India’s defence import embargo: oriented for strategic gains, not self-sufficiency
India’s defence import embargo: oriented for strategic gains, not self-sufficiency
WRITTEN BY SHISHIR RAO
2 September 2020
India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently announced a five-year import embargo on 101 defence items beginning in December 2020. The embargo aims to boost the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-sufficient India) and ‘Make in India’ initiatives promoted by the Modi government.
The move follows a May edict hiking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India’s defence manufacturing sector from 49 per cent to 74 per cent. These developments present an opportunity for Indian manufacturers to tie-up with foreign manufacturers for the production of defence equipment for India’s armed forces. Although the stated aim behind the embargo is to help India achieve self-sufficiency in its security requirements, this narrative is off the mark considering the country’s production capabilities.
Self-sufficiency is not an achievable goal
In 2019, India was the second-largest arms importer in the world after Saudi Arabia, accounting for 9.2 per cent of global arms imports in terms of value. Most of these imports included high-end military equipment, including the much-celebrated Rafale Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. These factors have been taken into consideration and the embargo covers a pragmatic list of products. These include platforms and enabling systems that India has the indigenous capacity to produce, such as cruise missiles, combat helicopters, armoured vehicles, SONAR, RADAR, assault rifles, and certain types of ammunition. Complex technology and research-intensive products such as interceptor missiles, combat aircraft, naval platforms, anti-submarine warfare equipment, etc are conspicuous by their absence. Thus, it is unlikely that the embargo will eliminate the Indian defence sector’s import dependency in these areas.
Developing the capability required to boost defence production as a result of the embargo can help India look beyond the Indian Ocean. In attempting to increase its defence imports, India is likely to not only look at profitability but also strategic gains.
While it is undeniable that boosting defence production capability is necessary for India to reduce its defence spending, which was placed at $71.1 billion in 2019, several factors undermine the self-sufficiency narrative.
For example, representatives of the country’s armed forces have questioned whether they will have to ask for a waiver if indigenously manufactured equipment does not match up to requirements or standards. Apart from such concerns about the quality of indigenous manufacturing, India is also likely to find it difficult to achieve self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing due to its geography. India has huge security requirements on its disputed land borders with China and Pakistan, coupled with the growing maritime threat from Beijing’s submarines in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR); terrorism and asymmetric warfare pose further challenges.
The reasons for and wisdom in peddling the self-sufficiency narrative are dubious. Several notable defence equipment producing countries continue to import arms.
China, the fifth-largest arms exporter with 5.5 per cent of global arms exports, is also the fifth-largest arms importer with 4.3 per cent of the global share. However, it has moved from a net arms importer to a net arms exporter over time. This is the goal that India must target in the long-term. In fact, the embargo supports this goal in two important ways: first, by encouraging joint ventures, and second, by incentivising transfers of technology from foreign to Indian manufactures. Notably, most of the equipment covered under the embargo, such as cruise missiles, assault rifles and RADAR, have been developed by India in collaboration with countries such as Russia, France and Israel. At the moment, India is far from reaching the goal of being a net arms exporter. The most likely path to achieve this goal is through an incremental increase in defence production and exports.
The strategic value of increasing Indian arms exports
India is placed 23rd in the arms exporters list, accounting for only 0.2 per cent of global arms exports. India’s biggest clients are Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Mauritius, accounting for 46 per cent, 25 per cent and 14 per cent of India’s arms exports, respectively.
Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Oman, and Vietnam occupy a smaller share of India’s arms exports. Most of India’s exports consist of patrolling platforms and intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment such as Coastal RADAR provided to Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles and Maldives. At the same time, India’s top export destination, Myanmar, has also acquired war fighting equipment, such as TAL Shyena anti-submarine torpedoes and the Kilo-class submarine INS Sindhuvir, in addition to RADAR, SONAR and other Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment. The general trend observed in Indian exports so far has been the extension of lines of credit to Indian Ocean littoral states. The key factor behind this is India’s increasing wariness to Chinese activities in the region.
Developing the capability required to boost defence production as a result of the embargo can help India look beyond the Indian Ocean. In attempting to increase its defence imports, India is likely to not only look at profitability but also strategic gains. This should make Southeast Asia, with its simmering nine-dash line dispute, a key focus area for India. The nine-dash line dispute in the South China Sea is a result of Chinese civilisational exceptionalism. China claims maritime sovereignty over the entire sea, disregarding the claims of all other littoral states and undermines the rules-based maritime order. The dispute has been reinvigorated recently as China has increasingly adopted aggressive military and diplomatic posturing.
Among the disputants, Vietnam has drawn special interest from India due to its resilience in asserting its sovereign rights. India has made attempts to gain a significant share in Vietnam’s arms market through sales of Offshore Patrol Vessels (a deal for which has materialised), Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, BrahMos cruise missiles, Akash surface-to-air missiles, and Varunastra torpedoes. India’s current exports to Vietnam mainly consist of ISR and electronic warfare equipment. The Philippines has also shown an interest in purchasing two BrahMos missile batteries, while Indonesia is believed to have shown an interest in India’s missile technology, and SONAR and RADAR development capabilities.
A substantial share in the Southeast Asian arms market is likely to propel India to adopt stronger positions in its commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific as the South China Sea is a key flashpoint between Chinese exceptionalism and a rules-based international order. On the strategic front, it allows India to pit its indigenous equipment against Chinese systems without risking a direct confrontation. However, India’s ability to take a more proactive approach towards the dispute hinges on its defence production capabilities in the near future.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Shishir Rao holds an MA (Geopolitics and International Relations) from Manipal Academy of Higher Education. He has worked as a journalist for five years and holds an MA in English and a Bachelor's in Media Studies (Journalism). His areas of interest are maritime security, the Indian Ocean Region, India’s foreign policy and national security and South Asia. Image credit: Wikipedia Commons.