Russia: India’s Trump card in the Indo-Pacific?
Russia: India’s Trump card in the Indo-Pacific?
WRITTEN BY RUSHALI SAHA
4 September 2020
The Indo-Pacific construct has gained salience in recent years as the countries in the region have adjusted their geostrategic thinking. Specifically, the prioritising of threats and opportunities in the maritime domains.
Representing the confluence of two oceans with the world’s busiest sea lanes traversing key maritime chokepoints, the Indo-Pacific undoubtedly represents the crucial space which will determine the global dynamics of power in the 21st Century. These developments have led Russia, which has traditionally resisted replacing Asia-Pacific in its vernacular with Indo-Pacific in official discourse, to increase its presence in the region. For India, this represents both an opportunity and a potential challenge.
The development of the Chennai-Vladivostok sea route has brought to the fore recent bilateral efforts between Moscow and New Delhi. Intended to intensify cooperation in developing the greater Eurasian space, it is also an attempt to align both governments’ visions in a manner which dissuades Vladimir Putin’s apprehensions about the Indo-Pacific as a Western geopolitical construct. At the same time to the concern of New Delhi, China and Russia are coordinating their naval manoeuvres through bilateral naval exercises which compliments their strategic convergence and reflects a mutual dissatisfaction with the US-led regional status quo.
At this crucial juncture where the international order is set to witness the increased competition between Beijing and Washington, Russia is well aware of the costs of alienating a traditional partner like India and seeks to expand the contours of this partnership.
India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific
India has enthusiastically embraced the Indo-Pacific construct due to the obvious importance accorded to it by its natural geography. President Trump has gone further than his predecessors in according India a prominent position in his administration’s ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This is in tune with Washington’s increasingly confrontational approach towards China, which perceives American leadership in the Western Pacific as coming under threat due to Beijing’s ‘revisionist’ intentions, such as with the South China Sea. Given India's historically complicated relationship with China, which has taken a turn for the worse following recent border clashes in the Galwan valley, the US is trying to bring New Delhi decisively into its ‘camp’.
Russia’s attitude towards the Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic construct is one of caution at best, and outright rejection at worst. Over the last two years, Moscow’s official position has been that the construct is artificially imposed to divide the region into rival blocks.
Although the Modi and Trump administrations have ramped up defence cooperation and with an openly anti-China QUAD becoming a distinct possibility, New Delhi is unlikely to abandon its balancing posture which accommodates the sensibilities of all regional stakeholders, including Russia.
India’s foreign policy disposition prioritising strategic autonomy makes it wary of alliance politics, therefore instead of an overt strategy favouring one country over the other, it has charted its SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision premised on inclusivity. Although unclear about whether this includes China, through SAGAR India has been able to separate itself from exclusionary American narratives. By defining the Indo-Pacific construct positively in terms of bringing countries together based on shared principles and emphasising that it is not directed against any one country, allows India to consolidate partnerships with countries which share these principles but are uncomfortable with calls to oppose China.
Renewed optimism about a revived QUAD must be tempered with the reality that India continues to hold a conceptual demarcation between the QUAD and its Indo-Pacific vision. Despite tensions with China, India has refrained from prioritising the QUAD over other plurilateral forums evident from External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s statement in an interview where he said:
“Even though people are attributing a novelty to this (QUAD), there is another acronym called RIC (Russia, India and China) going on for 20 years. BRICS is yet another one. They too are plurilateral and issue-based".
Russian caution over the Indo-Pacific
Russia’s attitude towards the Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic construct, in contrast, is one of caution at best, and outright rejection at worst. Over the last two years, Moscow’s official position has been that the construct is artificially imposed to divide the region into rival blocks. However, this is not to suggest that Russia has not interacted with the region. Moscow has maintained a presence in the Indian Ocean since the Soviet Union and in more recent times its interest in the region is driven by its renewed activism in Africa.
Viewing the US as the main architect of the Indo-Pacific, Moscow’s consistent stance has been that it is aimed at containing Russia and China. In some cases, this is justified as the 2019 US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report identified China as a ‘revisionist power’ and Moscow as a ‘revitalised malign actor’. Since 2012, large scale naval exercises between Russia and China have been held in the Pacific. However in 2019 for the first time, Russia, China and Iran launched their first joint naval drill in the Indian Ocean revealing the emergence of possible competing collective security pacts.
Despite the ‘strategic partnership’ between China and Russia, it would be wrong to assume that Moscow will turn a blind eye to the regional realities of the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s stated position that the Indo-Pacific undermines ASEAN centrality was seriously diluted when the ten-member organisation adopted the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ indicating its formal acknowledgement of the construct.
Domestically, Russians are acutely aware, even uncomfortable, with the asymmetry in relations with China which brings back harsh memories of the Sino-Soviet conflict from the Cold War. The key priority for Russia is to develop its Far East region for which it is looking actively for partners beyond China. President Vladimir Putin announced the idea of ‘Greater Eurasia’ in 2016, which would require wide-ranging cooperation from SCO, ASEAN, EU and support from countries including India, South Korea and Iran among others. New Delhi’s support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea fits well with Russia, which says it has no intention of getting involved in the dispute but has growing energy interests in the region.
Indo-Russian engagement in the Indo-Pacific
Russia’s ‘return’ to the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s claim for a multipolar Indo-Pacific and opens up another avenue, beyond defence, for closer cooperation with a long-term partner. The presence of a strong military power such as Russia can increase the weight of middle powers such as India in the increasingly bipolar contest between the US and China. Ahead of the annual summit between India and Russia in October, Indian envoy to Russia DB Venkatesh Varma described Russia as a "very important Pacific power" while reiterating the commonalities over differences in both countries approach to the Indo-Pacific paving the way for future cooperation.
Chinese attempts for regional hegemony, evident from its recent aggressive moves, have induced anxieties in Russian strategic circles since it threatens the delicate equilibrium on which the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations was based. Russian fears that Chinese expansionist intentions know no bounds and can come at the expense of partners is a by-product of the mistrust inherent in their relationship and may see Moscow casting a wary eye towards Siberia in the medium term
However, by refusing Chinese requests not to sell arms to India during the recent border clash, President Putin sent the message that he will not blindly follow Beijing in all circumstances. Meanwhile, India’s decision to attend the virtual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China days after the Galwan clash and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s presence at the 75th Victory Day parade in Moscow shows the importance India attaches to bilateral relations with Russia. By giving Russia priority in the Indo-Pacific construct, not only does India prove its commitment to an inclusive Indo-Pacific but is also leveraging its long-standing closeness with Russia against the chequered history of Sino-Russian relations.
The Indo-Pacific is now a reality that Russia cannot ignore and Moscow will not want to be left out of the critical debates which will shape the future of the region. It will look for mechanisms and partners to make its presence felt rather than blindly adapt to a construct which it did not participate in building. By providing Russia with these avenues, India is strengthening its position in the region as an independent actor while reducing China's leverage.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author Biography
Rushali Saha is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies. She has previously served as a Research Intern at Centre for Land Power Studies and Netaji Institute for Asian Studies. She graduated summa cum laude from Jadavpur University and holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations. Image credit: President of Russia.