Charting Australia and New Zealand's responses to China

9 April 2021

In 1915 the ANZACs landed on Gallipoli, binding together two countries — Australia and New Zealand. Today on the surface Australia and New Zealand are once again bound together, this time facing challenges with Beijing. Their top trade partner, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is a strategic competitor of their security guarantor, the United States (US). One might well expect both Canberra and Wellington to respond to the CCP’s growing international assertiveness in a similar fashion — but this is not the case. It has become increasingly clear that these two antipodean states respond to the PRC very differently. While Australia seeks out partnerships and alliances to offset China’s assertiveness, New Zealand has doubled down on its independent foreign policy.

Australia and New Zealand respond to Beijing

Australia has increasingly pushed back against Beijing’s assertiveness. The Australian parliament passed the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 which creates criminal penalties for covertly influencing Australian political processes on behalf of a foreign entity. The 2020 Australian Defence Strategic Update underscored what had been apparent for several years, that the world had changed and Australia was no longer far away from trouble. As part of the 2020 update, the Australian government planned for acquisitions designed to give its military greater lethality against a regional adversary (e.g. China). Finally, in April 2020 Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19.

Frustratingly, Wellington seems to episodically push back against the PRC in concert with allies, while choosing to go solo at other times, leaving observers to guess how it may respond and why.

As a result, China has started meting out punishments by slowing or limiting the movement of Australia’s exports to China. Coal, wine, barley and more are among the products impacted. China has also warned its students against attending Australian universities for fear of racist attacks. The idea that Australia could meet the challenges of a rising China, and that Canberra did not have to choose between its security guarantor and top trade partner, is dead. Australia has chosen, and China’s reaction has sealed that choice. New Zealand, on the other hand, has charted a different course. On 30 March the US and 13 others issued a statement calling for greater transparency in the WHO-led investigation into the origins of COVID-19. Wellington declined to sign the agreement, engaging in what New Zealanders call their ‘independent foreign policy’, leading some to question the reasons for their reticence.

Historically, New Zealand has not been a keen player in great power rivalry. In 1986, the introduction of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act caused a rift in its treaty alliance with the US. As a result, the US suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand which cast a long shadow over the relationship. To heal the rift, the two countries signed the Wellington Declaration (2010) and the Washington Declaration (2012) that re-established defence cooperation.

Today, the great power rivalry between the US and PRC sees New Zealand once again as an ambiguous player. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern came to power in 2017 leading her Labour Party into a coalition with Winston Peters’ NZ First. NZ First had the requisite parliamentary numbers that made an Ardern-led Labour government possible. As foreign minister and deputy prime minister, Peters’ influence on the country’s international conduct has been both clear and significant. Under Peter’s leadership, New Zealand announced its Pacific Reset, which signalled an increase in spending from Wellington in the Pacific. The Reset announced on 2 March 2018 in Sydney, nudged the Australians to follow suit with their Pacific Step Up. Both came about as a reaction to increased Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands. In December 2018, Peters then travelled to Washington to similarly nudge the US. For a moment, New Zealand committed itself to help shape a response to Beijing. The moment, however, seems to have been fleeting. New Zealand’s response to the PRC stands in contrast to Australia.

Time for a reset on New Zealand’s independent foreign policy?

New Zealand, like Australia, has had to grapple with foreign interference. Professor Anne-Marie Brady details New Zealand’s exposure to foreign interference in her Magic Weapons: China’s political influence activities under Xi Jinping. Where Australia took significant legislative action, New Zealand’s reply focused primarily on the regulation of overseas election donations. While Australia has experienced significant trade interruptions with China, New Zealand has fared much better. New Zealand signed a free trade agreement with the PRC in 2008 and finalised an upgrade in January 2021. Damien O’Connor, New Zealand’s trade minister, used the announcement of the upgrade to lecture the Australians on their need to be more mature and “show respect” to China.

Frustratingly, Wellington seems to episodically push back against the PRC in concert with allies, while choosing to go solo at other times, leaving observers to guess how it may respond and why. For example, in November 2020 New Zealand joined its Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, US, UK) in denouncing the PRC’s actions against Hong Kong legislators insisting they “immediately reinstate the Legislative Council members”. Then in early January 2021, when 55 Hong Kong activists were arrested, New Zealand declined to join with its Five Eyes partners in condemning the arrests. Wellington issued its protest as a solo act.

Why? — New Zealand’s recent refusal to join the other 13 countries in calling for greater transparency in the WHO-led investigation of the origins of COVID-19 seems capricious, leaving Wellington open to accusations of timidity and even appeasement. One could, for example, say much the same for the other 23 OECD members who did not sign the agreement, but the Ardern government has left itself open for criticism in part because there does not appear to be any reason behind its actions. If this is what an independent foreign policy looks like, then it might need some refinement.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Alan C. Tidwell is a Professor of the Practice and Director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Image credit: Flickr/Iain Farrell.