From the Wuhan Consensus to the Moscow Agreement: Unlocking the India-China conundrum

3 June 2021

India and China experienced two major clashes along their border in 2017 and 2020. In the years between these standoffs, both countries held informal summits, first in Wuhan in April 2018 and then in Chennai in April 2019, raising hopes of renewing bilateral relations with mechanisms for maintaining peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). However, the series of clashes in Ladakh beginning in May 2020, dubbed as one of the deadliest since the 1962 border war proved otherwise. India affirmed the border issue is now the most important part of their bilateral ties, and the tensions along the LAC have repercussions on the overall bilateral relationship.

A few months after the border tensions, in September 2020, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reached a five-point agreement at a meeting in Moscow on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conclave. India negotiated three main aspects to come to a temporary solution. First, the LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties. Second, neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally. Finally, all agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties. These points were essential for returning to the pre-April 2020 border position. Furthermore, India reiterated there must be no change in the status of the LAC. India and China agreed to end the eight-month-long border tension by implementing the Moscow Agreement as part of disengagement along the LAC in February 2021.

Many scholars, including M Taylor Fravel, argue that China’s recent assertiveness along the LAC could have been triggered by India’s move to change the status quo of Kashmir, which includes the disputed boundary in Aksai Chin. India’s declaration that the Kashmir issue is an internal matter, and its decision to develop large-scale infrastructure projects in the region are believed to have alarmed China. The recent tensions are far more consequential than the previous border clashes as the Chinese declined to vacate from Hot Springs, Depsang, and Gogra, attempting to reach the areas of their 1960 claim line and move away from the initial agreement. Amid the recent tensions in Ladakh, and the resulting deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, the key question is, what happened to the Wuhan-Chennai cooperative spirit that so dominated discourse less than two years prior?

Wuhan-Chennai cooperative spirit: A damp squib

The Wuhan Consensus between India and China in 2018 set expectations of a bilateral rapprochement following the Doklam standoff in Bhutan. Although perceived as a means to resolve disputes peacefully, the informal summit failed to address key areas of tensions such as the disputed border in Kashmir, rendering the Wuhan spirit merely a makeshift resolution. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to share information between the militaries along the LAC during the 2018 Wuhan Summit and reiterated the importance of peace along the border for the stability of bilateral relations. This cooperative spirit was carried to Chennai in 2019, which offered no new breakthrough, but raised hopes that India and China were heading towards a new direction by agreeing to respect each other’s developmental and national aspirations. The Chennai summit focused more on bridging the trade deficit, giving little attention to the structural trust deficit along the border and in overall relations.

The Galwan Valley clash marked the end of the Wuhan-Chennai consensus which had raised hopes that India and China would discuss and resolve deep misunderstandings, however, informal summits failed to prevent the recent tensions in Ladakh.

While both summits were informal chats between Modi and Xi and did not result in joint statements, direct communication between the two leaders was believed to help build trust between the regional rivals. The media hype surrounding the summits renewed expectations for improvements in bilateral ties — but this excitement did not last long. The increase in tensions along the LAC in 2020 reflects the failure of the Wuhan and Chennai summits in diminishing the simmering strategic tensions between India and China. In fact, the summits seemed more like media campaigns for both leaders through the ‘beginning of a new chapter’ in the bilateral relations without a serious outcome. A warming of ties around the Wuhan Summit was necessary given the Doklam standoff in 2017, however, the clashes in 2020 show there is little hope of informal summits resolving the structural suspicion and lack of trust between the two countries along the border.

Implications for China-India ties

There are three immediate implications for Sino-Indian relations post-Galwan Valley tensions. First, compared to the Doklam dispute in 2017, the recent tensions reflected India’s readiness to counter Chinese intrusions along the border. Through Operation ‘Snow Leopard’, the Indian military countered Chinese intrusions along the Ladakh border, showing the Indian army’s preparedness. Indian General M.M. Naravane stated, “China realised its habit of creeping forward will not work with India”. In any future clashes of this nature along the border, India will be proactive in countering China.

Second, New Delhi is looking to develop strategic partnerships with like-minded countries to counter China. The Quadrilateral meeting between India, the United States, Australia, and Japan held in March 2021 established India’s importance as a democratic partner. Leaders of the Quad countries highlighted Chinese aggression on land and sea globally (including the LAC). In recent times each of the Quad countries has faced Chinese aggression, for example, the US-China trade war, tensions between Australia and China across a range of issues including trade, the detention of Australian journalists and constant tension between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Quad countries appear more than willing to come forward and extend support to India such as Australian High Commissioner to India Barry O’Farrell’s support for India during tensions along the LAC. Moreover, the border clashes are reshaping India’s ties with other partners such as the United States. This gives India reassurance to counter China over its conduct not just along the LAC but in the wider Indo-Pacific by offering intelligence and information technology to boost India’s security and defence systems.

Third, the trust deficit in the wake of these border issues will continue to impact bilateral ties for the foreseeable future, and the risk of misperceptions, particularly in Ladakh, will remain high. Moreover, it is increasingly evident that tensions along the LAC will affect the broader relationship as stated in the Indian media by Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. In the past, bilateral trade between India and China continued despite tensions. India’s decision to ban the use of Chinese apps arguably did not have a major impact on trade though it represents New Delhi’s willingness to employ tools of economic coercion to take a stand against Beijing’s assertiveness. Friction is likely to intensify between the two countries on various fronts including trade and wider attempts to garner influence in South Asia.

Informal summits must address misperceptions

As the Modi government’s nationalism and global image influence foreign policy and Xi’s determination to achieve the ‘Chinese Dream’ grow further then border clashes seem inevitable. While tensions on the border have taken centre stage (following clashes in Ladakh) New Delhi and Beijing have been trying to deal with the border issue independent of overall relations, unfortunately, the strategy of ignoring the elephant in the room is no longer sustainable. Moreover, the purpose of informal summits is defeated as tensions continue to persist, be it due to border clashes or trade deficits. The Wuhan-Chennai spirit — of a fresh beginning — represented a temporary fix but not a long-term solution to structural issues. Unless informal summits directly address the deep-seated mistrust especially in relation to each sides global aspirations, military build-ups along the border and ambitions in South Asia, then ties will remain prone to misperception.

The Galwan Valley clash marked the end of the Wuhan-Chennai consensus which had raised hopes that India and China would discuss and resolve deep misunderstandings, however, informal summits failed to prevent the recent tensions in Ladakh. Finally, while the Moscow Agreement helped reset bilateral ties by reverting to the status quo ante, it is yet another temporary solution that does not offer long-term solutions to structural issues.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Archana Atmakuri is a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies, an autonomous research institute of National University of Singapore. She works on India's foreign policy, China's international relations and issues in the South China Sea. Image credit: Wikimedia.