The UK steps up defence diplomacy in Indo-Pacific

*The UK steps up defence diplomacy*
*in the Indo-Pacific*

18 August 2021

The United Kingdom has embarked on a diplomatic offensive toward the Indo-Pacific, employing its economic, diplomatic, and military tools to realise the new “Global Britain” strategy. The HMS Queen Elizabeth-led carrier strike group (CSG) deployment to the Indo-Pacific is a clear manifestation of the current administration’s understanding of the growing geopolitical and geo-economic importance of this mega-region in the years ahead. The CSG has conducted numerous defence engagement activities with a large number of allies and partners from the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific, building on the UK’s long-standing defence partnerships despite the much-publicised Covid outbreak onboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth.

In addition to the CSG’s high-visibility, the UK is building a robust Indo-Pacific presence with the permanent deployment of two patrol vessels to the region from late August, and the establishment and forward deployment of a Littoral Response Group by 2023. These moves will help the Royal Navy create and sustain a modest naval presence in the Indo-Pacific with scalable impact, ranging from lower-end presence and engagement missions, supporting multinational counterterrorism coalitions and disaster relief assistance missions, to carrier-led power projection and shows of force.

CSG21 deployment and defence diplomacy

The deployment of a UK-led CSG to the Indo-Pacific has already conveyed a message that goes beyond the immediate headlines of power politics and ‘gunboat’ diplomacy — one that stresses engagement and cooperation. This is evident in the CSG itself, which is not solely a UK effort but has welcomed warships from other allied nations such as the US and the Netherlands. During the deployment, the CSG will engage with 40 different countries from the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific. This will help the UK to ‘show flag’ around the Indo-Pacific and re-engage allies and partners throughout the mega-region in various defence diplomacy activities. Such missions signal London’s commitment and ability to sustain a modest regional presence.

Unlike the Royal Navy’s much larger destroyers, the OPVs can offer more opportunities for regional engagement, including participation in multinational training and exercises, capacity building activities, and showing flag. After all, ‘showing up’ is the ‘hot currency’ in Southeast Asia.

However, due to the continuing fight to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic and numerous restrictions for in-person meetings, the defence diplomacy value of the CSG deployment has taken a hit with a reduction in shore activities. To make matters worse, the HMS Queen Elizabeth and some of her accompanying ships suffered from a Covid outbreak with at least 100 cases reported. Nevertheless, London has ensured that the HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group’s maiden deployment will make the maximum impact, despite the challenging circumstances.

As the CSG21 entered the Indian Ocean, the ships first conducted a passing exercise with a Japanese ship near the Horn of Africa, followed by further exercises with India, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore, as they made their way to the South China Sea. The CSG has certainly shown great flexibility and full utilisation of available resources, which is shown in some ships breaking away from the main force and seizing opportunities to train with more partners or engaging in other pre-planned operations. The ships are headed to Japan and will likely engage with the Philippines and Vietnam along the way.

Furthermore, South Korea and Japan are given special attention as they loom large in London’s Indo-Pacific charm offensive. The two Northeast Asian democracies are seen as natural partners, sharing the same values and interests, and offer significant mutual opportunities for economic, technological and security cooperation. Arriving in Japan, the ships will conduct several training exercises with their Japanese and US counterparts. On their return leg, the ships will take part in the Bersama Lima exercise, marking the 50th anniversary of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The UK deploys two offshore patrol vessels permanently to the Indo-Pacific

In addition to the CSG deployment, the UK announced the permanent deployment of two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to the Indo-Pacific, during Secretary of Defence Ben Wallace’s official visit to Japan on 20 July 2021. The ships will not have a permanent base but will rely on partners like Japan, Australia, and Singapore for logistical support. The two OPVs would spend most of their time visiting friendly nations in Southeast and East Asia, showing flag and advancing the UK’s defence engagement in the region.

The UK’s plan to permanently deploy naval vessels to the region was first made public in the March 2021 Integrated Review — the most comprehensive re-thinking of London’s foreign, economic, development, and security policy in decades. The Integrated Review also detailed the plan to replace the ageing OPVs with modern Type 31 multirole frigates in the future. The new frigates will offer the UK an increased capacity and flexibility to work with allies and partners and respond to various contingencies ranging from disaster relief to counterterrorism and criminal activities at sea, and the monitoring of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing (IUUF) — the region’s so-called ‘everyday’ security challenges.

Although a positive move, the small number of deployed vessels will also limit what the ships can realistically achieve. Factoring in the ships’ maintenance requirements means that only one of the vessels will likely be available most of the time. Moreover, the immense scale of the region and the ‘tyranny of distance’ also restrict the number and duration of defence engagements. Therefore, the two ships can only do so much and attend only so many activities per year. Nevertheless, the permanent deployment of patrol vessels will help London to sustain a limited naval presence in the region, build trust amongst partners, and advance inclusive defence diplomacy engagement.

‘Right-sizing’ capabilities for defence diplomacy

The permanent deployment of the two patrol vessels to the Indo-Pacific can offer outsized benefits for both the UK and partner nations. The deployment of smaller naval vessels helps ‘right-size’ their impact in terms of training value and conveying strategic signals. Unlike the Royal Navy’s much larger destroyers, the OPVs can offer more opportunities for regional engagement, including participation in multinational training and exercises, capacity building activities, and showing flag. After all, ‘showing up’ is the ‘hot currency’ in Southeast Asia.

Despite criticism over the displacement and armament (or lack thereof) of the two patrol vessels, the HMS Spey and HMS Tamar are the ‘right fit’ for engaging smaller partners in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. For example, the participation of the patrol vessels in the US-led maritime security drills in Southeast Asia like the SEACAT and CARAT series will benefit from the wealth of experience the Royal Navy offers. Moreover, with a primary focus on improving maritime domain awareness, information-sharing, and practising ship-boarding and search, search and rescue, and other low-level, yet important skills, deploying a destroyer to such an exercise would be redundant and do the crews a disservice. Instead, smaller lightly armed vessels are better suited to address these scenarios as being able to engage partners on an equal footing will help the UK gain acceptance in the region without unnecessarily overshadowing local navies.

It is also easy to see how smaller naval vessels can help reduce some of the fears associated with the deployment of major combat platforms like destroyers. Therefore, the two OPVs could enjoy more access to friendly ports and approvals to join regional exercises which may not be the case with larger, more imposing naval assets. Smaller states in Southeast Asia, for example, may be hesitant to accept or invite naval visits of destroyers or other large surface combatants due to fears of a diplomatic backlash elsewhere or the chances of undermining the optics of neutrality. Thus, with a right-sized naval presence (in terms of assets and role) in the Indo-Pacific, and especially in Southeast Asia, the UK can make a meaningful contribution to regional maritime security capacity building and improve interoperability with regional partners.

In addition, the UK is also planning to establish two Littoral Response Groups (LRG) by 2023, which will put Royal Marines onboard Royal Navy’s LHD- and LST-class ships, essentially creating high-readiness flexible amphibious groups. One of the two LRGs will be deployed to the Indo-Pacific and will help the Royal Navy sustain a forward presence and support regional efforts to combat various security threats. The UK’s return to the small club of aircraft carrier operators has created the first leg of the UK’s three-pronged power projection puzzle, which in the future will consist of a carrier strike group, forward-deployed LRG, and permanently deployed assets.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Olli Pekka Suorsa, PhD, is a research fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological School, Singapore. His research focuses on maritime security and regional security and defence issues. Olli holds a BA from Tallinn School of Technology, an MSc from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, and a PhD from the City University of Hong Kong. Olli has prior work experience in the defence industry in Finland. Image credit: Flickr/Official US Navy.