Suga Yoshihide and Japan’s foreign policy: What to expect?
Suga Yoshihide and Japan’s Foreign Policy: What to Expect?
WRITTEN BY FELIX KUHN
15 September 2020
Abe Shinzo, Japan’s long-ruling prime minister, has left the stage; his anointed successor is Suga Yoshihide, the former chief cabinet secretary. As others have pointed out, in the election to succeed Abe, held among members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Suga was widely seen as the continuity candidate. What does this mean for Japan’s foreign policy? A look at a pamphlet that Suga disseminated before the election can give us some idea. Though it is short on detail, it clearly points out what Suga considers the central aspects of Japan’s foreign policy and the major issues it faces.
Continuity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Suga is unequivocal in calling the Japan-United States alliance the “foundation” of Japanese foreign policy. In this, he will face little opposition from his own party or beyond. Indeed, this is one of the elements of Japanese foreign policy that all three candidates for the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party agreed on.
Suga promises to continue a central feature of Abe’s foreign policy: pursuing a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, which envisions cooperation among like-minded countries in promoting freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the region, among other aspects. However, for some in the LDP, this strategy is not ambitious enough. Thus, he faced some pushback from one of the other contenders for the leadership of the LDP, Ishiba Shigeru, a former defence minister, who made the case for the establishment of an Asian version of NATO. Suga rejected this idea in a televised debate before the election, arguing, with reference to China, that “an Asian NATO would risk dividing the region between allies and enemies”.
Walking the tightrope on China
Following in the footsteps of Abe, Suga is likely to try to strike a balance between cooperation among the like-minded and engaging China, the country against which this cooperation is directed. As Suga writes in his pamphlet, next to the free and open Indo-Pacific, he wants to “build a stable relationship with neighbouring countries beginning with China”. It is thus not surprising that China has welcomed his election. However, this aspect of Suga’s foreign policy is likely to face the greatest pressure domestically.
A policy that will find much greater favour among LDP hardliners is Suga’s promise in his election pamphlet to revise the constitution, which would include a clear statement on Japan’s right to hold military forces. This has long been a dream of more right-wing politicians.
Negative perceptions of China are widespread among Japanese politicians. This does not only include the current Defence Minister Kono Taro, who recently called China a “security threat to Japan”, but also the chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, who has criticised the new national security law passed in Hong Kong. While Suga can mostly ignore opposition figures, he at least has to listen to those in his own party who call for stronger measures against China. One issue will be the state visit of China’s leader Xi Jinping. In July, Abe faced calls from LDP lawmakers to cancel this visit, which was planned for earlier this year but had to be postponed due to COVID-19. How Suga will deal with this issue is not yet clear. But if he is serious about engagement with China, he will have to find some way to meet his Chinese counterpart.
The conflict over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by China) is another point of contention. In the face of Chinese incursions into the waters of the islands, Suga recently reiterated the government’s stance that there is no territorial conflict since the islands unambiguously belong to Japan, further telling the assembled reporters that the situation around the islands was “deeply worrying”. He has thus taken a firm stance on this issue. However, he faces a group of LDP lawmakers who have banded together to push for even more forceful policies in defence of Japanese sovereignty. Suga’s difficult task will be to reconcile these more hawkish impulses in his party with his desire not to antagonise China.
National security and domestic politics
North Korea also finds mention in Suga’s pamphlet; more precisely, he promises to put all his effort into finding a solution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean state. In this, he will face little headwind. For instance, Kishida Fumio, a former foreign minister and another contender for the position of prime minister, also stressed this issue in his election platform. Ishiba, the other former contender, went even further in his short election manifesto by calling North Korea a “realistic threat”, further noting the importance of missile defence. Abe also shortly before the election pointed to North Korea to make the case for a new missile defence strategy; he has left this issue for his successor.
A policy that will find much greater favour among LDP hardliners is Suga’s promise in his election pamphlet to revise the constitution, which would include a clear statement on Japan’s right to hold military forces. This has long been a dream of more right-wing politicians. However, even Abe failed to make much headway during his long reign; it is not clear that Suga can succeed where Abe did not.
After alluding to “emergencies”, such as natural disasters, which he promises to deal with quickly, Suga ends the foreign policy section of his pamphlet by pledging to fight against climate change and for a stable supply of energy. Japanese politicians certainly put a premium on ensuring stable energy supply, but how serious Suga will be in tackling climate change remains to be seen.
Finally, it is important to note that foreign policy is only one of six major issues that Suga discusses in his pamphlet, with COVID-19 and the economy dominating the agenda. It is likely that much of Suga’s attention will initially be taken up by domestic issues rather than foreign policy concerns.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Felix Kuhn is a senior lecturer at the Beijing Foreign Studies University-Keele University Collaborative Programme on Diplomacy in Beijing. Image Credit: MCAS Iwakuni/Flickr.