Written by Huynh Tam Sang
A Quad-aligned security umbrella with Taiwan’s security as one of the top priorities would also assure Taiwan of the grouping’s commitment to supporting the island. Additionally, the security and defence alignment framework would be a firm signal to Beijing that the Quad is not merely a talking shop, but a mode of security multilateralism in the making.
Read MoreWritten by William Choong
While there have been negotiations for a formal Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, ASEAN has found no solution to Chinese assertiveness. This is where the four Quad navies can bring power and presence to bear.
Read MoreWritten by Alan Tidwell
New Zealand signed a free trade agreement with the PRC in 2008 and finalised an upgrade in January 2021. Damien O’Connor, New Zealand’s trade minister, used the announcement of the upgrade to lecture the Australians on their need to be more mature and “show respect” to China.
Read MoreWritten by Ja Ian Chong
ASEAN’s woes were already becoming apparent before the Myanmar crisis, with debates over whether to expel certain members, but the silence as the situation deteriorates really underscores how much rethinking may be necessary.
Read MoreWritten by Anisa Heritage
The E3 could continue to deepen interoperability in flexible small groups including Japan, India, Australia and South Korea on security issues of mutual concern, including cyber defence and maritime domain awareness. Japan has developed strong security ties with France and the UK.
Read MoreWritten by Tridivesh Singh Maini
The US and its allies need to provide an alternative economic narrative as merely criticising Beijing is not enough. Thus far the Biden administration has made the right noises by calling for a collaborative approach on economic issues. Nevertheless, it needs to strike a careful balance and can not ignore domestic political pressures.
Read MoreWritten by Velina Tchakarova
Whereas China approaches its affairs with India as asymmetric and non-zero-sum, India sees itself involved in a zero-sum interaction between two equally powerful countries in South Asia. India’s perception of China is that Beijing is taking the central position in its direct neighbourhood and increasingly in the IOR, while China perceives New Delhi as a major geopolitical factor with considerable naval capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.
Read MoreWritten by Gokul Sahni
Greater buy-in among European countries will help broaden the Indo-Pacific concept and the Netherlands would therefore join those voices in Brussels already pushing the EU towards working more closely with 'like-minded' partners in the region in seeking to promote both peace and prosperity.
Read MoreWritten by James Rogers
For Japan, drawing Britain, a global power, into the region provides an additional layer of security above and beyond that provided by the United States. Although the UK may not be the superpower it once was, the Royal Navy still has assets that only the US Navy can match.
Read MoreWritten by Thomas Bruce
It also demonstrates its agency will not be constrained by the alliance system of the United States’ or by close economic relations with China. Since Southeast Asian states routinely indicate they have no interest in choosing sides, a ‘hedging’ preference will continue to make Russia an attractive third partner.
Read MoreWritten by Xuan Dung Phan
India should aid Vietnam in further developing infrastructure in the deep-water Cam Ranh Bay port (Hanoi has reportedly asked New Delhi for such assistance) and, having established a network of military facilities overseas and drastically modernised its naval assets, India is certainly in a position to lend its support.
Read MoreWritten by Niranjan Marjani
Owing to a focus on continental South Asia, Indonesia has long remained a neglected entity in India’s regional foreign policy. However, as the geopolitical realities of the Indo-Pacific region continue to change in the face of a rising and assertive China, India and Indonesia are looking to coordinate their security policies and increase trade.
Read MoreWritten by Bich T Tran
As the two countries share a socialist ideology, Hanoi has built close party-to-party relations with Beijing which serve as conduits to tone down the South China Sea disputes. Although Vietnam might agree with the core objectives of the Quad, it is less likely to be enthusiastic about publicly adding its name to a group that seeks to counter China.
Read MoreWritten by Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp
As a middle power, Japan has the potential to enhance its role. In maintaining its partnerships with the United States and in balancing its deep economic ties with China it can lay the course and mediate in policies that concern itself, the United States and others in Southeast Asia.
Read MoreWritten by John Bradford
Even as some regional states will increasingly welcome Japanese military contributions, Suga will emphasise economic assistance and capacity-building projects. When it comes to Southeast Asian maritime security, we can expect a greater presence from Japan.
Read MoreWritten by Jagannath Panda
For India in particular — which sees China’s stern claim in the Galwan valley as a distinct breach of its sovereignty, a departure from bipartite consensus, and a unilateral attempt to change the status quo means trust has now been lost — permanently.
Read MoreAs this year draws to a close we recap events through ten of our most-read articles. As an entirely independent platform, we remain committed to connecting Europe and the Indo-Pacific while also seeking to showcase the next generation of leading thinkers. Thank you to all our contributors and we look forward to offering yet more high-quality analysis next year.
Read MoreWritten by Blake Herzinger
Malabar 2020 may be trumpeted as a triumph of the Quad, but defining it as a ‘Quad exercise’ is unnecessarily narrow, and would likely preclude participation from other countries in the future, should the organisers wish to include them.
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