Thailand’s Far-Future Space Programme: 2030 and beyond
Thailand’s Far-Future Space Program: 2030
and beyond
WRITTEN BY HADRIEN T. SAPERSTEIN
19 January 2021
On 16 December 2020, Anek Laothamatas, the Minister of Higher Education, Sciences, Research and Innovation (MHESI), announced at a press conference summarising the year 2020 that Thailand’s new space program would aim within five years to acquire domestically-built satellites weighing 50-100 kilograms and, within seven years, to domestically-build and launch a spacecraft for the purpose of orbiting and exploring the Moon. As such, Thailand has now officially entered the ‘Asian space race’.
The ambition for space travel is not just found in the public sector but in the private sector too. For example, Mu Space Corporation, a three-year-old domestic private satellite and space technologies firm, declared that it will build Thailand’s first spaceship and plans to start construction in 2021. The company will also build eleven gateway stations initially in Bangkok to operate its upcoming Low Earth Orbit Satellite (LEO) and is preparing to propose up to eight projects to the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
China’s ‘tooth fairy’ lobbying push towards Thailand’s space program
One of the Minister’s first moves after this historic announcement was a closed video conference on 13 January 2021, where the MHESI (formerly, Ministry of Science and Technology) reportedly penned another agreement in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on science, technology and innovation with the People's Republic of China.
Thailand’s smaller-state space power approach will be unmatched to the strategic environment. The Royal Thai Air Force Space Operations Centre must, therefore, begin thinking about the way it could successfully transition from a user to actor in the space domain.
This latest Sino-Thai MoU may be an indication that Thailand’s space program has finally drifted into China’s orbit in the same way defence cooperation between the Royal Thai Armed Forces and China have “advanced by leaps and bounds” over the last seven years since the 2014 military-led coup d’etat.
Yet there is presently a dispute between the Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA) — a Thai space agency responsible for remote sensing and satellite technology development — and the National Astronomical Research Institute of Thailand (NARIT) — a research institute with a mission to perform and promote the development of astronomy and astrophysics in Thailand — about the degree of support the newest agreement (MoU) should command.
Thailand’s lack of readiness for far-future space warfare
The most recent comprehensive analysis of Thailand’s historical and contemporaneous use of space concluded that the country’s efforts reflected a ‘smaller-state space power approach’ with its focus on power asymmetry in inter-state relations and adoption of a multilateral, non-adversarial and holistic approach towards the space domain. In an effort to keep pace with future space developments prompted by great-power competition, the article concluded that Thailand must regularly reassess its strategic and operational approach towards the space domain. It thusly proposed numerous recommendations ranging from “enhancing partnerships with key actors through Track 1.5 and Track 2 networks, ameliorating its infrastructure resiliency, and operating satellites outfitted with ‘dual-use’ purpose technology”.
This latest thrust on space-related activities by the Thai government should be commended as they have needed to persevere owing to the negative backlash from announcements. However, the Thai government still has not yet sufficiently prepared for far-future warfare in the space domain. By the turn of the decade (2030s), some far-futurists at the American Foreign Policy Council penned that two possible scenarios are likely to occur. While the conservative scenario presumes that “wars begin on Earth (over geostrategic interests on Earth), and extend into space to maintain the advantages of continued overhead satellite sensing”, the expansionist scenario contrarily presumes that “space wars begin in space over geostrategic interests in space and proceed with relative independence of events and military activity on Earth”.
The germane Thai governmental documents for space-related activities — “National Space Strategy 2017-2036”, “National Space Master Plan 2017-2036” and the forthcoming revised “National Space Master Plan 2020-2037” — are currently focused on economic and technological dimensions reflective of a smaller-state space power approach unable to project itself beyond the conservative scenario. As a consequence, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) has neither prepared conceptually or operationally for the possibility that the expansionist scenario ensues accordingly.
In the latter case, this might mean that under the premise that the Thai government keeps pace with its ambitious timeline RTAF Space Operations Centre (SOC/Centre) — the primary organisation to prevent and preserve national security in space for Thailand — will be unprepared to assist subsequent Thai civilian expeditions to the Moon (circa 2030s) or navigate its way through a potential escalatory conflict contained to the space domain.
For example, while arguments about future terrestrial water wars are said to range from grossly unlikely to a mere myth, none of the arguments that can explain away this type of conflict on Earth are present in the context of lunar water wars. Therefore, the RTAF SOC may have to navigate Thailand’s lunar exploration programme through a context of lunar water wars given that countries and/or private firms are forecasted to successfully mine the Moon for water around 2030.
Recommendations
If this expansionist scenario comes to pass, then the guidance from the national strategy and revised master plan or the recommendations provided for the medium-to-long term (seven years: 2022-2028) in the comprehensive analysis will not be wholly suited for the long-to-far-future term risk horizon (seven-to-fourteen years: 2028-2035). In that light, this article provides recommendations to help the Thai government begin thinking about the approach it would need to take amid an expansionist scenario in the space domain. All the recommendations are fundamentally grounded in the idea that Thailand should transition away from a smaller-state space power approach towards something structurally and operationally different. In other words, Thailand must transition from a ‘user of space’ to an ‘actor in the space domain’.
