Best of 2022: Russia’s War and the International Order
BEST OF 2022:
RUSSIA’S WAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
4 January 2023
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February last year took the international community by surprise and raised concerns about the precedent this might set especially for China’s policy vis-à-vis Taiwan. The differing responses from countries, particularly established and rising powers, were also scrutinised, and implications were drawn for global governance and the international order.
9DASHLINE published several expert analyses on this issue last year. Here, we summarise some of our most-read pieces, which also generated a lot of discussion and debate among our readers.
WRITTEN BY JANA-CHRISTINA VON DESSIEN, DOCTORAL RESEARCHER, UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN, AND CO-HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAM AT FORAUS, SWITZERLAND
Here, Jana-Christina von Dessien explores how the limits of Western strategy and the loss of external credibility of the West’s value system prevented the allies from closing ranks to deter Russia’s aggression and expansionism early on. Faulting generations of Western decision-makers for failing to recognise Putin’s metamorphosis into a full-fledged autocrat, she evaluates the options now available to them. She concludes by considering what all this means for China’s designs on Taiwan.
WRITTEN BY DR INDRAJIT ROY — CO-DIRECTOR, INTERDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, AND SENIOR LECTURER, UNIVERSITY OF YORK
In this piece, Indrajit Roy argues that the Global South is not a monolith. Exploring divisions within this broad grouping, especially at the UN General Assembly, he contends that predictions of the death of the liberal international order (LIO) are premature. He also observes that despite criticism of the LIO as a ‘Eurocentric’ construct, several countries with a strong anti-colonial tradition have upheld multilateralism and the rules-based order, suggesting that “Liberalism from below” is alive and here to stay.
WRITTEN BY DR WANG LI — PROFESSOR AT JILIN UNIVERSITY, AND RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE CENTRE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
Here, Wang Li explains the strategic calculus underlying China’s reaction to its ‘no limits partner’ Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Explaining the strategic imperatives Beijing must balance, Wang underscores the importance of preserving the country’s partnership with Russia in part due to the latter’s vast natural resources and formidable nuclear arsenal. He predicts that once the war is over, China and Russia are likely to cooperate more closely in promoting a ‘multilateral world order’.
WRITTEN BY DR JUSTYNA SZCZUDLIK — DEPUTY HEAD OF RESEARCH AND CHINA ANALYST, POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PISM)
Keeping the focus on China, Justyna Szczudlik takes a closer look at what China’s apparent endorsement of Russia’s actions entails. Parsing official discourse on the matter, she finds that Chinese rhetoric mirrors Russia’s disinformation and propaganda about the war. She also details how China’s narrative is strategically vague, allowing Beijing to signal support to Moscow while preventing serious deterioration in its ties with the West. Szczudlik concludes that even though Beijing’s support for Russia is limited to political declarations, combined with its unprecedented economic coercion against Lithuania, this indicates that China has already become a security threat to Europe.
WRITTEN BY LUNTING WU — PHD CANDIDATE AND LECTURER, FREIE UNIVERSITAT BERLIN, AND NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, INSTITUTO DO ORIENTE, UNIVERSITY OF LISBON, AND KAMIL MATUSIEWICZ — BERLIN-BASED POLITICAL OBSERVER AND FREELANCE WRITER
As Russia’s war drags on, however, Beijing seems to be becoming more ambivalent. In this piece, Lunting Wu and Kamil Matusiewicz remind us that despite strategic interdependence and some shared interests, China and Russia are not allies. Although both seek to fight Western liberal hegemony, Chinese entities have also been mindful of sanctions against Russia and have suspended agreements in several cases. They conclude that for now, China remains firmly on the fence.
WRITTEN BY DR ROHAN MUKHERJEE — ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Rohan Mukherjee shifts the focus to India — the other rising power whose stance on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was criticised by the West last year. Instead of the oft-cited justification of military dependence on Russia, Mukherjee argues that New Delhi’s positioning is better understood as a function of deep-seated nonalignment, or the more recent foreign policy principle of strategic autonomy. A multipolar order, both at the global level and in the Indo-Pacific, are most conducive to India’s rising power ambitions. Above all, India’s unwillingness to go along with the West against Russia must be understood in the context of New Delhi’s preferences for a world with more widely distributed power and reforming the current unrepresentative order.
WRITTEN BY DR CELINE PAJON — HEAD OF JAPAN RESEARCH, CENTRE FOR ASIAN STUDIES, FRENCH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IFRI), AND INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH FELLOW, CANON INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES (CIGS)
Here, Celine Pajon discusses the major rift in Japan-Russia relations due to the war in Ukraine and the realisation that Moscow and Beijing are working together as revisionist powers. Tokyo now seems to have abandoned Shinzo Abe’s magnanimous engagement policy towards Moscow and has firmly aligned with the West. Japan also seems willing to take exceptional measures to prepare itself for what it sees as a democratic fight against autocratic regimes with revisionist views.
WRITTEN BY DR NICHOLAS ROSS SMITH — SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON EUROPE, UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Finally, turning to the US, Nicholas Ross Smith exhorts Washington to replace its ‘global’ grand strategy with more nuanced strategies that reflect the evolving power dynamics of the international and regional systems. With the international system transitioning from unipolarity to multipolarity, and incentives for regional great powers to dabble in revisionism, Smith argues that the US must abandon its obstinate preference for maintaining the status quo. Instead, Washington must find a more realistic vision of its international role as well as pragmatic ways of balancing the demands of Russia and China with its goals of supporting actors like Ukraine and Taiwan.
WRITTEN BY DR IAN HALL — PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
In a similar vein, Ian Hall argues that although India has become more vocal about the war in Ukraine over time, its position has not changed substantively. India remains reluctant to criticise Putin directly, for reasons that have much to do with its strategic, security, and economic imperatives. Above all, however, Hall argues that concerns about China’s power and ambition underpin India’s calculus.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Image credit: Flickr/President of Ukraine.