One prime minister, two legacies: Looking back at Abe Shinzo’s time in office

3 September 2020

Last week’s announcement that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo will finish his seven-year tenure early due to health concerns brought an unprecedented era of political stability in Tokyo to a quick end. Abe concludes his term as Japan’s longest-serving premier with two legacies: a domestic one characterised by a laundry list of unfulfilled political and economic ambitions; and an international one, where Japan has seen itself secure its place firmly in the international order with a host of major trade deals and defence reforms now under its belt.

Abe’s core priorities while in office included his Abenomics economic reform policy and revising the constitution, as well as raising Japan’s profile through the Olympics and other international events. Seven years later, Japan’s GDP has failed to see the 2 per cent growth per year his administration initially promised and still faces many of the same problems it did in 2012 when Abe assumed office. While Japan’s standing overseas has been elevated, the constitution remains unchanged.

A divided legacy in domestic and foreign policy

Despite initial momentum, the three arrows of Abenomics (namely, monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reform) did not quite hit their respective marks. Abenomics found some success in the weakened yen and strengthened stock market that followed the Bank of Japan’s “bazooka” of asset purchases in 2013, the major expansion of overseas tourism, and immigration reforms to allow specialised overseas workers in on short-term visas. However, consumption tax hikes in 2014 and 2019 trampled consumer spending, and expectations fell flat in reaching his targeted 2 per cent inflation rate.

Abe also failed to make meaningful progress in advancing other core structural reforms such as female empowerment in the workforce or addressing Japan’s plummeting birth rate – reforms necessary to maintain growth prospects in the face of compounding issues like labour shortages, staggering debt (to the tune of 235 per cent in 2017) and low wage growth.

Abe will also be remembered for his efforts to redefine Japan’s bilateral relations. Under his premiership, he strengthened Japan’s ties to the US through his adept management of President Donald Trump, built on Japan’s ties to actors like Australia, India, and a host of Southeast Asian countries.

Abe’s ambition to revise Article 9 of the Japanese constitution – a post-World War 2 feature which revokes Japan’s right to go to war – to codify the existence of the Japanese Self Defence Forces was similarly cut short. Despite his successful push in 2014 to reinterpret Article 9 to allow for collective self-defence and expand the scope of US-Japan military cooperation, he was unable to set in motion the mechanisms for revision and achieve his goal of making Japan a more 'normal' country (and one finally rid, to Japanese nationalists minds, of the last vestiges of the US occupation). This failure lies however with the deep unpopularity with the general public of changing the status quo combined with realpolitik compromises made with Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner.

Abe’s diplomatic legacy, however, stands in contrast as one marked by major wins. Abe made it a mission of his to elevate Japan’s global standing, telling audiences in Washington in 2013 that “Japan is back” as a tier-one player on the international stage. He has been successful in that regard, carving out new global leadership roles for Japan and strengthening its bilateral relationships across the world.

He has been particularly successful on the trade front – when the US announced its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, Abe played a key role in picking up the pieces and forging its extant version, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He also concluded free trade agreements with the EU (creating a trade zone covering nearly a third of global GDP), Canada, and the US.

Abe's changes to Japan’s security posture were also significant and will stand as a core feature of his legacy. These changes included the creation of the National Security Council and National Security Secretariat, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, and the aforementioned reinterpretation of Article 9. His concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific has now been adopted by the Trump administration, and the Quad cooperation framework between Australia, India, the US, and Japan has been resurrected (with the US potentially eyeing a formalisation of the arrangement).

Abe will also be remembered for his efforts to redefine Japan’s bilateral relations. Under his premiership, he strengthened Japan’s ties to the US through his adept management of President Donald Trump, built on Japan’s ties to actors like Australia, India, and a host of Southeast Asian countries, and fostered warmer relations with China through a dialogue-oriented strategy – Chinese premier Xi Jinping was set to make a landmark state visit to Japan this April before the COVID-19 outbreak. However, his streak of relationship-building was not entirely positive. Japan’s relations with neighbouring South Korea turned historically sour under Abe as his vision for a softened view of Japan’s imperial history clashed with a left-wing Blue House in Seoul and a Korean public unsatisfied with Japan’s apologies for its conduct during wartime.

Looking forward

Helming a post-Abe Japan will not be an easy task for his successor, who will likely be decided in the coming weeks after an intra-LDP election. His successor, whoever that may be, will be faced with the immediate challenge of managing an economy faltering in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic (having shrunk by 27.8 per cent in April-June).

He will also have to decide whether to continue the legacies of his predecessor or carve out a unique political vision for himself in the limited time before next year’s general election. The political stability brought about by Abe Shinzo’s record-breaking tenure is significant, and proactive efforts on his part to maintain internal discipline were supported by Abe’s inheritance of a fractured opposition and a governing apparatus glad for relief from the rapid-fire turnovers in leadership of the past two decades. Whether that stability will remain is unclear.

Whether the next Prime Minister will run an Abe 2.0 premiership remains to be seen. Abenomics will likely persist in some shape or form, as will his legacies in shaping Japan’s trade and security policies. Long-term issues like labour shortages and debt that Abe was unable to remedy also continue to loom heavy. The tumult of the ongoing pandemic may yet be a Fukushima moment for the LDP as its economic impacts continue to devastate — and perhaps be the impetus to take on the challenging, difficult reform necessary for the long-term wellbeing of the Japanese economy. Whoever the successor may be, they have their work cut out for them.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author Biography

Ellen Ehrnrooth is a recent graduate of Tufts University, living and working freelance in Washington, DC. She most recently interned in Helsinki at Nordic West Office and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Japan Chair in Washington DC. Image credit: Office of the Prime Minister of Japan

Pacific9DLSeptember 3, 2020China, India, Japan, Shinzo Abe