2023: The future of CEE-China relations
2023: The future of CEE-China relations
16 January 2023
In 2022, many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries recalibrated their relations with China, and the Beijing-led mechanism formerly known as ‘17+1’ shrank to a mere ‘14+1’.
Moving into the new year, 9DASHLINE asked a select group of experts to assess CEE countries’ relations with China and how they expect them to evolve in 2023.
DISTRUST, DISENGAGEMENT, AND DECAY OF THE 14+1
DR JUSTYNA SZCZUDLIK — DEPUTY HEAD OF RESEARCH AND CHINA ANALYST, POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PISM)
China’s unvarying and zealous endorsement of Russia after its invasion of Ukraine accelerated the deterioration of PRC-CEE relations. I use the term ‘accelerate’ as China-CEE ties have been going downhill for years. Until recently, the reason for this was twofold: an increasing disappointment with Beijing’s unfulfilled pledges of deepening economic cooperation and rising security concerns related to China’s interests in the region’s critical infrastructure and high-tech industry.
However, in the past two years, China crossed two red lines that sped up the backsliding of its relations with CEE countries. First, in 2021, Beijing deployed unprecedented coercion against Lithuania that in fact was an attempt to undermine the EU’s common market. Then, in 2022, China sided with Russia after the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Beijing has underestimated, or misinterpreted, the impact of its “no-limits” and “rock-solid” friendship with Russia on CEE, despite the fact that the region has been voicing its concerns about Beijing enhancing its bonds with Moscow for years.
In 2022, despite China’s enormous efforts, CEE countries rejected a proposal to hold a 16+1 summit and celebrate the format’s 10th anniversary. Over April and May, Ambassador (and special envoy to CEE) Huo Yuzhen’s trip to eight CEE countries to explain China’s stance on Russia and diffuse concerns ended without success. In early August, Estonia and Latvia announced their withdrawal from the 16+1 (thereby joining Lithuania, which left the format in 2021). In October and November, the newly appointed envoy to CEE Ambassador Jiang Yu’s two trips to the region also did not repair damaged relations.
To sum up, 2022 ended with CEE countries increasingly distrusting China. The region has been doubling down on its relations with the US as a security guarantor (with the aim of being strongly anchored in NATO) and has been in the vanguard of hardening the EU’s policy towards China and enhancing its bond with Taiwan.
In 2023, further disengagement with China and the decay of the China-CEE format (now 14+1) is expected. Regarding the 14+1, two parallel processes are likely: new exits (for instance, the Czech Republic is on the brink of leaving) and deepening inertia or inaction of those CEE participants that decide to stay.
IT’S COMPLICATED
DR VUK VUKSANOVIC — SENIOR RESEARCHER, BELGRADE CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (BCSP) AND ASSOCIATE, LSE IDEAS
China’s ties with the CEE region will remain complicated, and not just because of the Ukraine war. The 17+1 mechanism, or 16+1 (as it was known before Greece’s admission), used to be China’s institutional mechanism for cooperating with the region. However, the promise of Chinese investments and projects in the region never came through, resulting in disappointment. The mechanism was dented back in 2021 when Lithuania — disappointed with the lack of benefits in cooperating with China — left the initiative.
Russia is also a complicating factor for China because Moscow remains the main security concern for the region, leaving it dependent on NATO and US security guarantees. To preserve the good credentials they have in the US, these countries will gladly sacrifice their ties with China to please the US without Washington even asking them to do so. The Russia-Ukraine war has only exacerbated this dynamic. Frustrated by the Chinese partnership with Russia in the wake of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia took Lithuania’s path and left the 16+1 initiative, reducing it to 14+1.
