India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific decade: Future scenarios — Part II
India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific decade, Future scenarios — Part II
WRITTEN BY VELINA TCHAKAROVA
12 May 2021
China and India — two nuclear-armed nations with the largest militaries and populations in Asia — are slowly but surely turning into regional rivals despite their shared aspiration for multipolarity and cooperation on international issues of mutual interest. From a geopolitical point of view, the new great game will be predominantly situated in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean due to rising competition between the two Asian giants, and the systemic rivalry between China and the US. But the outcome of the geostrategic rivalry between China and India is not yet clear.
The geopolitical approach of both countries reflects a constructive pragmatism when necessary and a comprehensive competition whenever possible. However, their relationship in the coming years will be increasingly shaped by economic competition, geostrategic rivalry and a certain readiness for confrontation in their quest for shaping their common geopolitical space. Looking ahead, there are two plausible scenarios: either the US and India will unite to coordinate actions and measures against the growing influence of China in tandem with Russia (the Dragonbear) or the US and China will engage in a process of relaxation of their tensions, while India will need to carefully navigate between the two systems of power without aligning itself in a strategic manner.
Territorial skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control
Political, economic, and diplomatic relations between China and India have grown significantly in recent decades, guided by the principle of cooperation and trust-building. However, Beijing’s surging geopolitical clout and geo-economic footprint, coupled with unresolved border issues, have brought about a shift in the relationship between the two Asian powers over the past few years. The two nuclear-armed nations with the largest militaries in Asia are slowly but surely turning into regional rivals despite their shared aspirations for multipolarity and cooperation on international issues of mutual interest. Since 2017, geopolitical tensions between them have intensified with armed clashes on the Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas last year representing not only the worst standoff in the last decade but also shifted the bilateral relationship from efforts toward cooperation to one characterised more by confrontation.
India’s geopolitical choices are either joining the US-led bloc of predominantly Anglosphere allies and close partners such as Japan and Australia against China, or, once again, building partnerships of non-aligned middle powers that can navigate through the complex relationship between Washington and Beijing without taking sides.
The disputed region on the Doklam plateau — claimed by both China and Bhutan — is of strategic importance to India due to its proximity to the Indian border. The Galwan skirmishes between the Asian giants along the Line of Actual Control last summer caused an unprecedented loss of life for both parties and led to the deployment of troops on both sides of the border, with China allegedly mobilising some 50,000 troops. Dr Jagannath Panda of IDSA identifies “rising tempers on both sides alongside more robust nationalism in each country that frames the other as an antagonistic power” as the main reasons for the most recent tensions.
Both the clashes with China along the disputed Himalayan border and the Chinese presence on the Tibetan plateau are neither expected to diminish nor likely to be resolved diplomatically. Instead, such incidents between the Indian and Chinese troops can be expected to repeatedly occur in the coming years. India will have to develop its transport infrastructure near the common border as well as transform its military to enhance its capabilities to contain Chinese activities near Indian territory. The two armies are likely to remain engaged in a standoff in “Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in Eastern Ladakh”, which might easily lead to further brinkmanship in the future.
The complex security triangle between China, India and Pakistan
Just as China sees the US as its most significant competitor, India sees China in a similar light. Additionally, India is more cautious since Beijing has established close ties with Pakistan, while China increasingly distrusts New Delhi because of its warming relations with the US. In this context, Pakistan is clearly the bone of contention between them, and the Kashmir region has been a focal point for conflict since India’s foundation.
Muslim-majority Kashmir remains largely part of India while Pakistan has occupied its Western side. The frozen conflict between the two hostile neighbours is periodically shaped by the emergence of tensions, regular skirmishes and sudden brinkmanship along their common border. Despite possessing nuclear weapons, both countries have been involved in direct military clashes throughout the decades. From an Indian point of view, the steady geoeconomic rapprochement between China and Pakistan aggravates the already complicated geopolitical situation. Beijing has gained access to the Indian Ocean through the Comprehensive Economic Corridor (CPEC), which entails railways, a trans-Himalayan highway, and a port in Gwadar in Pakistan — all to the disadvantage of Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests.
