Chinese investments — 9DASHLINE

Navigating Sinophobia amid Indonesia's economic ascent

Written by Dr Narayani Sritharan and Peter Rizkillah

Sinophobia in Indonesia is not merely a by-product of the BRI but a consequence of economic ambition intersecting with security concerns in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

Emerging Issues, Southeast Asia, Most Popular9DLApril 5, 2024Navigating Sinophobia amid Indonesia's economic ascent, NARAYANI SRITHARAN, PETER RIZKILLAH, 9DashLine, China, Indonesia, geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese lending, BRI-related loans, infrastructure, Sinophobia, Global South, Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen, economic growth, debt sustainability, debt, AidData, Xi Jinping, Global Civilisation Initiative, Global Security Initiative (GSI), development tools, President Jokowi, Chinese investments, influx of Chinese workers, Chinese workers, immigration, labour migration, COVID-19 pandemic, Jakarta, PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry (GNI), nickel, nickel processing plant, Jiangsu Delong Nickel Industry, Morowali, Central Sulawesi, PT Virtue Dragon Nickel Industry (VDNI), Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesian labour regulations, labour disputes, labour unions, ferronickel smelter, Indonesia Country Climate and Development Report, data protection laws, tourist visas, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, visa-free, visa-waiver policy, North Sumatra, Dairi regency, regional security, Islamist extremist groups, Jamah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), counterterrorism, counterterrorism cooperation

BRI 2.0: Reflecting on the past, charting the future

Written by Kelly Antoinette Khyriem

As criticisms propel the initiative towards a BRI 2.0, if China actively addresses and mitigates risks associated with its projects by enhancing transparency and accountability frameworks, it has the potential to outpace the emerging alternatives that are challenging the BRI.

East Asia9DLMarch 29, 20249dashline, BRI 2.0: Reflecting on the past, charting the future, Kelly Antoinette Khyriem, Xi Jinping, China, PRC, Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, Maritime Silk Road, digital infrastructure, trade policy coordination, financial cooperation, multilateral institutions, Memoranda of Understanding, geopolitical strategy, domestic development, US-led international order, ‘string of pearls’ theory, Chinese investments, naval bases, Indian Ocean, crucial shipping routes, debt-trap diplomacy, BRI-related loans, Sri Lanka, economic sovereignty, debt trap narrative, governance deficiencies, corruption, 1Malaysia Development Berhad, 1MDB, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, human rights abuses, BRI infrastructure, BRI commitments, large-scale infrastructure projects, sustainability, ecology, carbon dioxide emissions, environmental implications, EU, US, India, transparency, labour rights, EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, Global Gateway Initiative, Blue Dot Network, Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, PGII, G20 Leaders' Summit, hydropower plants, solar farms, 5G, public-private partnerships, Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Digital Silk Road, e-commerce initiatives, BRI 2.0, Green Belt and Road, renewable energy, Clean Silk Road, Silk Road Economic Belt, Hambantota Port, Kenya, Zambia, Malaysia, debt management, digital connectivity, debt burdens, renewable energy investment, AIIB

2023: EU decoupling from China?

Such a move would suggest that Brussels was giving in to Washington’s demands instead of pursuing its own objectives. Perhaps counterintuitively, a decoupling from China would therefore be at odds with European calls for strategic autonomy.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLJanuary 18, 20239dashline, 2023: EU decoupling from China, Agathe Demarais, Moritz Rudolf, Maximilian Mayer, Luke Patey, Angela Stanzel, EU, Europe, European Union, China, Beijing, US-China trade conflict, decoupling, strategic autonomy, trade partners, goods shortages, EU imports from China, Washington, Brussels, PRC, party-state, Chinese market, Chinese investments, capacity building, hegemonic competition, Biden Administration, technological development, interdependence, emerging technologies, economic sanctions, European economy, European diplomacy, minilateral, anti-coercion instrument, decoupling debate, European industries, green supply chains, electric vehicle production, green exports, European welfare, European decision-makers, European common market, economic integration, technological integration, Russia-Ukraine war, geostrategic dependencies, critical raw materials, green transition, digital transition, alternative partnerships, mutual interdependency, Taiwan-Strait

2023: The future of CEE-China relations

9DASHLINE asked a select group of experts to assess Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ relations with China and how they expect them to evolve in 2023.

Europe and the Indo-Pacific9DLJanuary 16, 20239dashline, 2023: The future of CEE-China relations, JUSTYNA SZCZUDLIK, VUK VUKSANOVIC, VALENTINA VENGUST, STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV, Central and Eastern European, CEE, China, 17+1, 14+1, Beijing, 2022, 2023, Russia, Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine war, PRC-CEE, PRC-CEE relations, economic cooperation, security concerns, critical infrastructure, high-tech industry, backsliding, democratic backsliding, coercion, Lithuania, EU common market, 'no-limits' friendship, Moscow, 16+1 summit, Huo Yuzhen, Estonia, Latvia, Jiang Yu, US, united states, Taiwan, security guarantor, NATO, China-CEE format, Czech Republic, Greece, Chinese investments, security concern, security guarantees, Washington, Belarus, Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, Serbia, Hungary, Middle Corridor, Albania, North Macedonia, cooling-off period, joint statement, territorial integrity, sovereignty, diplomatic missions, Baltic countries, EU-China relations, China-CEE cooperation, cooperation mechanism, Sino-Serbian cooperation, territorial disputes, free trade agreement

More of the same is not the answer to building influence in the Pacific

Written by Meg Taylor DBE and Soli Middleby

While all nations share an interest in promoting a peaceful, safe, and prosperous region, the independent Pacific states do not necessarily share the same geostrategic perspectives as the large powerful economies of the industrialised West.

Pacific9DLOctober 21, 20229DashLine, More of the same is not the answer to build influence in the Pacific, Meg Taylor, Soli Middleby, Pacific, New Zealand, Australia, Pacific interests, geostrategic perspectives, independent Pacific states, West, industrialised West, climate change, non-renewable energy sources, exploration permits, climate adaptation finance, Pacific Resilience Facility, Green Climate Fund, China, sovereignty, Chinese investments, AUKUS, Indo-Pacific strategy, Partners in the Blue Pacific, Indopacific priorities, foreign aid, Western aid paradigm, Chinese-built infrastructure, Asian Development Bank, Papua New Guinea, Japan, United States, India, aid projects, geopolitical competition, Pacific Islands Forum, regional processes, Pacific priorities, Western aid, Chinese aid, aid intermediaries, international organisations, international financial institutions, multinational companies, independent aid agency, Chinese financiers