The war in Ukraine also destroyed China's ambition to connect itself with European markets via Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian territories. This leaves China with the option of going for the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) Middle Corridor, which runs from Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, Turkey, and finally Europe. Another option is the Balkans, where China looks much better, as Albania is one of the few countries recording a drop in Chinese investments. The line connecting Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary enables China’s connection with the European edge of the Eurasian supercontinent, from the Eastern Mediterranean and deep into Central Europe. Among these countries, Serbia and Hungary are the most China-friendly in Europe. The relationship with the region will remain complicated for Beijing in 2023, as CEE countries are divided between those attracted by economic opportunities offered by China (though not always fulfilled) and those with security alliances with the US.
NO COHERENT OR UNIFIED APPROACH
VALENTINA VENGUST — JUNIOR ASSOCIATE, ATHENEUM PARTNERS
2022 has proved to be a sobering year for the CEE countries’ relations with China. The cooling-off period already began much earlier, following years of disillusionment and frustration with the dwindling economic results of the 16+1 initiative, combined with suspicions surrounding the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and negative responses towards China’s economic coercion tactics targeting Lithuania after its rapprochement with Taiwan. The rocky relationship nevertheless hit an all-time low at the beginning of February, when China signed a joint statement with Russia, and afterwards with China’s silence on Russia’s aggression and war in Ukraine.
The war, which is a painful reminder of persisting regional historical wounds, has consequently sown distrust towards China’s commitments on territorial integrity and sovereignty. China’s disregard for regional security concerns has therefore pushed CEE countries into recalibrating their relations with China, focusing on valuing closer ties with NATO, and clearly questioning the worth of any alliance with Beijing.
Meanwhile, China’s lukewarm reassurances and renewed diplomatic interest in the region — such as sending diplomatic missions to tour various CEE countries — have not gained any real high-level political traction and seemed more like failed attempts at damage control. The cracks in the relations became painfully visible with the Baltic countries leaving the 16+1 initiative last summer. Now, the Czech Republic might be next. With the current geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, 2023 could very well push the already limping format to the brink of extinction.
The CEE countries by no means possess a coherent or unified approach towards China, with ‘soloing’ to be expected from some regional presidents — whose actions at times clash with their own governments’ approaches toward China — which is a persistent problem also on the EU scale. However, the evolution of relations seems to be directed towards even more troubled waters, with the CEE countries potentially being the vanguard of more hawkish approaches towards EU-China relations, focusing mostly on security concerns. Losing the goodwill of most of the CEE will prove costly for Beijing, which will be seeking to reestablish its ties with the EU after the current escalation of tensions with the United States.
SERBIA-CHINA RELATIONS ON AN UPWARD TRAJECTORY
STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV — PROGRAMME COORDINATOR, BELGRADE FUND FOR POLITICAL EXCELLENCE (BFPE) AND ORGANISATION TEAM MEMBER, BELGRADE SECURITY FORUM
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the question of national security has become increasingly important. This has resulted in countries making decisions that re-confirm their allegiance to providers of security, led by NATO and the US. While this has not been the sole reason, it has influenced the decision of three Baltic countries to withdraw from the China-CEE cooperation mechanism, leaving it with a lower number of participants than Beijing would like. Still, even with these developments, not all countries have distanced themselves from dedicated participation in the existing mechanisms of cooperation with China, and some have not even fully distanced themselves from Russia.
The main example of this behaviour is Serbia. Belgrade remains dedicated to cooperating with China, and the existing crises (the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, rising inflation, and the energy crisis) may lead Sino-Serbian cooperation to evolve and a new phase of partnership to emerge. The main points of cooperation to expect are new developments in political cooperation and Belgrade’s diplomatic support of Beijing. Serbia disputes Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence, which is fully in line with China’s stance on territorial disputes. We can expect the signing of a free trade agreement which could further boost the two countries’ trade exchange and promises of new Chinese investment and loans in Serbia. One thing to follow is the possibility of Xi Jinping visiting Serbia in 2023. With such a trip, Xi would deliver his promise tracing back to 2019 and the pre-COVID-19 world. With all that in mind, it could easily be concluded that while the China-CEE cooperation mechanism is in trouble, bilateral relations between China and one CEE country — Serbia — is on an upward trajectory.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia (cropped).