India seeks to be the most significant naval power in the IOR, as the Chinese presence is becoming menacing to India’s goals. Consequently, both Asian powers seek to strengthen their positions in South Asia through various cooperation formats and economic ties. Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives are already witnessing a strong Chinese presence in their domestic affairs. And yet, New Delhi aims to offer an alternative to the Chinese connectivity projects by attracting foreign investment and engaging the neighbouring countries diplomatically and economically. Thus, South Asia will witness growing competition between China and India over ‘hearts and minds’ in each of these countries, even as there might be diplomatic efforts towards the normalisation of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad in the future.
Geoeconomic competition between India and China
The two Asian goliaths are already vying for limited resources at a time when the COVID-19 crisis has been exacerbating their domestic socio-economic weaknesses and disrupting global supply chains. A large proportion of the world's goods, as well as energy transports, pass through the Indo-Pacific region, entailing some of the most significant maritime routes and global chokepoints for food and oil supply. Around 40 per cent of the world's oil shipments and one-third of the annual global trade in goods pass through the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including critical transport hubs such as the Strait of Hormuz, the connection to the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, the main artery between the two oceans. An immense proportion of the world’s raw material supplies also pass through the Indian Ocean on their way from Africa to the South China Sea and beyond. Given the increasing interconnections in the Indo-Pacific region, a rise in tensions can be expected due to enhanced competition over natural resources and the “blue-water” status, hindered access to free navigation along the oil and food chokepoints, as well as disrupted access to shared water resources in their transboundary rivers.
Furthermore, Beijing’s controversial region Xinjiang occupies a strategic position in China’s main terrestrial connectivity projects within the BRI — the primary route goes through Russia, the middle route through Central Asia, Turkey, and the Black Sea, and a third one through Pakistan (CPEC) connecting to the port of Gwadar in the Indian Ocean. Xinjiang, known for its forced labour camps and broad violations of human rights against the Muslim Uighurs, is of great importance as China asserts claims over parts of India’s Arunachal Pradesh, while India claims the Aksai Chin region connecting Tibet with Xinjiang in Northwest China. The two nations have even fought a war over this territory in 1962. Viewed through a geopolitical lens, rapprochement with Pakistan offers a solution to several key issues in terms of the long-term Chinese interests — a transport and trade route from China to the Indian Ocean and Gwadar port as a maritime component of the BRI. Moreover, an ambitious and costly project such as CPEC requires safety and protection, which China already provides with the help of private security companies. Finally, Gwadar is also part of a comprehensive network of ports in key locations, which enables power projection into the Indian Ocean Region and beyond.
Future geopolitical scenarios
The rapprochement between China and Pakistan, as well as the systemic coordination between China and Russia (the Dragonbear) in a much broader geopolitical context, are key examples of fluid regional formations. Russia remains a major actor with a significant geopolitical potential for both China and India. Moscow’s approach during the border tensions in 2020 clearly showed that it prefers to play the role of a mediator, aimed at mitigating possible escalations instead of taking sides. In fact, Russia has a strong geoeconomic interest in supplying arms to both countries and will only renounce this opportunity with great reluctance. However, the possibility of systematic coordination between China and Russia in various key fields is perceptibly becoming a factor in India’s foreign and security calculus.
Considering Moscow's claims that bilateral relations with Beijing are at their historic best, New Delhi also needs to intensify its traditionally good and stable relations with Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently paid an official visit to Delhi and Islamabad, indicating India's growing weight in global affairs and Moscow's balancing act between Washington and Beijing. The two countries also established a 2+2 ministerial dialogue at the level of foreign and defence ministers. As a rising regional power, India will use the trilateral format with the Dragonbear at the level of foreign ministers (RIC) and the upcoming BRICS summit to invest in trust-building and coordinate positions on important security and defence issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, New Delhi is gaining diplomatic leverage through its engagement with like-minded regional powers (e.g. Quad) and will thus seek to enhance the dialogue on issues of global and regional security with China within the framework of RIC and BRICS.
