Horn of Africa — 9DASHLINE

China’s uncertain future as a global security provider

Written by Lukas Fiala

The key question is whether Xi’s growing assertiveness and inadequacy of existing means to ensure the security of Chinese entities abroad will lead to a more pronounced security footprint over the coming decade, featuring new military base arrangements and, potentially, institutionalised security guarantees.

Faultlines9DLAugust 11, 2023China’s uncertain future as a global security provider, Lukas Fiala, 9DashLine, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Beijing, Global South, security, mediator, Riyadh, Tehran, Middle East, Washington, diplomacy, isolation, COVID-19, pandemic, United States, China’s overseas security strategy, strategy, foreign policy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, mediation, peace and security, peace broker, non-state actors, intrastate conflicts, statist approach, Ukraine, Russia, Israel, Palestine, security and defence cooperation, Hu Jintao, United Nations peacekeeping (UNPK) missions, South Sudan, Mali, Africa, Latin America, multilateral, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), military base in Djibouti, Global Security Initiative (GSI), security actor, US-led global security order, global security governance, UN Charter, indivisible security, sovereignty, 1975 Helsinki Accords, Vladimir Putin, NATO expansion, NATO, Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western imperialism, imperial history, Western colonial powers, century of national humiliation, Soviet Union, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Western hegemony, principle of non-interference, non-aligned movement, Cold War, non-intervention, 干涉, 干预, security provider, Sudan, Libya, ‘Go Out Strategy’ (走出去战略), Chinese state-owned enterprises, natural resources, raw materials, multilateral lenders, development finance, human rights, good governance, 2008 Beijing Olympics, al-Bashir regime, African Union, Darfur, Libyan civil war, People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA), Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Chinese interests, power projection, security-development nexus, liberal peace, developmental peace, Ethiopia, civil war, Pakistan, South Asia, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamic extremism, Islamabad, sovereign lender, arbiter, Abiy Ahmed, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Saudi-Iran rapprochement, Iraq, Afghanistan, global war on terror, piracy, Gulf of Aden, 9dashline

2023: The future of the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific

As a reinvigorated Quad steps up its engagement, some observers have called for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to establish a permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific via a standing maritime force. But how viable is this idea?

Pacific9DLJanuary 11, 20239dashline, The future of the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific, Quad, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, standing maritime force, Blake Herzinger, United States, military, vaccination, supply chains, climate, maritime security, Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, Quad vaccine partnership, Beijing, China, Australia, India, Japan, Horn of Africa, military alliance, Indian Ocean, New Delhi, South or East China Seas, East China Seas, South China Sea, navy, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, Gulf of Aden, maritime trade, geoeconomic, Pacific islands, Canberra, Pacific arc, Retired US Admiral Gary Roughead, Pentagon, Washington, defence planning, sea control, Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Indo-Pacific, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia, Ukraine, rule of law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and overflight, Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief meeting, Asian NATO, Quad Leaders’ Meeting, Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, Oceania, Southeast Asia, Taiwan Straits, Korean peninsula, ASEAN, Canada, south korea, Taiwan

Italy's 'non-strategy' in the Indo-Pacific

Written by Andrea Caligiuri

Italy’s ‘non-strategy’ in the Indo-Pacific is partly conditioned by the fact that Rome does not want an open confrontation with China. Rather, it seeks a pragmatic approach with Beijing.

The UK steps up defence diplomacy in Indo-Pacific

Written by Olli Pekka Suorsa

Unlike the Royal Navy’s much larger destroyers, the OPVs can offer more opportunities for regional engagement, including participation in multinational training and exercises, capacity building activities, and showing flag. After all, ‘showing up’ is the ‘hot currency’ in Southeast Asia.