The rationale behind Beijing’s position on the war in Ukraine

WRITTEN BY WANG LI

7 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine drags on, global attention is focused on how it could end. As key strategic partners, China and Russia have enhanced their strategic relations to “no limits”, cemented by the affinity between the two countries’ presidents. Accordingly, some scholars and politicians have inquired whether China could act as an "honest broker" to mediate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Recently, Joseph Nye — the originator of the ‘soft power’ school in International Relations — discussed the case of former US President Theodore Roosevelt’s skilful mediation of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905 to reflect on President Xi Jinping’s possible role in persuading his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine.

According to Nye, mediating might win Xi a Nobel Peace Prize. More than that, like the United States’ status during the Russo-Japanese war, China's prestige as a responsible power would also be enhanced if Xi could persuade Putin to accept a ceasefire in Ukraine. However, such historical analogies have very limited relevance today, particularly because the United States and its allies seem to have decided to completely weaken Russia as a great power and create favourable prospects for victory in any future confrontation with China.

China’s security concerns are legitimate

There is little parallel between the cases of Teddy Roosevelt and Xi Jinping. First, geopolitically, although the United States was the rising power in the early 20th century, its core interests and security concerns were not directly related to either Russia or Japan. Isolated from both Europe and Asia, the United States was much more secure in foreign affairs. Second, diplomatically, both the United States and the United Kingdom (the ruling power of the time) favoured, if not supported, Japan.

Beijing believes that even if Moscow’s reputation as a formidable military power has suffered a serious blow during its war in Ukraine it will be able to re-emerge as a stronger power in a short time.

In the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, however, although China is a rising power, Russia is a vital strategic partner for Beijing, especially in terms of geopolitical security and sustainable economics. If Russia falters in the war, China will be more isolated and could face increasing pressure from the US-led AUKUS and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, China will certainly lose Ukraine, which has been a significant trade partner and a key participant in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Eastern Europe. Moreover, much like other countries and most great powers, China’s power potential is shaped by its geography, and this drives its geopolitical strategy. According to China’s ‘NEWS’ (north, east, west, south) security doctrine, which was adopted in 2016, the country’s northern border must be secured through a quasi-alliance with a strong Russia.

Doing so would allow China to concentrate its well-equipped and well-trained forces on the looming threats near the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. This would enable the country to push forward its geo-economic strategies such as the BRI in Central Asia and the Middle East in the west as well as ASEAN in the south. In addition, contemporary China’s geopolitical approach continues to be driven by the ancient wisdom of “if the lips are gone, the teeth will be under immediate threat” (or: China and Russia share a lot in common). Given these reasons underlying Beijing’s stance on the ongoing war in Ukraine, China indeed finds it deeply regrettable that “the scenario in Ukraine has come to where it is today”, as Xi said to his EU counterparts in April. On the one hand, China has urged both Russia and Ukraine to comply with the tenets of the UN Charter and international norms. Yet, on the other hand, Beijing cannot afford to lose Moscow as the most effective strategic partner in foreign affairs.

Realpolitik or principled neutrality?

The dilemma Beijing now faces is that the US, its allies, and some of its partners have threatened to sanction China should it refuse to side with the US-led challenge to Putin’s “illegal, unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine”. However, Beijing is unlikely to give in to this threat of sanctions. First, China’s realpolitik cannot afford to lose Moscow as a strategic partner, as Russia has rich natural resources and a formidable nuclear arsenal. As Sergey Karaganov put it, “both countries are the biggest sources of each other’s strength”. Echoing these remarks, on 19 April, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng revealed to the Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov that “[n]o matter how the international situation evolves, China will, as always, strengthen strategic coordination with Russia and jointly safeguard the common interests of both sides”. This is not lip service but geostrategic thinking of the leadership in Beijing and Moscow, given that the United States formally perceives China and Russia as strategic rivals and enemies.

Second, although the US and EU have tried to ‘persuade’ or warn China and other countries to side with the ‘anti-Russian’ movement, Beijing reiterates that it has continued to work with the international community centred by the United Nations rather than any political block. In fact, China has adhered to a more or less neutral policy in calling for a ceasefire to end the war and endorsing the two sides to carry out direct dialogue for peace. It was encouraging for China to see that many other countries including India, Pakistan, and Indonesia decided not to side with the anti-Russian bloc at the UN General Assembly vote on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion. The leadership in Beijing believes that even if Moscow’s reputation as a formidable military power has suffered a serious blow during its war in Ukraine it will be able to re-emerge as a stronger power in a short time. The rationale behind this notion is Russia’s huge natural resources, its impressive military and industrial capacity, and the solidarity it can expect from China, India, and many other countries in the Global South.

Looking ahead

It is certainly hard to predict how long Putin’s war will endure and what final terms might be written into any eventual peace deal. Yet, it is likely that in the post-war world order, China and Russia will work more closely to promote a ‘multilateral world order’ based on the majority of the international community rather than a ‘rich countries’ club like the G-7 or the globalised NATO. As China has reiterated, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership has developed in line with their good neighbourhood and shared security interests. Specifically, although Beijing is not a formal ally of Moscow, both sides seemingly view their strategic partnership as unlimited. In addition, China is Russia’s largest economic partner and has declined to join the anti-Russian sanctions since the Ukraine war broke out.

Furthermore, alongside bilateral relations, China and Russia have advanced multilateral interaction between states in the non-Western part of the world and given a greater focus to building international institutions — the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS and the Russia-India-China grouping. Russia is capable of playing a seminal role in coordinating the interests of partner countries within these institutions. It is true that there are challenges ahead for both China and Russia, yet the bottom line is that together they are much stronger.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Wang Li is a Professor at Jilin University and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Global Security & Governance at the University of Aberdeen. Image credit: Wikimedia.