At 50, Bangladesh perfects an India-China 'balancing act'

WRITTEN BY RUDABEH SHAHID AND ARAFAT KABIR

2 June 2021

On 26 March, Bangladesh hosted India’s Narendra Modi as the guest of honour to celebrate the country’s 50th anniversary as an independent nation. News of his visit, however, angered both leftist and Islamist sections in Bangladesh, apparently due to the Indian premier’s record on minority rights. Protests followed and these demonstrations turned violent. Rarely does a visit by a foreign leader result in scores of deaths in the host country, and it is almost unheard of when the two countries are close friends. The violent anti-Modi demonstrations in Bangladesh should have served as a wake-up call for India.

Instead, New Delhi chose to overlook them, calling the “riots the doings of the fringe Islamists elements. Nevertheless, a deeper look into the events during that time reveals a more complicated picture, an interplay between lingering frustrations over many policies of the Indian government and Bangladesh’s growing ties with China. Such trends are likely to continue over the next fifty years as Bangladesh looks to maintain its economic progress in partnership with the two Asian rivals.

Schisms in India-Bangladesh relations

Given their shared past and geographic proximity, India features prominently in discussions about Bangladesh’s future. Yet, the unflattering spectacle that unfolded in late March draws a stark contrast between intergovernmental relations and people-to-people ties. Why certain segments in Bangladesh are disenchanted with India, despite a purportedly robust friendship between the two governments, is as much an academic question as a policy one.

If China responds to Bangladesh’s urgent call for help, it will only reinforce the established trend. For now, Dhaka has learned to keep faith in Beijing, which is most evident in Bangladesh’s reluctance in joining the Quad Security Initiative.

One popular explanation in Indian media is the alleged role of Pakistan in planning and funding these anti-Modi protests. These allegations are based on trying to draw links between the Hefazat-e-Islam leadership, the Islamist group that primarily instigated the violence, and the Bangladesh Nationalists Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami — two Bangladeshi political parties which are deemed to have pro-Pakistan leanings. However, reports coming out of Bangladesh suggest otherwise. The lack of control by the Hefazat-e-Islam leadership over their field activists is the likely reason why the protests grew out of control. Moreover, even if Pakistan was somehow able to coordinate with Hefazat, it is implausible that Bangladeshi left-wing parties also protested Modi’s visit at Islamabad’s behest.

Hence, growing anti-India sentiments can hardly be explained as something limited to Islamist factions. One does not need to look far back to find out why. Two relatively recent issues related to India’s citizenship laws, i.e. the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) caused alarm in Bangladesh. Some civil society members are fretful about their ramifications. Many in Bangladesh fear that the outcome of the NRC in the northeastern Indian state of Assam might spark another influx of refugees. Given that Bangladesh already hosts the majority of Rohingya Muslims, who fled brutal persecution in Myanmar, there seems to be a precedent already. Additionally, India’s CAA that grants fast track citizenship to non-Muslim minorities facing persecution in India’s neighbouring countries is another thorny topic. Some in the ruling elite view it as an indictment of Bangladesh’s record in maintaining inter-communal peace.

The incendiary rhetoric employed by India’s ruling party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), against its eastern neighbour also adds to frustration in Bangladesh. The rhetoric of BJP politicians is based on the notion that there is a large number of undocumented Bangladeshis living in India. While it is indeed true that many Bangladeshis had gone to India for economic reasons, now with Bangladesh enjoying better economic indicators than India, this assertion can be put under scrutiny. A BBC fact-checking report in 2020 puts it succinctly: “with no real data available for the numbers, politicians in India still insist that illegal immigrants from Bangladesh are taking away their jobs”. The Bangladeshi blogosphere is often abuzz with debates about their country’s relative gains vis-à-vis their heavyweight neighbour. The unresolved water sharing of joint rivers, deaths of Bangladeshi citizens at the hands of Indian security forces at the borders, and trade restrictions maintained by India against Bangladeshi traders all take their turn. Protests during Modi’s visit were simply an outcome of such pent up frustrations and an occasion to express sentiments about reducing dependence on India.

