Understanding Russia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific
Understanding Russia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY THOMAS BRUCE
2 March 2021
Scarcely a week away from a coup that would catch Myanmar watchers and the world by surprise, Russian Defence Minister General Sergey Shoigu appeared in Naypyitaw. Speculation intensified post-coup regarding the timing of the high profile visit, especially after General Min Aung Hlaing, the coup’s primary instigator, claimed Russia was a “loyal friend” and, “…has always supported Myanmar in difficult moments”.
It is unclear if Hlaing was cultivating support for the planned coup against Aung San Suu Kyi's government ahead of time from fellow autocracies, or simply seeking closer Russian ties and weapon systems. However, these contrasting assumptions about Russian actions in the Indo-Pacific reflect popular misconceptions about Moscow’s interests there and a tendency to downplay its significant historical role.
Russia’s quiet influence in Asia
In contrast to popular opinion, Russia has influenced Asia’s regional security and politics as much as Japan, China, or indeed the United States have over many centuries, and will continue to do so despite unending pronouncements of its forthcoming ‘decline.’ Analysts and commentators focus intently on the Sino-American rivalry when attempting to frame and explain events in the Indo-Pacific, which can mean either consigning Russia to the role of ‘spoiler’ in continental Europe or as the junior partner in a Sino-Russian strategic alliance. This singular focus understates Russian agency and downplays conflicting Russian and Chinese interests in states such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, or India, for example. It is tempting, in turn, to view those enduring conflicts as historically consistent with Sino-Soviet rivalries over influence in the developing world, even if ideology has less salience these days than it did during the heat and fire of the Cold War.
Since Southeast Asian states routinely indicate they have no interest in choosing sides, a ‘hedging’ preference will continue to make Russia an attractive third partner.
Nevertheless, beyond disparities in material power, important changes in identity, status, and the global system now sharply differentiate Russian from Soviet interests. Although its once fearsome Qing rival was weakening, the nineteenth century brought the expanding Tsarist Empire into an infamous ‘shadow conflict’ with the British Empire in Central Asia (when it wasn't fighting the British in Crimea or Japanese in Korea). The decisive defeat of the Tsar’s navy by Meiji Japan at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 signalled the end of any Russian pretence to being a Northeast Asian power, let alone an Indo-Pacific one. This despite the incredible globe-spanning journey of the Baltic Sea fleet to the Sea of Japan. The 1917 collapse of the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the civil war which followed seemed to confirm this until it became grudgingly clear the Bolshevik government was not going anywhere fast. Scholars continue to debate to what degree ideology gave rise to Soviet interests and foreign policy, as opposed to the more traditional seeming geopolitics benefitting a state brutally grafted onto the territories of the Tsarist Empire.
In practice, Soviet actions displayed a mix of geopolitical pragmatism and ideology, whereas, in contrast, Imperial Japan’s leaders feared the spread of Soviet communism (driven by their interest in preserving the stability of their expanding empire in Manchuria). The relatively unknown 1939 Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol or Nomonhan over the Manchukuo army during the Japanese-Soviet border conflict is argued to have sent Tokyo southward toward the more vulnerable looking European colonies in Malaya and Indochina, thereby unintentionally igniting nationalist revolutions. This decision, amid an already horrific war in mainland China and the legacy of Japanese expansionism in Southeast Asia, helped shape American post-war fears concerning the USSR and subsequent containment efforts in the Pacific. With Imperial Japan defeated and Manchuria reoccupied by the Red Army, the Soviets sought to take advantage of a post-1945 global system that afforded them opportunities to shape the development of newly independent states.
Moderate Russian aims and interests
In contrast, contemporary Russian interests and aims under the presidency of Vladimir Putin seem more moderate. Gone are the days of supporting communist parties, wooing non-aligned leaders, and trying to deter Southeast Asian states from joining the US-led, anti-communist containment coalitions such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Instead, interests range from a mutual Sino-Russian concern in preserving the security of their borders, resolving long-standing territorial disputes with Japan, to offering alternative sources of weapons and support to states looking to diversify away from China or the US. This is perhaps the greatest and least appreciated strength of the Russian approach to the Indo-Pacific. While commentators were understandably focused on recent Sino-Russian joint bombers flights over South Korean airspace or cooperation on missile defence, Russian oil companies in Vietnam were drilling in Chinese claimed areas in the South China Sea. Rosneft may have since bowed to Chinese pressure and withdrawn from Vietnam, though reports are conflicting and claims that Chinese dependence constrains Russian actions in the Western Pacific are overstated.
It would be more accurate to view Russia as in competition with both China and the US in the Indo-Pacific for prestige, influence, and status. Russia continues to provide arms to Myanmar of course, but also Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos, and repeatedly boasts of providing twenty-five per cent of arms sales to the region since 2000. This is not solely about acquiring a source of revenue for struggling defence firms or an economy battered by post-2014 sanctions, but instead, creating the impression it still retains global influence in key strategic regions. It also demonstrates its agency will not be constrained by the alliance system of the United States’ or by close economic relations with China. Since Southeast Asian states routinely indicate they have no interest in choosing sides, a ‘hedging’ preference will continue to make Russia an attractive third partner.
An opportunity Moscow will continue to exploit as a balancer amid pressures on regional states from Washington and Beijing. Focusing exclusively on the growing and sustained rivalry between the United States and China overlooks the fluidity of states in this region. It also overlooks the different forms of competition and cooperation that occur between them and Russia's role, as it struggles for status and prestige as a would-be great power, and to preserve and expand its agency.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Thomas Bruce is a PhD student at the Political Science Department of the University of Toronto and a veteran of the Royal Canadian Navy. Image credit: President of Russia.