In Brief: Happymon Jacob on India in the Indo-Pacific
In Brief: Happymon Jacob on India in the Indo-Pacific
IN BRIEF WITH HAPPYMON JACOB
17 February 2021
We recently spoke with Professor Happymon Jacob; author and founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, a New Delhi based think tank. Our comprehensive discussion covered a broad range of issues including domestic concerns, regional security and India's role in the Indo-Pacific.
Given the tumultuous change India has undergone in recent years we began by exploring the government’s record under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
9DL: Since 2013 India has seen a seismic shift in its domestic politics, highlighted notably by the BJP’s electoral landslides in 2014 and 2019.
How has India’s electoral landscape and political culture under Modi changed in the last decade, and in your view, where has the administration achieved most success and where do its failures lie? Also, how secure is the BJP’s electoral coalition?
HJ: To begin with, it is very evident when comparing India today to the India of 2007 or even to 2011 that it’s a very different country. This is something that strikes you right away if you live and work here as I do.
There has been a fundamental change in the country's political culture. The broad political consensus that the country had, especially on social issues, seems to have broken down. The current Indian government has little desire to enter into negotiations with the country’s diverse communities, minorities and interest groups. We are currently in the midst of a huge agitation by farmers who have been protesting against a new farm law brought by the government which it has been unwilling to withdraw. This unwillingness to seek consensus or make concessions on the part of the government comes from the domination of one party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in the country’s political scene and its highly centralised decision-making process located in the prime minister’s office.
More importantly, the BJP often fights and wins elections by stoking religious sentiments and dividing society along nationalist lines rather than emphasising performance by the government. Narendra Modi’s government has not made any major achievements in the context of national security, economic growth or domestic and legislative reforms, but that has not affected the BJP’s electoral coalition. Since the BJP holds a majority in the Lok Sabha, sizeable enough for it to remain in office over the next four years, it doesn’t need to worry about building bridges with other parties. The party’s senior leadership knows that there are no significant doubts about the Modi government’s ability to continue in power. And so far, both the BJP and Narendra Modi have proven themselves to be Teflon-coated; nothing seems to affect them. However, we do not know what the impact will be of the ongoing farmer's protests in the immediate future, because farming is a major component of the Indian economy.
Now to be fair to the government, it has been successful in infrastructure development especially in the border areas. I feel the government has achieved some success with the ‘Clean India Mission’, especially the elimination of open defecation. And it has also eased, at least to some extent, so-called ‘Red Tapeism’ and improved the ease of doing business.
As far as failures are concerned, the biggest one is the mismanagement of the Indian economy. The infamous demonetisation drive in Modi’s first term was a disaster that broke the back of the informal sector, which forms a large part of the Indian economy. The government has also failed to protect the rights of minorities. India is an incredibly diverse — multireligious, multilingual, multiethnic — country. Losing our social cohesion would jeopardise the government’s ability to pursue economic development and implement effective foreign and security policies. The BJP has also been accused of trying to topple opposition-led governments in various states and using federal agencies to harass individual leaders in these states.
The government’s Kashmir policy has also been a complete failure. There may be some validity in the argument that Kashmir needs to be mainstreamed and brought into the Indian federal system, constitutionally, legally, and politically. But this in my opinion was done in the wrong way. The decision to revoke Article 370 has alienated both the Kashmiri political class and the people, and it has not halted Pakistan’s interference or violence in the former state. The underlying problems haven’t gone away just because the political status has been altered.
9DL: How do you assess India’s handling of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and has the Modi government’s response been effective or are we seeing a major failure of the Indian state? In addition, what are some of the likely long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on India and its domestic institutions?
HJ: The fact is that India has abysmal healthcare infrastructure, so any government would have found it difficult to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. But, there was also a severe lack of coordination between various ministries. The home ministry was the focal point for the response, and early on, there was very little coordination not only between central agencies but also at the state level.
