What to expect from US-Japan relations under the Biden administration
What to expect from US-Japan relations under The Biden Administration
WRITTEN BY ELLI-KATHARINA POHLKAMP
21 January 2021
Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential election is expected to bring about significant changes in America’s foreign policy. The return to a sense of normality, reliability, coherence, and consistency is overwhelmingly stressed by analysts — including Japanese commentators — when talking about the implications of Biden’s much anticipated foreign policy. The sincere hope is that with the end of Donald Trump, the ‘America First’ approach to foreign policy will, for now at least, come to an end.
Biden has signalled his willingness to strengthen US alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, including with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to counter authoritarian trends and to expand informal networks of security cooperation such as the Quad. A regional diplomacy approach towards Asia is expected of the Biden administration, instead of the one-dimensional diplomacy, together with a series of tactical bilateral bargains, conducted by President Trump. As renowned Japan scholar, Sheila A Smith wrote just prior to the election, “finding common cause with countries in the region in building networks and institutions for collective action”, should be a key pillar for a renewed and comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy that will restore trust to America’s regional partners.
What the United States and Japan are dealing with
As Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga stated in his first phone call with President-elect Joe Biden, "the alliance is indispensable for the peace and prosperity of our neighbouring region and international society”.
Japanese interest is high regarding the potential for an American return to global leadership, and its academia and members of its bureaucracy expect an easier time in dealing with the incoming Biden administration since they believe many key positions will be filled with highly experienced and well-known people from the Obama era. The recent nomination of Antony J. Blinken as Biden’s Secretary of State is widely perceived in Japan and beyond as an excellent choice for the prospect of future cooperation between the Biden and Suga administrations.
As a middle power, Japan has the potential to enhance its role. In maintaining its partnerships with the United States and in balancing its deep economic ties with China it can lay the course and mediate in policies that concern itself, the United States and others in Southeast Asia.
There is an awareness in Tokyo that Biden will likely be consumed by domestic issues. The pronounced racial and political divisions within American society, the economy which has suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the challenge to cohere policies in the face of a divided government and electorate will influence the direction of Biden's foreign policy in general, and in particular towards China.
Tokyo is worried that Biden’s policy towards China will be a rerun of the Obama years and be ‘too soft’ regarding Beijing’s increased assertiveness. However, there are clear indications early on from the transition team that Biden will maintain a firm position towards Xi Jinping and will be keen on cooperating with allies in the region to reduce their economic dependence on China. The Suga administration, in particular, was relieved when Biden underscored, in their first call, “his deep commitment to the defence of Japan and US commitments under Article V”, especially regarding the current high-intensity dispute concerning the Senkaku Islands, as well as any future provocative actions by North Korea.
Though US-Japan relations under Prime Minister Abe and President Trump were reportedly good on a personal level, there were significant policy clashes between the two countries over the cost of US bases in Okinawa and on tariffs for Japanese car imports.
Japan’s foreign policy has been changed by the Trump years, and at the same time, Japanese politicians and policymakers have learned from the experience of the past four years. Tokyo was obliged to search for ways to protect itself independent of its security alliance with the United States. While being relatively stable domestically, Japan has adjusted its role and policies both in the region and globally. The changing tides of the international liberal order forced Japan to adapt to the reality of a more distant, transactional United States. While remaining supportive of the strategic alliance with Washington (especially in terms of direct security commitments) Tokyo has sought to elevate its own diplomatic standing and establish itself as a regional leader with neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia.
Under Shinzo Abe, this saw the promotion and signing of a wave of economic agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement and most recently the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes China, Japan and ASEAN members and covers thirty per cent of global GDP.
In accomplishing this, Japan proved to be a key actor in the promotion of free trade and multilateralism and an advocate of a rules-based system during the Trump years like no other country in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Japan first under Abe and now Suga is promoting its ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FIOP) vision that other Western countries, such as France, Germany and the United States are now trying to support and imitate. Prime Minister Suga’s first overseas trips to Vietnam and Indonesia were a clear sign that Japan aims to expand its network of strategic ties with Southeast Asia, where Chinese economic influence is substantial.
In terms of Indo-Pacific security, the Quad is playing an increasingly significant role for Japan and was designed to strengthen security alliances and cooperation with democracies in the region. At the same time, the Quad served as an insurance policy, providing Japan with an extra safety net in terms of diplomatic and security partners should the United States continue to turn inwards. The same intention applies to growing India-Japan security cooperation or the most recent Japan-Australia defence pact, a major new treaty that will see increased cooperation between Canberra and Tokyo.
What will future cooperation look like?
Japan will seek to find ways to work productively in a multilateral environment with the Biden administration given the range of common interests, ideas and values in working together on global issues and revive American engagement in the region.
Substantial support for FIOP is expected as Biden’s commitment to alliances in the region is high. Engaging with like-minded bilateral partners in Tokyo, as well as Canberra and Seoul will serve to shore up and rebuild America’s standing. Japan could play a significant role in this regard given that Indo-Pacific states have high expectations for Tokyo to play a mediating role in encouraging Washington toward greater levels of engagement and be more attentive to regional issues. A stronger American presence at East Asian Summits and engagement with ASEAN and India are further areas where Japan can have a positive mediating impact on the US.
A return of the United States to the TPP and its participation at RECP would be favourable for Japan and a huge signal towards US economic engagement in the region. Unfortunately, a swift return is not expected due to reticence in Congress and the Senate (post-Trump) for large, international trade deals. The near future is likely to see narrower deals on specific issues such as climate change or medical supply chains.
As a middle power, Japan has the potential to enhance its role. In maintaining its partnerships with the United States and in balancing its deep economic ties with China it can lay the course and mediate in policies that concern itself, the United States and others in Southeast Asia. Japan’s task will become progressively easier to fulfil given Biden’s foreign policy is expected to be more rules-based (and therefore predictable) in contrast to the US under President Trump.
In addition, the United States under the Biden administration will have the ability to help mediate between Japan and South Korea where relations have become increasingly strained. In looking forward to the return of Washington as a serious partner for the international community (under a president already well-known in many capitals) Japan will also need to change its course and be aware that the United States is likely to exercise a different form of internationalism than before. At the same time, the Biden administration and wider Washington policy circles will be confronted with a more confident, independent, and regionally well-established Japan.
In light of issues such as China and North Korea, Prime Minister Suga will seek to relaunch the US alliance (particularly in the security sphere) while simultaneously acting, and promoting, individual policies as a middle power. Despite the departure of Donald Trump, the forces that propelled him to the White House remain. However, for now, under Biden and Suga both countries have the potential to be a formidable pairing for the region in the years ahead.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr. Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp is a Japan analyst based in Munich where she is a Policy Fellow at The Progressive Center, an independent think tank and a Fellow at the Agora Strategy Group. Image credit: US Indo-Pacific Command.