Logically, the US regards India as a significant and reliable partner in creating a counterweight to China’s overwhelming presence in South and Southeast Asia. Following the COVID-19 crisis and the deteriorating relations between China and the Anglosphere (e.g. Canada, Australia, Great Britain etc.), various groupings such as the Quad and CPTPP are increasingly seen as part of a broader US-led counterbalancing effort against China’s rise. Political elites in New Delhi are increasingly in favour of closer relations with Washington, but also continue to rely on friendly relations with Moscow amid intensifying tensions with Beijing. It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration can play a skilful balancing act between China and India. Washington’s success in establishing a comprehensive strategic relationship with New Delhi would amount to a major geopolitical shift in the region. At the same time, China will continue extending its terrestrial connectivity to Europe through Central Asia, in order to bypass the US maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific space.
There are two plausible middle-term scenarios for the Indo-Pacific: either the US and India will join forces to coordinate actions and measures against China's growing influence in tandem with a rather neutral Russia, or the US and China will engage in a partial relaxation of bilateral tensions through cooperation in areas of common interest such as multilateralism and climate change. The new US president may be wary of continuing Trump's attempts to cut off China from global trade and technology networks for fear of sparking a ‘new Cold War’. The latter scenario will require India to carefully navigate between the two systems of power without aligning itself in a strategic manner with either, but it seems increasingly unlikely due to growing pressure by China. In the case of further escalations in South Asia, the US would support New Delhi, while Russia would seek to remain officially unaligned. India’s geopolitical choices are either joining the US-led bloc of predominantly Anglosphere allies and close partners such as Japan and Australia against China, or, once again, building partnerships of non-aligned middle powers that can navigate through the complex relationship between Washington and Beijing without taking sides.
Geographically speaking, China is an Asian-Pacific country, while India is turning into an Indo-Pacific one. However, the focal point of intersection between China’s terrestrial and maritime connectivity projects is situated in the Indo-Pacific region, where Beijing will further seek to enhance its presence and geoeconomic leverage. It is beyond any doubt that China has adopted a geopolitical approach of simultaneously becoming a ‘heartland’ (Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, the Dragonbear) and ‘rimland’ power (the Indo-Pacific, South China Sea and South East Asia). Such an approach risks triggering further tensions with India in the upcoming Indo-Pacific decade.
New Delhi will have to make tough geopolitical choices and engage in multi-fora alliances. Unless China builds a navy big enough to allow power projection into the Indian Ocean, India will keep its leverage as a major naval power. However, China is gaining more importance in the geoeconomic arena by the day. Thus, there is a risk that India will cede ground to Beijing on trade, investment and infrastructure issues. In addition, China may be viewed as being an emerging winner from the current COVID-19 crisis, while it will take more time for India to recover. This will give China additional geoeconomic leverage, particularly while engaging countries linked to the Indo-Pacific region. Given that China and India will be the two major powers of the Indo-Pacific region, their relationship will increasingly be shaped by economic competition, geostrategic rivalry, and a certain readiness for confrontation in their quest for shaping this common geopolitical space.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Velina Tchakarova is Director of the Austrian Institute for Europe and International Security (AIES). She holds an M.A. in political science/political science of South Asia from the University in Heidelberg, Germany and a B.A. in international relations from the University of World and National Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria. Her scope of work includes research, lecturing and consulting on the topics of Global System Transformation, geostrategy of global actors and the role of the EU in Eastern Europe. An earlier version of this article appeared in TDHJ Special Edition II/21. Geopolitics. May 2021, p. 36-39. Image credit: Wikimedia.