The exodus of migrant workers from major Indian cities to villages soon after the announcement of the lockdown saw tens of thousands of workers return to their villages and carry the virus with them. This happened because the government did not consider these people in their decision-making processes and did not consult with ministries that may have been working to mitigate the plight of migrant workers. This humanitarian crisis was a profoundly shocking moment for the Indian people.
Cities across India witnessed similar scenes of exodus during the Covid-19 pandemic. Image credit: Pixabay/balouriarajesh.
The pandemic has also clearly broken the back of the Indian economy and we are witnessing rising unemployment rates. The economy, which had already been damaged by the demonetisation program, will take a very long time to return to pre-pandemic levels. The Modi government did, however, respond well to the needs of India’s diaspora overseas by organising repatriation flights operated by Indian carriers. The government has also done well in its pharmaceutical and vaccine diplomacy efforts.
9DL: From a strategic perspective just how deeply has the Indo-Pacific (as a conceptual framework) penetrated the minds of New Delhi's policymakers and just how strong are these foundations? Furthermore, do you feel India's potential partners share New Delhi’s view of this framework, and if not, where are the differences and how do they manifest?
HJ: Historically speaking, New Delhi has not had a very imaginative, maritime strategy. Policymakers in New Delhi have often been accused of being preoccupied with a continental grand strategy towards China and Pakistan thereby suffering ‘sea-blindness’. As a result, little attention was paid to the Indian or Pacific Oceans, or as it's now termed the Indo-Pacific.
This is perhaps changing now, with the ‘Indo-Pacific’ becoming one of the most talked-about concepts of our times. I feel that the foundation is still being laid regarding this worldview in New Delhi. India’s strategic elite today seems to have recognised that the key to meeting the China challenge lies in developing its strategy in the Indo-Pacific. With Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives increasingly under pressure from Beijing, the Indo-Pacific is where India can find willing partners and seek to build coalitions. The necessity of meeting the China challenge is driving and fast-tracking India’s engagement with the emerging Indo-Pacific framework.
India's difficult continental geostrategic terrain along its borders in the north, east, and west is another important factor. Hemmed in by China, Pakistan, and a domestic insurgency in Kashmir, the Indo-Pacific offers an alternative space for India to expand its engagements and sphere of influence. India’s policymaking in strategic matters is a slow-moving affair, New Delhi usually likes to it takes its time in making decisions. So the China threat, after all, will usher in a certain amount of strategic urgency in New Delhi.
At the same time, some of India’s traditional partners will be careful in how they view India’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept. Moscow could be one big casualty in the process of New Delhi’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific. India’s historically great relationship with Russia has come under strain of late, in part because of Russia’s increasing dependence on China and its growing rivalry with the US. As India develops closer relationships with other Indo-Pacific actors, the gulf between India and Russia can be expected to widen.
9DL: New Delhi has often been criticised for failing to follow through on important foreign policy pronouncements, especially concerning affairs in the Indo-Pacific. Can you speak to India’s core ambitions for the region and — with these in mind — do you feel it has the capacity, capability and will to influence events? On a related note, much has been made of last year’s Quad exercise but in your view how healthy are regional institutions and do you feel smaller states share India’s view of their value and function?
HJ: I think within South Asia, India’s neighbours would welcome New Delhi as a partner to work with. The trouble is not with the neighbours but with India itself. The country has been unable to walk its talk in the region. You only need to look at the huge and growing difference in India's trade with its neighbours compared to China's trade with them. For example, India’s trade with Bangladesh was only $9.2 billion in 2018-19 compared to China’s $18 billion.
We observe the same trend with other countries in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Australia’s trade with China was $252 billion in 2018-19 compared to India’s $30 billion. India also has very few free trade agreements in the region compared to China. India’s decision not to join the RCEP is a perfect example of its unwillingness to proactively engage the Indo-Pacific. If you are not trading in the region, if you are not participating in the region, if you are not part of major trading arrangements like RCEP, then you are bound to become an insignificant player in the region.