Not putting all eggs in one basket

As not to appear to be too friendly with India, there are signs that the ruling Awami League party is taking a more transactional stance toward New Delhi. The growing bonhomie with Beijing is one manifestation of that development. For example, last year, China announced that it would grant duty-free access to 97 per cent of Bangladesh products in its market. Indeed, China is now Bangladesh’s largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its primary international trading partner. Ironically, Bangladesh’s solid ties with China defy historical uneasiness between the two countries. Mao’s China staunchly opposed Bangladesh’s creation in 1971 and delayed officially recognizing the state until 1975. Today, however, China’s opposition to Bangladesh’s War of Independence hardly registers in the collective psyche of the country. Surprisingly, there is also no significant grievance against the Chinese treatment of Uyghur Muslims as compared to complaints against the treatment of Muslims in India. Bangladeshis are disappointed over China’s continued support for the Burmese junta on the Rohingya issue but not enough to have prompted calls for their government to reassess the country’s relationship with China.

It is not that China is writing unconditional checks to Bangladesh for earning the latter’s goodwill. Recent history, however, shows that China stood by Bangladesh at critical times. After World Bank-led financiers withdrew in 2012 from the Padma Bridge project, a desperate Dhaka found solutions in Beijing. Over the years, Dhaka has also become a big buyer of Chinese arms. China is Bangladesh’s largest source of weapons purchases and the country is also the second-largest recipient of Chinese arms exports only behind Pakistan. Yet, this closeness to Beijing does not mean that Dhaka is moving from one primary partner to another. Unlike its South Asian neighbours like Pakistan and the Maldives, Bangladesh has not yet succumbed to the ‘Chinese debt trap’. At times, it does not hesitate to play off China with other development partners, especially Japan, which is developing critical infrastructure projects such as the Matarbari deep seaport, power plants, and a new airport terminal.

Bangladesh’s delicate balancing strategy, which involves moving away from being overly dependent on India, has been long in the making. Two examples from recent times illustrate how Bangladesh was forced to learn (the hard way) lessons of overdependence. In 2019, India’s sudden decision to restrict the export of onions due to domestic shortages led to the price of the necessary food items skyrocketing in Bangladesh. Even Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, during a trip to New Delhi, expressed her displeasure in her trademark wit, quipping “it would have been better if I was told earlier that we won’t be getting onions from India, as I could have imported from other countries. But now, I have to instruct my chef to cook without onions”. Another challenging situation appears to be unfolding with COVID-19 vaccines. Developed by the United Kingdom’s University of Oxford and AstraZeneca, and produced in plants operated by India’s Serum Institute and marketed as Covishield, Bangladesh had purchased them a few months ago through a tripartite deal. Due to India’s spike in COVID-19 infections, it has expressed its inability to deliver the second consignments of vaccines. In a last-minute attempt to contain the impending disaster, Dhaka has had to scramble to seek assistance from Beijing and Moscow.

Continued balancing for the next 50 years?

If China responds to Bangladesh’s urgent call for help, it will only reinforce the established trend. For now, Dhaka has learned to keep faith in Beijing, which is most evident in Bangladesh’s reluctance in joining the Quad Security Initiative. The Quad was initially established in 2007 as a medium for strategic dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India and lately, is shaping up as an anti-China bloc. Bangladesh’s refusal to join is likely to complicate the grouping’s aim of shoring up support among the Bay of Bengal countries for meeting its objectives.

Bangladesh’s thriving relations with China do not exist in a vacuum. They certainly cannot flourish at the expense of India, which has expressed worries at this development. Cultural ties between Bangladesh and India, especially the shared linguistic heritage with the state of West Bengal, transcend time and borders, however, complacency among policymakers is real. The well-known Bangladeshi-British author Tahmima Anam aptly captured this dynamic in a Guardian op-ed. She argued that even though “none of these [contentious outstanding] issues stops Bangladeshis from embracing our neighbour's prolific cultural exports”, there remains a need to “work towards a relationship of mutual respect”.

Perhaps this mutual respect is what Dhaka finds in its relationship with Beijing, in both actions and words. As Bangladesh strives to maintain robust economic growth, this balancing between the two Asian behemoths becomes crucial. Dhaka needs the support of both, which cannot be gained at the expense of irking the other. Therefore, balancing will only become more delicate in the years to come, and only time will show if this balancing game is played with tact and consideration.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Rudabeh Shahid is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Politics, University of York. Arafat Kabir is a graduate student of political science. He currently works as a research intern at the Quincy Institute. Image credit: Flickr/Sabbir Ahmed.