The Philippines faces a strategic choice: China or the United States
The Philippines faces a strategic choice: China or the United States
WRITTEN BY JOSHUA BERNARD B. ESPEÑA
16 October 2020
In August this year, the United States’ Defence Secretary Mark Esper visited the Pacific islands of Guam and Palau to discuss options to reinforce the area for a free and open Indo-Pacific. This visit could signal either an exodus of American power or the possibility of a drawn-out episode of great power competition in the region. Either way, this article argues that the Philippines should up the ante to uphold its strategic interests.
Fortress Western Pacific
In the wider Indo-Pacific, the US has managed to rally India, Australia, and Japan for an ‘anti-China’ Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. As China wages its influence across the South China Sea (through both hard and soft power), the US grows more insecure, nevertheless, it has resolved to take the fight to them by fortifying the Second Island Chain.
The US remains responsible for Palau’s defence – by rotational presence – through the Compact of Free Association (CoFA). Esper affirmed their ties with Palau through the renewal of the CoFA in 2024 to protect them from China’s ‘predatory‘ economics. They also discussed opening a permanent military base to host regular American forces and the installation of a radar network for enemy detection and domain awareness.
President Rodrigo Duterte’s independent foreign policy which on one level sought to balance both the US and China, at its core, appeared to appease Beijing by setting aside the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling and accept Chinese investment.
Esper also affirmed Guam’s strategic value in hosting American air and naval forces through the Joint Region Marianas. A recent US Indo-Pacific Command report indicated Washington’s intention to invest in a 360-degree air-missile defence system in Guam to provide the long-range precision-strike capability to the states of the First Island Chain. Notably, Esper met his Japanese counterpart Taro Kono to reiterate America’s intention to relocate US marines from Okinawa to Guam — which will house a force of 5000 marines.
For some, Esper’s visit may look like a US contingency designed to mitigate a conventional war with China. Others, however, perceive this as an exodus of American power as Washington grows uneasy based on Beijing’s ability to saturate the First Island Chain and pose a threat to them in the Second. Whether an exodus or a contingency, recent developments should provide the Philippines with some useful insights in order to move forward and support its strategic interests.
Caught in the crossfire
The Philippines is located in the First Island Chain between the South China Sea and the Western Pacific while Guam and Palau are geographically proximate to the Philippines. All of which traditionally sit within the ambit of American influence.
China’s rise to power has clashed with US interests as it has sought to push it back and into the Eastern Pacific. This power play continues to roll downhill and was not helped by the 2017 withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership which merely served to encourage China to fill the vacuum. China is effectively pressuring weaker littoral South China Sea states into submission by repudiating international law and the use of Gray Zone Operations and the construction of man-made structures and islands.
Moreover, it remains uncertain as to how an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct would level up the power dynamics between relatively weaker ASEAN states and an ever stronger China. The Code of Conduct is likely only to serve to legitimise China’s dominance in the South China Sea as regional states lack genuine leverage around the negotiating table.
President Rodrigo Duterte’s independent foreign policy which on one level sought to balance both the US and China, at its core, appeared to appease Beijing by setting aside the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling and accept Chinese investment. The presence of Chinese 5G technology in military camps and at airport construction sites (near military camps) have led to security concerns.
Duterte has shown contempt for the Philippines' security alliance with the US due to the latter’s human rights criticism of the former’s domestic policy. Despite this, the Philippines has shown it is not prepared to discard its alliance with the US anytime soon. Instead, Duterte’s foreign and defence secretaries demonstrated their resolve to ensure the security alliance remains key to future policies. These efforts have involved suspending the planned termination of the 1997 Visiting Forces Agreement, firm agreement to a US-led rules-based order in the region, and US support in the event of armed Philippine-China naval conflict in the South China Sea. In a rare stance, the Philippines recently acknowledged the 2016 arbitral tribunal award at both the national and United Nations levels.
Yet, China remains firmly positioned on the Philippines doorstep and (as usual) Beijing continues to repudiate the 2016 tribunal award. It also insisted on getting its way during its defence minister’s recent visit to Manila as part of its reset-relations tour in Southeast Asia where it merely produced a toned-down joint statement in relation to COVID-19 assistance and military cooperation. Not surprisingly, Duterte expressed a will to set aside the tribunal ruling after his UN speech.
The lack of consistent guidance, statecraft and the simple reality that time is not on the Philippines side means it remains increasingly vulnerable to great power competition. With Duterte’s term scheduled to end in 2022, China is in a position to raise the stakes and ensure the next president approaches relations in a friendly manner, particularly with regards to their interests. Furthermore, the issue of election interference remains a concern.
The way forward
In reviewing the geo-strategic picture, the United States is increasingly likely to develop contingency plans to manage a prolonged security competition with China (rather than an exodus). Unfortunately, for the Philippines, it could easily become a battleground for a US-China conflict should the situation intensify. The US is unlikely to wait for its Filipino ally to contribute toward the rules-based order.
In light of a US presence in Palau and Guam (soon to play home to missile defence) its possible the Philippines could lose credibility as an ally. The tragedy of geography means that friction is inescapable for the Philippines. Hence, Manila needs a course of action to engage Palau and Guam. It should, therefore, enhance its channels of communication with them in relation to maritime security, logistical capabilities, and military cooperation in order to fortify itself against what could be significant friction between two great powers.
Current electoral polls show there is a Filipino appetite to stand up to China. However, the question remains — how long are they willing to take that risk in political, economic, legal, and military terms. With regards to military modernisation, the next leadership should prioritise congressional funding geared toward conflict as a means to absorb the shocks of a worsening geopolitical storm. The Filipino people face a simple but difficult choice — choose sides between a false sense of peace or an uncomfortable struggle for order.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author Biography
Joshua Bernard B. Espeña is a Manila-based defence analyst who works and writes on topics and issues about the Great Power politics of the Indo-Pacific, Philippine Strategic Culture, and ASEAN Studies. He is currently pursuing his master’s degree in International Studies at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. Image: Flickr/Republic of Korea
Disclaimer: The opinions in this article do not reflect the views of his affiliated office, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the Philippine Government. All opinions expressed in this article are entirely the author’s and are offered for the purpose of academic debate only.