This is true of India's military outreach too. India’s participation in the Quad is a good development, which I hope will continue to deepen though China does far more than India in terms of military outreach in the region. Beijing is a major defence supplier to several countries including Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka while India is nowhere to be seen.
India has been unable to perform crucial economic and security roles in the region for a very long time. South Asia was open to India long before China began making its presence felt in a big way. Today, New Delhi has been overtaken and is forced to share its neighbourhood with Beijing with the latter becoming the region’s dominant power. South Asian states are looking for economic partnerships to help meet their infrastructure and investment needs. If India cannot deliver, then they will look elsewhere. So that’s where our foreign policy focus should be.
9DL: In foreign policy terms how important is India’s commitment to democracy and multiculturalism and just how meaningfully do these values shape its conduct? In addition, can you quantify the role soft power plays in New Delhi’s strategic calculus and would losing this appeal (as a multicultural democracy) damage its ability to conduct foreign policy in South Asia and beyond?
HJ: If recent events in the United States tell us anything, it is that democracy is not perfect anywhere. It is a work in progress even in the United States, which is one of the oldest democracies in the world.
Democracy is under great stress in India today with respect for multiculturalism, pluralism and liberal values having been reduced significantly, nevertheless, I think countries pass through these phases. Barring the emergency period under Indira Gandhi, western countries recognise India as a consistently democratic country since its independence in 1947.
The issue of democracy must be understood within a historical context. While there is no doubt the government of India should be subtly persuaded to respect multiculturism, religious harmony, and human rights in Jammu and Kashmir; the issuing of public statements that risk embarrassing India’s post-colonial sensitivities may not improve relations between India and the US and EU. The West should therefore be careful in giving lessons to India.
9DL: Has the standoff in Ladakh substantially changed perceptions of China within India, and is the 2018 Wuhan consensus now on life support? Similarly, what role does China now play vis-a-vis India’s relations with border states and how can traditional areas for cooperation such as trade and climate be progressed amid current tensions. Just how dangerous is the frontier with China and could it ultimately resemble the border with Pakistan?
HJ: I think perceptions of China have dramatically changed in India in the wake of the Ladakh standoff. China is now seen as the number one threat in India. But Indians are still grappling with this new reality because for a very long time, Pakistan was viewed as our principal threat and now suddenly China has come to occupy that space.
Yet, despite all the calls for boycotting Chinese products and for a self-reliant India, and the banning of over 200 Chinese made mobile and web apps, I do not think Indians are ready to decouple from China economically. For instance, Indians continue to overwhelmingly buy Chinese smartphones, and according to one report, Indians bought 1.7 million more Chinese smartphones in October 2020 than they did in 2019. So changing the economic relationship is easier said than done in practice. India’s business community is dependent on cheap Chinese products, without which India’s already fragile economy could suffer even more.
Last year India moved to ban hundreds of Chinese smartphone apps due to data and privacy concerns. Image credit: Pixabay/solenfeyissa
I think China is making a huge mistake by alienating a neighbour which is a major market for its goods, for a few kilometres of territory on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. It is important to note that during the height of the standoff, Prime Minister Modi and many ruling party politicians refused to mention China directly by name, which stands in stark contrast to what happens during clashes with Pakistan.
A recent report by the US Institute of Peace on China's influence in South Asia and the Himalayas highlights Beijing’s already massive influence on politics and economy in the region. The contest between China and India over South Asia is going to increase in the years to come though a great deal will also depend on the role the United States decides to play in the region.
I think the rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing as previously witnessed in global forums, and cooperation on issues like climate change will be pushed to the back burner. China also opposed India’s appointment as the chair of the counter-terrorism committee; and the Taliban and Libya sanctions committees at the UNSC due to Beijing's close ties to Islamabad, which has traditionally supported terrorist and insurgent groups.
