Liberal International Order — 9DASHLINE

Best of 2022: Russia’s War and the International Order

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February last year took the international community by surprise and raised concerns about the precedent this might set especially for China’s policy vis-à-vis Taiwan. The differing responses from countries, particularly established and rising powers, were also scrutinised, and implications were drawn for global governance and the international order.

Faultlines9DLJanuary 4, 2023Russia, Ukraine, The day the music stopped, Jana C. von Dessien, University of St Gallen, Taiwan, Putin, Liberalism from below: The Global South, Indrajit Roy, UN, United Nations General Assembly, UNGA, Liberal International Order, The rationale behind Beijing’s position on the war in Ukraine, Wang Li, University of Aberdeen, China, Beijing, China's Endorsement of Russia's Assault: Implications for Europe and Asia, Justyna Sczudlik, propaganda, Moscow, Lithuania, Europe, Alignment without alliance: China’s growing ambivalence to Putin’s war, Lunting Wu, Kamil Matusiewicz, Nonalignment’s long shadow: India and the Ukraine crisis, ROHAN MUKHERJEE, India, indo-pacific, multipolar order, New Delhi, Japan-Russia: The end of delusions, CÉLINE PAJON, Shinzo Abe, Nicholas Ross Smith, Ukraine — A wakeup call for the United States, Ian Hall, Why India won’t break from Russia… yet

The problem is not a power transition

Written by Michael J. Mazarr

The US-China relationship is not accurately captured as a power transition, but it is a clash of an often self-righteous leading power and a dissatisfied challenger. That recipe is one of the most combustible in world politics.

Faultlines9DLDecember 2, 20229DashLine, Michael J. Mazarr, The problem is not a power transition, power transition, China, Chinese Communist Party, CCP, Party Congress, 20th Party Congress, national rejuvenation, power, USA, sanctions, great power, United States, hierarchy, world politics, international relations, international relations theory, index of national power, global norms, American strategy, comprehensive national power, international order, GDP, technology, hegemon, hegemony, Beijing, debt, housing bubble, liberal internationalism, Liberal International Order, demographics, fertility rate, dependency ratio, per capita wealth, Autocracy, autocratic rule, material power, Soft Power, diplomacy, World Bank, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, European Union, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US-Japan-Australia-Taiwan coalition, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, counterbalancing, human rights, UN, post-war international order, power measurement, Stacie Goddard, community of common destiny for mankind, rising power, John Ikenberry, institutionalist theory, exceptionalism, US-led order, Daniel Rosen, Jessica Chen Weiss

Alignment without alliance: China’s growing ambivalence to Putin’s war

Written by Lunting Wu and Kamil Matusiewicz

Functional, strategic and normative factors have shaped Beijing’s growing ambivalence towards the war, and despite the absence of outright condemnation, a subtle shift and distancing can be discerned.

Faultlines9DLNovember 4, 20229DashLine, Lunting Wu, Kamil Matusiewicz, Alignment without alliance: China’s growing ambivalence to Putin’s war, China, Russia, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jingping, Xi Jinping, SCO, SCO Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Samarkand, Ukraine, Ukraine war, military, Moscow, Beijing, Russia's aggression, cooperation, economic partners, Russian oil, gas, and coal, Saudi Arabia, trade, decoupling, US, NATO, security, Taiwan, AUKUS, Quad, Li Zhanshu, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, State Duma, NATO allies, liberal hegemony, Liberal International Order, liberal internationalism, Orange Revolution, colour revolutions, 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, Yang Jiechi, Foreign Affairs Commission, US hegemony, Western powers, liberal democracy, US interests, Western sanctions, Sinopec, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), Huawei, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Arctic LNG 2 project, EU sanctions, Xiaomi Corp., Lenovo Group Ltd., Power of Siberia 2, zero-covid, secondary sanctions, food security, food insecurity, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Wang Yi, Kremlin, social media, Ukraine's counter-offensives, Weibo, Central Asian states, Belt and Road Initiative, humanitarian aid, Central and Eastern European countries, 17+1, People’s Liberation Army, indivisible security, Global Security Initiative, Cold War, sovereignty, Nuclear weapons, autonomous regions

Liberalism from below: The Global South, Ukraine and the Liberal International Order

Written by Indrajit Roy

Of the 141 countries that condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, over 90 are from the Global South. Criticisms of Russia are thus not confined to European or North American countries.

Faultlines9DLApril 12, 20229DASHLINE, Indrajit Roy, Liberal International Order, Global South, LIO, Non-Aligned Movement, China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, UNGA, Russia, Putin, Ukraine, Zelensky, Middle East and North Africa Region, MENA, Rule of law, Eurocentric, Second World War, Atlantic Charter, UN, United Nations, US, UK, USSR, Kenya, Haiti, Nepal, Liberia, multilateralism, rules-based order, liberal internationalism, Potsdam, Tehran, Yalta, Bandung Conference, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Antigua, Barbados, Cote d'Ivoire, Ivory Coast, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Palau, colonisation, colonialism, Maldives, Martin Kimani, Liberalism from below: The Global South, Ukraine and the Liberal International Order, Asia Pacific, Nations General Assembly, Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, internationalism, WW2, United States, United Kingdom, Multilateralism, Asia, Africa, Trinidad, Non-alignment, University of York