New Delhi and the Russia-India-China triangle
New Delhi and the Russia-India-China triangle
WRITTEN BY SHANTANU ROY-CHAUDHURY
1 September 2020
In 1998, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov drafted the concept of a Russia-India-China (RIC) strategic triangle as a doctrine of multipolarity to serve as an alternative to the United States-imposed unipolarity after the Cold War’s conclusion. Although not an ‘anti-West’ concept per se, the strategic triangle was meant to serve as a counterbalance to the Western alliance, and Primakov argued the troika would allow protection for nations not allied to the United States, European Union and Japan. The developments that led Moscow towards seeking a closer strategic relationship with India and China are threefold.
First, the inability to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from expanding closer to Russia’s borders and the unilateral action taken the following year in Kosovo. Second, Russia, India, and China’s own problems with Islamist militant groups in Kashmir, Chechnya, Central Asia, and Xinjiang, respectively, and a common ground on fighting insurgent groups. Third, a common interest in the arms trade. During a period when India and China accounted for almost 70 per cent of Russia’s arms exports, and Indian apprehensions on Russia exporting systems with the same features to China, the RIC would be a platform to appease Indian sensitivities.
With India and China buying similar weapons systems from Russia, India should use its relationship with Moscow to check exports to China which has been known to reverse engineer products for indigenous production.
Although the RIC has not developed into a strategic triangle to the extent envisaged by Moscow, the three countries, all of which are nuclear powers, together, occupy over 19 per cent of the global landmass and contribute more than 33 per cent of the world’s GDP.
The latest RIC meeting took place on 23 June 2020, with each country represented by their respective Foreign Ministers. Amidst a border clash and standoff between Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India’s external affairs minister confirmed his attendance, with Moscow stating bilateral issues were usually not on the table for discussion. For India, however, questions arise about whether the RIC fits New Delhi’s aims as it increases its strategic engagement with the United States, Japan, and Australia. This goes against the RIC’s objective to undermine a growing American presence in the Indo-Pacific.
While China sees the US Indo-Pacific policy as one to contain China, Russia views it as an American strategy to draw India and Japan into an outright military alliance. The US, for their part, have not alleviated Moscow's concerns and it is in New Delhi's interests to draw Russia into the Indo-Pacific through the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor. Furthermore, with China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy towards India and South Asia, and growing calls for a re-thinking of India’s China policy, it is becoming difficult to see constructive engagement between India and China in limited international forums like the RIC, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Additionally, Russia is growing wary of China's increasing economic footprint in Central Asia, which combined with the non-recognition of China's claims in the South China Sea, (and vice versa on Russia's claims over Crimea), means the two countries do not see eye to eye in what is often termed a ‘friendship of convenience’. All of which points to growing tensions within the Russia-India-China axis.
These developments, however, should not mean that New Delhi ceases engaging Russia and China through the RIC. New Delhi should increase its participation and demand India’s concerns to be taken more into account. Presently, the RIC joint statements are geared more towards Russian and Chinese interests with India acting as an additional signatory. Furthermore, Russia often views India as a means to balance China, and India should make the most of this by addressing New Delhi’s China concerns which include those surrounding arms exports to Beijing which may end up on the Indian border.
With India and China buying similar weapons systems from Russia, India should use its relationship with Moscow to check exports to China which has been known to reverse engineer products for indigenous production. During the border clash along the LAC, Chinese media also urged Moscow not to sell arms to India. More importantly, India needs to continuously engage the two countries on the issue of Central Asia.
The region, strategically located just north of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is crucial for connectivity routes, capital investment and extensive natural resources present in the post-Soviet republics in Central Asia. It is, therefore, important for India to shape the Russia-China dynamics and prevent them from establishing a duopoly in the region. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that will link India to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan is an important aspect of maintaining a presence alongside Russia and China. For India, the RIC acts as another platform to preserve good relations with Russia and to express concerns and foreign policy visions. It should, therefore, also be used to find points of convergence with Beijing.
While the RIC grouping has many delicate and complex parts to it, with bilateral tensions between India and China, and between Russia and China, Moscow needs Beijing and New Delhi, especially in the post-COVID world. Similarly, New Delhi views Moscow as an invaluable partner and China knows Russia’s approval is imperative for the success of its Belt and Road Initiative across Eurasia.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author Biography
Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) based in the Western Air Command, New Delhi, India. He has an MPhil. from the University of Oxford, St. Antony’s College where he focused on the international relations of South Asia. Image credit: Office of the President of Russia.