I have travelled extensively along India’s Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir (both on the Indian and Pakistani sides). The Line of Control is incredibly dangerous with large numbers of troops standing eyeball to eyeball, frequent firing, and civilian casualties. I don’t think we will see a repetition of that on the LAC with China though I think if China keeps pursuing land grabs there will be a major increase in the standoffs and Indian troops will expand their patrols. The situation will be hot but not anything like what we see on the LoC with Pakistan.
9DL: How do you assess the impact of former President Trump on India-US relations and where do you think the Biden-Harris administration needs to focus their attention both with regards to bilateral relations and (more broadly) in the realm of shared interests?
HJ: I think the United States and India are natural allies in many ways and the bilateral relationship is so institutionalised that minor hiccups won’t blow it off course. There exists a significant bipartisan consensus regarding relations with India in Washington DC due to several commonalities: democracy, shared beliefs in enlightenment values, the economic relationship, and, of course, the challenge posed by China.
India-US relations have come a long way since India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and the sanctions imposed by the US in response. Today, we have a nuclear agreement with the United States and the Americans played a key role in getting the NSG waiver for India to engage in nuclear commerce. We also have military agreements and a robust political relationship. With the rise of China, I think the desire to further enhance the relationship will increase on both sides.
There are also other looming questions. What happens if the US policy towards China changes? Could there be a post-Trump rapprochement between the US and China? Such a development would hurt India. On the other hand, if the US returns to the JCPOA with Iran, that could ease some of the pressure India is currently feeling in West Asia. A rapprochement between the US and Iran would see Tehran brought back into the mainstream of the international order which would reduce its dependence on countries like China, Russia and Pakistan.
9DL: Alongside efforts to reboot India-UK ties, several EU member states have recently moved to publish strategy papers for the Indo-Pacific. Given India and the EU already enjoy a strong trading relationship; where do you see relations heading in the years to come and more specifically what role can (and should) each side play for the other?
HJ: To begin with, it is interesting that France, Germany, and the UK have all published strategic papers on the Indo-Pacific region identifying China as a challenge. When one looks at Sino-EU relations from New Delhi, it seems that the EU is not so critical of Chinese policy. The EU wants to do business with China and Brussels is not very keen to push back on Beijing's aggressive behaviour or criticise its conduct toward smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific. The CAI, which replaces 16 existing economic agreements with Beijing with a single major agreement is perhaps indicative of this.
On the other hand, however, India has been trying to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU since 2007 (though discussions were suspended in 2013). Unless India can get the kind of arrangements with the EU that China has, I worry about the future of India-EU relations.
9DL: And finally — Taiwan's global profile is on the rise through its New Southbound Policy, ‘Mask Diplomacy’, etc; in addition, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently moved to lift restrictions on contact between US and Taiwanese officials. As a key regional democracy what role can Taiwan play in India’s Indo-Pacific vision and what are India’s interests (if any) in maintaining the status quo in East Asia?
HJ: India has been very careful in how it has traditionally dealt with Taiwan though things now seem to have changed; the growing feeling in New Delhi is that India should reciprocate some of the ‘feelers’ coming from Taipei. In a notable first, two BJP parliamentarians participated (virtually) in the swearing-in of Taiwan's president in 2020.
Although bilateral trade is not very significant in volume, there are areas where Taiwan can help India, such as agriculture and smart cities. Since Taiwan is a key player in the United States' Indo-Pacific vision and given the relationship between New Delhi and Washington and the potential room for growth in ties between Taiwan and India, we may see a lot more activity in the years to come.
Taiwan has also been looking to engage with South Asia, especially Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, therefore, given what happened in the Galwan Valley, India may no longer hesitate to make forays into areas that it previously avoided. These may include Taiwan and possibly Tibet.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of Happymon Jacob and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, a New Delhi-based think tank. He is the author of The Line of Control: Travelling with the Indian and Pakistani Armies (Penguin Random House); and Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India–Pakistan Escalation Dynamics (OUP). Dr Jacob is a columnist with The Hindu and hosts National Security Conversations at The Wire.