a geopolitical research analyst at SratNewsGlobal in Delhi, working on South Asian geopolitics with a focus on Pakistan and human rights issues. With a master’s in political science from Jadavpur University, she specialises in Indian foreign policy, particularly in the context of non-traditional security challenges such as climate and migration. Image credit: Flickr/GovernmentZA.