Is the Quad pushing India’s increasing engagements with Taiwan?
Is the Quad pushing India’s increasing engagements with Taiwan?
WRITTEN BY NIRANJAN MARJANI
27 October 2020
After years of resisting Taiwanese requests, India may be about to change its stance and consider formal trade talks. New Delhi’s decision to grant incentives worth $6.65 billion to 16 Taiwanese firms earlier this month could be an important precursor to a trade deal between the two sides.
The prospect of closer ties takes place at a time when India’s conviction about the strategic value of the Quad seems to be solidifying, it is therefore worth considering these developments in tandem.
India and the Quad
India has approached the Quad and Taiwan along similar lines, and, in both cases, it has remained mindful of China’s objections and broader sensitivity. However, not only has there been little sign of improvement in India-China relations but, the past six months has seen a significant deterioration in bilateral ties due to the now widely reported bloody exchange in the Himalayas. India’s approach towards China has, therefore, been shifting in a slow and nuanced manner.
It should be noted that it has taken India more than a decade before it has been prepared to approach the Quad with its current level of enthusiasm. The concept of the Quad was first proposed in 2007 by then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, and, that same year, the four proposed members participated in the Malabar Naval Exercise. Having started as a bilateral exercise between India and the US in 1992, it has been held annually since 2002, with Japan joining as a permanent partner in 2015.
Since the border conflict in May this year, India has chosen to be both, more assertive, and less interested in Beijing’s many sensitivities. While the Quad is expected to be a strategic deterrent to China, Taiwan could prove to be an important economic counterbalance.
While Australia participated in the 2007 Malabar Exercise, it chose to walk out the following year. During Kevin Rudd’s premiership, Australia moved notably closer to China and away from the United States and India. Relations between India and Australia have (only in recent years) started to gain momentum following the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Despite Australia’s decision to keep its distance from the Malabar Exercise for well over a decade, earlier this month, it was invited to participate by India.
Efforts to revive the Quad only started in 2017 when officials from all four countries met in Manila on the sidelines of an ASEAN Summit, and, it should be noted, the participation of each member in next month’s Malabar Exercise could be an important step towards formalising the Quad.
India and Taiwan
India-Taiwan relations have followed a similar trajectory. Taiwan is represented in India through the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre while India is represented in Taiwan through the India-Taipei Association. However, India does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state, therefore, formal diplomatic relations do not exist between them.
Taiwan is strategically located in the Indo-Pacific region and could therefore emerge as an important part of India’s economic response to China. In recent months, India has blocked direct FDI from China and also banned more than 200 Chinese apps (tellingly) citing security concerns. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in veiled references to China, stressed the need to diversify Indian pattern’s of consumption in order to reduce its dependency on China.
With business reviewing its future in China, India could well become a favoured destination. New Delhi’s decision to consider formal trade talks with Taiwan would provide an enormous boost to bilateral relations. This possibility comes at a time when India has reduced its trade deficit with China by 50 per cent. Conversely, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) has seen it move to reduce its own dependence on China, thus, there is much scope for greater economic cooperation between the two sides.
A long way to go
India-Taiwan relations still have a long way to go, particularly as India (officially) recognises the People’s Republic of China and, since 1950, has assiduously followed the One China policy. Nevertheless, there are some indications New Delhi may be reconsidering this stance. The recent warming of relations between India and Taiwan has not taken place exclusively at the government level with public sentiment in India tilting in favour of Taiwan. Unsurprisingly this is likely fuelled by India’s recent dispute(s) with China. While Taiwan has sought to reach out at a governmental level, India’s response has largely come through its citizens and media.
India’s approach toward the Quad and Taiwan indicate it is looking to diversify its response to the challenge posed by Beijing. During the recent conflict in the Himalayas, India consistently called for peaceful solutions based on dialogue and negotiation, and, even as tensions soared, military officers from both sides regularly engaged in dialogue. Despite this, discouraging responses from China have forced India to explore other options.
India’s increasingly positive response toward the Quad stems from two crucial factors. The first, an impression that it held concerns about the Quad as a military alliance (dubbed the Asian NATO) — leading to a reluctance to participate. The other, summed up by India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar in that renewed interest in the Quad merely reflects how the world has moved from the Cold War toward an era of multilateralism.
The Quad members are expected to work together on maritime security, connectivity, supply chains, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In coming together as four democratic nations, the Quad also points towards further democratisation of the Indo-Pacific region in the face of Communist China’s expansion.
India’s relationship with Australia remains another crucial factor. Bilateral ties were only revived in 2014 when Narendra Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Australia in 28 years. Despite the significant boost this provided, an invitation to participate in the Malabar Exercise still took several years owing to fears that Beijing would take offence.
Subtle hints
India’s relations with Taiwan may follow a similar trajectory. While both exist as thriving democracies, India-Taiwan relations would require time to develop — mirroring New Delhi’s approach to the Quad. However in the past year, just as the Quad has seen acceleration, there are subtle hints from the Indian government about Taiwan too. Following the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen in May this year, two members of the ruling BJP attended the swearing-in ceremony (albeit virtually) due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
India has increased its military presence in Ladakh to meet the strategic challenge China presents, in addition, it has also undertaken a series of economic measures. Since the border conflict in May this year, India has chosen to be both, more assertive, and less interested in Beijing’s many sensitivities. While the Quad is expected to be a strategic deterrent to China, Taiwan could prove to be an important economic counterbalance.
Furthermore, New Delhi recently mandated that China-based Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) seek government approval before investing in India. Significantly, Taiwan has been exempted from this rule. Not only does this highlight yet closer economic ties but also, pointedly, a challenge to the One China Policy. Unsurprisingly, in recent months Taiwanese firms have sought to invest in India in order to reduce their dependence on China. In exploring deeper ties with the Quad and Taiwan, India is finally moving out of its foreign policy comfort zone.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Niranjan Marjani is an independent journalist and researcher based in Vadodara. His areas of interest are India’s foreign policy, international relations and geopolitics. He writes articles for various national and international publications. His articles mostly focus on the strategic angle of international politics. Image Credit: Flickr/US State Department