South Korea navigates the Indo-Pacific
South Korea Navigates the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY RAMON PACHECO PARDO
31 May 2021
“We agree we will work to align the ROK’s New Southern Policy and the United States’ vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific and that our countries will cooperate to create a safe, prosperous, and dynamic region”. So reads one of the most consequential sentences in the joint statement issued by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US President Joe Biden following their recent summit. A sentence that encapsulates Seoul’s policy towards the Indo-Pacific. A policy that has undergone a dramatic change in recent years. When former US President Donald Trump visited South Korea in late 2017, he tried to convince Moon to join his then-recently launched Indo-Pacific vision. The South Korean president did not bite. Seoul’s assessment was fairly straightforward; the mercurial US leader could change his position at any point, and his Indo-Pacific vision may not have any meat to it. And certainly, neither Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy nor the Quad had any real material impact during Trump’s years in office.
South Korea, however, was undergoing an important change in terms of the orientation of its foreign policy. Scarred by China’s economic sanctions after the Park Geun-hye government agreed to the deployment of the US’s THAAD anti-missile system, disappointed at former US President Barack Obama’s lack of support for Seoul at the time, and wary about Trump’s disregard for allies, the Moon government tried to seek new partners. Seoul selected Southeast Asia and India as priority areas. Shortly after taking office in 2017, the Moon government launched its New Southern Policy (NSP) to strengthen economic and political links with Southeast Asia. The policy has been a success, leading to several new bilateral trade agreements, strengthening economic links, and helping grow diplomatic presence in the region. If there is one foreign policy issue in which Moon will leave a legacy, it will be the NSP, which happens to concern the region right at the centre of Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
Along came Biden, and China
Seoul’s NSP preceded the onset of the Biden administration by several years. And indeed, even before the new US president took office, the Moon government was making the case that its NSP complements Washington’s Indo-Pacific approach. Yet, during the Trump years, the only tangible outcome of this policy was South Korea attending Quad Plus COVID-19 related meetings after the pandemic struck. The Biden administration, however, has taken the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad to the next level. After the new US president took office, the Quad leaders held their first-ever summit. And the joint statement coming out of the meeting did not mention China by name, instead focusing on cooperation among its members. This drew the attention of the Moon government, which sees no point in openly antagonising Beijing even if it is obvious that the Quad has a strong anti-China element.
Along with China and India, South Korea is one of the top three Asian manufacturers of vaccines. Thus, South Korean pharmaceutical firms are going to become critical to the rollout of vaccines across the Indo-Pacific region. The KORUS Global Vaccine Partnership (agreed to by Seoul and Washington) is a clear step in this direction.
South Korea insists that the Biden administration has not formally asked it to join the Quad. While this might be technically true, there is no doubt that the US government would very much welcome South Korea becoming its fifth member. After all, Seoul’s membership would enhance the credibility and power of the Quad. It would also give the group a much-needed presence in mainland East Asia. Seoul joining would add a symbolic layer to the Quad as well. And even though Seoul has so far declined to formally join, its preferred approach of linking the NSP to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy — and the Quad, as also laid out in the Moon-Biden joint statement — means that there is de facto cooperation.
Other than Biden’s more subtle approach to the Indo-Pacific, China’s behaviour in recent years has also led Seoul to embrace the Indo-Pacific concept. Other than the THAAD deployment-related sanctions, Beijing’s alleged threats to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the incursions of its fighter jets on South Korea’s air defence zone, or diplomatic quarrels on issues such as the origins of kimchi have soured relations between South Korea and China. While Seoul does not see any reason to openly antagonise Beijing, tensions with its neighbour have tilted the balance towards those in the South Korean government advocating a more forceful stance — including in the Indo-Pacific.
Plus, South Korea certainly has an interest in open maritime lines between East Asia and Europe. South Korean firms benefit from them as much as any other Asian exporter. After all, it should not be forgotten that the ROK Navy has been part of the international naval mission to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden since the beginning. Similarly, South Korea believes that an open South China Sea is non-negotiable. Considering this, its alignment with Washington’s call for a free and open Indo-Pacific is a no-brainer.
Putting your money where your mouth is
South Korea brings the most valuable of assets to the Indo-Pacific table; its material capabilities. It is relatively easy to provide diplomatic support for a concept. It is not as easy to back this up with economic and military resources — but Seoul does. To its destroyers operating in the Gulf of Aden, South Korea will add its planned aircraft carrier in the coming years. The aircraft carrier will no doubt be deployed to protect the maritime commons. This includes the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, where South Korea will be able to more effectively provide a support role to the US Navy along with other American allies such as Australia, France, or Japan. This way, South Korea will join a select group of four Asian countries with aircraft carriers in operation (or planned) the others include China, Japan, and India.
In addition, South Korea has quietly become one of the largest suppliers of quality infrastructure across Southeast and South Asia. China and Japan dominate the headlines when it comes to infrastructure competition in the region. This suits South Korea, whose highly competitive infrastructure firms have won or are bidding for contracts to build airports, ports, roads, and other infrastructure across the region. In other words, South Korean firms are increasingly important players in efforts to strengthen connectivity across the region. Plus, Seoul is also becoming a key contributor to the most precious of resources in 2021 — COVID-19 vaccines. Throughout the first half of the year, South Korea has become one of the five largest exporters of vaccines globally. Along with China and India, South Korea is one of the top three Asian manufacturers of vaccines. Thus, South Korean pharmaceutical firms are going to become critical to the rollout of vaccines across the Indo-Pacific region. The KORUS Global Vaccine Partnership (agreed to by Seoul and Washington) is a clear step in this direction.
Ultimately, it should not be a surprise that Seoul is both interested in being a player in Indo-Pacific geopolitics and deploying its resources in the region. South Korea is a trade-dependent country, and the Indo-Pacific connects it with a key export market: Europe. With the Biden administration playing its cards right in terms of bringing allies to support its Indo-Pacific vision, a more assertive China making Seoul wary, and its NSP providing the perfect entry point into the region, the Moon government has decided that it is in South Korea’s interest to become an active player. Most likely, this is a policy development that is here to stay.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ramon Pacheco Pardo is the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the School of Global Studies of Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Reader in International Relations at King’s College London. Image credit: Wikipedia.