Written by Melissa Conley Tyler
Australia has no ability to remake China into a completely different country. We need to live with it. This means both standing up to China and getting along — hardening our defences, while ensuring our economic prosperity. Without an economy, a country can’t pay to keep itself safe.
Read MoreWritten by Charles Dunst
Upon Hun Sen’s death or incapacitation, public anger—the result of his closeness with China and failure to address corruption, a lack of jobs, and lagging development—could converge with elite discontent to topple Hun Manet, the strongman’s eldest son and successor.
Read MoreWritten by Stephen Nagy and Hanh Nguyen
US lawmakers and officials are contemplating a ‘reshoring fund’ of $25 billion to encourage critical suppliers to move out of China. Japan earmarked more than $2 billion in subsidies for companies to either bring manufacturing back home or diversify supply chains to Southeast Asia.
Read MoreWritten by Amy E. P. Kasper
There will likely be a great deal of idealism in Biden’s foreign policy; one example of this is his promise to convene a summit of world democracies within the first year of his presidency. Such a move could start to rebuild key relationships, a talent for which Biden is known.
Read MoreWritten by James Laurenceson
With China’s purchasing power over the next decade forecast to grow more than that of the US, Japan, India and Indonesia combined, expect Australian businesses to craft more sophisticated strategies to manage coercive risk, rather than just looking to sell more to other markets.
Read MoreWritten by Pratnashree Basu
Understood from this perspective, the participation of Australia in this year’s Malabar exercise along with the three other participants elevates the geostrategic significance of the exercise and marks an additional sphere of engagement in the already many-tiered network of alliances that the Indo-Pacific has given rise to.
Read MoreWritten by Niranjan Marjani
Since the border conflict in May this year, India has chosen to be both, more assertive, and less interested in Beijing’s many sensitivities. While the Quad is expected to be a strategic deterrent to China, Taiwan could prove to be an important economic counterbalance.
Read MoreWritten by Lucas Knotter
For the rest of the world, similarly, this means that they can expect much the same from New Zealand’s foreign policy, which continues to balance its relationship with China and its Pacific connections. In many respects, New Zealand will continue to be considered, and consider itself, as a force of progress and innocent whimsy in world politics.
Read MoreWritten by Rupakjyoti Borah
While it is highly unlikely that the new prime minister will go for a complete overhaul of Japanese foreign policy (especially in the field of Japan-India relations) there may be subtle changes. For one, under the Suga administration, India may not figure as highly on the radar as had been the case with his predecessor.
Read MoreWritten by Joshua Bernard B. Espeña
President Rodrigo Duterte’s independent foreign policy which on one level sought to balance both the US and China, at its core, appeared to appease Beijing by setting aside the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling and accept Chinese investment.
Read MoreWritten by Melissa Conley Tyler
Over the last four years, many members of Australia’s foreign policy and the security community have continued to be immensely supportive of the US alliance while Trump has derided allies as free-loaders who have abused their relationships with the United States.
Read MoreWritten by Melissa Conley Tyler
The Morrison government wants sweeping new powers to cancel international arrangements by universities, councils and state governments. After announcing its intentions in August, it introduced a bill to parliament last week.
Read MoreWritten by Felix Kuhn
A policy that will find much greater favour among LDP hardliners is Suga’s promise in his election pamphlet to revise the constitution, which would include a clear statement on Japan’s right to hold military forces. This has long been a dream of more right-wing politicians.
Read MoreWritten by Simran Walia
Abe attempted to reorient Japan’s security policy with regard to a rising and increasingly assertive China and in so doing expanded its security and strategic ties with Australia, India, France, the UK, and several countries in Southeast Asia. Abe has therefore left an indelible imprint on the country’s foreign and security policy.
Read MoreWritten by Garima Mohan
The real significance of these guidelines lies in the signal they send — to China, to partners in the region, and to other European countries. Timing is significant — coinciding with Germany’s EU Council presidency, releasing this document suggests Germany will make a real push, along with France and other Member States, towards an EU-wide approach to the Indo-Pacific.
Read MoreWritten by Robert Ward
While Abe may have had his most obvious successes in foreign relations, he also leaves his successor a full in-tray of foreign policy problems, not least a failure to advance on a territorial dispute with Russia and relations with South Korea that are at their lowest ebb since the 1965 bilateral normalisation treaty.
Read MoreWritten by Charles Dunst
Thai demonstrators’ sense of malaise stems from a number of factors: The unfair nature of the 2019 election; a restrictive political environment in which activists are disappeared; the disbanding of the opposition party; vast economic inequality (the widest in ASEAN); and an economy that was already anaemic even before COVID-19.
Read MoreWritten by Rushali Saha
Russia’s ‘return’ to the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s claim for a multipolar Indo-Pacific and opens up another avenue, beyond defence, for closer cooperation with a long-term partner. The presence of a strong military power such as Russia can increase the weight of middle powers such as India in the increasingly bipolar contest between the US and China.
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