Image credit: Flickr/US Dept of Defence
First, Thailand should resolve the ‘tyranny of time' (sometimes called, ‘loss of strength gradient’) to outer space by investing monetarily and temporally in its wargaming capabilities. Simply put, Thailand needs to find its own ‘war plan orange(s)’ for a variety of premeditated conventional attacks on future lunar missions. At this time, it is unclear whether the RTAF even systematically wargames or indeed intends to commence wargaming beyond ten years’ time. A systematic failing in wargaming across the Thai armed forces is already noted elsewhere with regards to the maritime domain and its growing indigenous defence industry, and, therefore, it is likely to be present here, as well.
Furthermore, the sole identified wargame known to the author — TempoGame — and executed at the Thai Naval War College (NWC), is used merely to inspire new students and stimulate their understanding of the strategic environment. Its implications place little value on information concerning the play of the opponent but rather focuses on exploiting the available weapons systems. The choice to utilise this wargame and not another is likely a result of the modernisation efforts of the three service branches “joint operations” capabilities through its interpretation of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept that started nearly a decade ago and which took a decidedly technicist turn by focusing more on sensors than operators.
This technicist turn is counterproductive given that the trend with ‘serious games’ — games whose main purpose is more than just entertainment — have shifted towards multi-domain concepts and away from joint operations, where the former means integration of combinations and the latter collaboration and synchronisation. Not only should Thailand’s wargaming efforts increase in frequency and intensity, but it should also shift towards “developing a wargame to change the current military mindset towards a more multi-domain approach and enable a motivational learning environment for non-technical personnel” on the use of the space domain in far-future operations.
In contrast, the ‘tyranny of distance’ to outer space is a less pressing issue considering that, in this timeframe, Thailand will be able to send ‘responsive launch operations and logistics’ through ownership of a spaceport with numerous launching platforms and reusable spacecraft. The latter assets would give the domestic space programme limited operational autonomy beyond the Karman line — the limit where aerospace ends and space begins.
Second, once having resolved its tyranny of time issue, Thailand should develop a ‘general deterrence’ concept for the space domain that is focused on ‘above the threshold of war’ attacks. The general deterrence concept will likely mature from the ‘immediate deterrence’ concept recommended in the comprehensive analysis to stymie ‘below the threshold of war’ attacks (e.g. space hybrid provocations or operations) for the medium-to-long term risk horizon. Similar to the Royal Thai Navy’s ‘deterrence by [entrance] denial’ concept for its near-seas environment, the RTAF SOC should also adopt a deterrence by denial concept, which “emphasises the ability to absorb an attack” and communicates the resilience of space capabilities through “disaggregation, diversification, deception, protection, proliferation, and distribution of space assets designed to convince the adversary that it will be unable to achieve its objective”.
Third, in order to satisfy the aforementioned tenets of deterrence by denial concept, Thailand should move away from a non-adversarial, smaller-state space power approach towards an ‘intra-alliance hedging strategy’, where it maintains “a robust alliance while gradually moving towards autonomous defence” over decades. The intra-alliance hedging strategy would gradually transform Thailand’s space program “from one based on the principle of peaceful use of space, involving exclusively civilian entities and technologies, to a program aimed at ensuring national security through non-offensive means”. The four aforementioned Thai governmental documents for space-related activities each already discuss a need for a robust national security dimension.
The intra-alliance hedging strategy will allow the RTAF SOC to possess strike capabilities through access to a great-power alliance; manufacture non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons and electro-magnetic systems that do not infringe the non-offensive principle; and, eventually acquire space-based assets with active defence systems, albeit this technology is still not presently available. The use of this strategy should be adopted with care though, as competitors and adversaries in the ‘second space age’s’ anarchical structure are less clearly delineated than in the ‘first space age’. If care and attention are neglected, it might well result in the rise of an ‘entrapment/abandonment dilemma’ and a complete loss of an autonomous security policy in the space domain.
Fourth, in order to fully satisfy the aforesaid tenets of deterrence by denial concept, the RTAF SOC should implement a ‘layered approach’ for its satellites positioning, “with space services provided by a mix of large and small satellites in both high and low orbits”. The particular priority on small-satellite construction by both the private and public sectors' in Thailand bodes well for the application of this approach. As, not only do smallsats move in great numbers, operating as a ‘single meshed network’ (also called, ‘smallsat constellation’), and at great speeds being in a lower geocentric orbit, they “can also be reconstituted more rapidly than larger satellites — with spares available in orbit or ready to launch [and more] rapidly deployed to provide short-term, mission-specific support”. The emphasis on the use of a single meshed network or smallsat constellation coheres with the RTAF’s interpretation of the NCW concept noted above.
Concluding thoughts
The acclaimed Canadian-American actress, Mary Pickford, once remarked that “the past cannot be changed, but the future is yet in your power”. Although Thailand finds itself in the early days of its participation in the Asian space race, it nonetheless already stands at a critical juncture. In the case that the expansionist scenario of space warfare arises, Thailand’s smaller-state space power approach will be unmatched to the strategic environment. The Royal Thai Air Force Space Operations Centre must, therefore, begin thinking about the way it could successfully transition from a user to actor in the space domain. The article argues that it can start this transition by following four recommendations: resolve the ‘tyranny of time’ to the space issue, develop a general deterrence concept for the space domain, adopt the intra-alliance hedging strategy, and implement a layered approach for its satellites positioning.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Hadrien T. Saperstein is a researcher at Asia Centre, specialising on maritime strategic thought and strategic foresight and warning in the Indo-Pacific region. Image credit: Unsplash/ActionVance